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Systemic risk is commonly used to describe the possibility of a series of correlated defaults among
financial institutions---typically banks---that occur over a short period of time, often caused by a
single major event. However, since the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, it has
become clear that hedge funds are also involved in systemic risk exposures. The hedge-fund industry
has a symbiotic relationship with the banking sector, and many banks now operate proprietary
trading units that are organized much like hedge funds. As a result, the risk exposures of the hedge-
fund industry may have a material impact on the banking sector, resulting in new sources of systemic
risks. In this paper, we attempt to quantify the potential impact of hedge funds on systemic risk by
developing a number of new risk measures for hedge funds and applying them to individual and
aggregate hedge-fund returns data. These measures include: illiquidity risk exposure, nonlinear factor
models for hedge-fund and banking-sector indexes, logistic regression analysis of hedge-fund
liquidation probabilities, and aggregate measures of volatility and distress based on regime-switching
models. Our preliminary findings suggest that the hedge-fund industry may be heading into a
challenging period of lower expected returns, and that systemic risk is currently on the rise.
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The term \systemic risk" is commonly used to describe the possibility of a series of correlated
defaults among nancial institutions|typically banks|that occurs over a short period of
time, often caused by a single major event. A classic example is a banking panic in which
large groups of depositors decide to withdraw their funds simultaneously, creating a run on
bank assets that can ultimately lead to multiple bank failures. Banking panics were not
uncommon in the U.S. during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, culminating in
the 1930{1933 period with an average of 2,000 bank failures per year during these years
according to Mishkin (1997), and which prompted the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the
establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934.
Although today banking panics are virtually non-existent thanks to the FDIC and related
central banking policies, systemic risk exposures have taken shape in other forms. With the
repeal in 1999 of the Glass-Steagall Act, many banks have now become broad-based nan-
cial institutions engaging in the full spectrum of nancial services including retail banking,
underwriting, investment banking, brokerage services, asset management, venture capital,
and proprietary trading. Accordingly, the risk exposures of such institutions have become
considerably more complex and interdependent, especially in the face of globalization and
the recent wave of consolidations in the banking and nancial services sectors.
In particular, innovations in the banking industry have coincided with the rapid growth
of hedge funds, unregulated and opaque investment partnerships that engage in a variety
of active investment strategies, often yielding double-digit returns and commensurate risks.1
Currently estimated at over $1 trillion in size, the hedge fund industry has a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the banking sector, providing an attractive outlet for bank capital, investment
management services for banking clients, and fees for brokerage services, credit, and other
banking functions. Moreover, many banks now operate proprietary trading units which are
organized much like hedge funds. As a result, the risk exposures of the hedge-fund industry
may have a material impact on the banking sector, resulting in new sources of systemic
risks. And although many hedge funds engage in hedged strategies|where market swings
are partially or completely oset through strategically balanced long and short positions in
various securities|such funds often have other risk exposures such as volatility risk, credit
risk, and liquidity risk. Moreover, many hedge funds are not hedged at all, and also use
1Although hedge funds have avoided regulatory oversight in the past by catering only to \qualied"
investors (investors that meet a certain minimum threshold in terms of net worth and investment experience)
and refraining from advertising to the general public, a recent ruling by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Rule 203(b)(3){2) will require most hedge funds to register as investment advisers under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 by February 1, 2006.
1leverage to enhance their returns and, consequently, their risks.
In this paper, we attempt to quantify the potential impact of hedge funds on systemic risk
by developing a number of new risk measures for hedge-fund investments and applying them
to individual and aggregate hedge-fund returns data. We argue that the risk/reward prole
for most alternative investments dier in important ways from more traditional investments,
and such dierences may have potentially important implications for systemic risk, as we
experienced during the aftermath of the default of Russian government debt in August 1998
when Long Term Capital Management and many other hedge funds suered catastrophic
losses over the course of a few weeks, creating signicant stress on the global nancial system
and a number of substantial nancial institutions. Two major themes emerged from that
set of events: the importance of liquidity and leverage, and the capriciousness of correlations
among instruments and portfolios that are supposedly uncorrelated. These are the two main
themes of this study, and both are intimately related to the dynamic nature of hedge-fund
investment strategies and risk exposures.
One of the justications for the unusually rich fee structures that characterize hedge-fund
investments is the fact that hedge funds are active strategies involving highly skilled portfolio
managers. Moreover, it is common wisdom that the most talented managers are drawn rst
to the hedge-fund industry because the absence of regulatory constraints enables them to
make the most of their investment acumen. With the freedom to trade as much or as little
as they like on any given day, to go long or short any number of securities and with varying
degrees of leverage, and to change investment strategies at a moment's notice, hedge-fund
managers enjoy enormous 
exibility and discretion in pursuing performance. But dynamic
investment strategies imply dynamic risk exposures, and while modern nancial economics
has much to say about the risk of static investments|the market beta is sucient in this
case|there is currently no single measure of the risks of a dynamic investment strategy.2
These challenges have important implications for both managers and investors since both
parties seek to manage the risk/reward trade-os of their investments. Consider, for example,
the now-standard approach to constructing an optimal portfolio in the mean-variance sense:
Maxf!igE[U(W1)] (1)








2For this reason, hedge-fund track records are often summarized with multiple statistics, e.g., mean,
standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, market beta, Sortino ratio, maximum drawdown, worst month, etc.
2where Ri is the return of security i between this period and the next, W1 is the indi-
vidual's next period's wealth (which is determined by the product of the fRig with the
portfolio weights f!ig), and U() is the individual's utility function. By assuming that U()
is quadratic, or by assuming that individual security returns Ri are normally distributed
random variables, it can be shown that maximizing the individual's expected utility is tan-
tamount to constructing a mean-variance optimal portfolio !.3
It is one of the great lessons of modern nance that mean-variance optimization yields
benets through diversication, the ability to lower volatility for a given level of expected
return by combining securities that are not perfectly correlated. But what if the securities
are hedge funds, and what if their correlations change over time, as hedge funds tend to do
(see Section 3.1)?4 Table 1 shows that for the two-asset case with xed means of 5% and 30%,
respectively, and xed standard deviations of 20% and 30%, respectively, as the correlation
 between the two assets varies from  90% to 70%, the optimal portfolio weights|and
the properties of the optimal portfolio|change dramatically. For example, with a  30%
correlation between the two funds, the optimal portfolio holds 38:6% in the rst fund and
61:4% in the second, yielding a Sharpe ratio of 1.01. But if the correlation changes to 10%,
the optimal weights change to 5:2% in the rst fund and 94:8% in the second, despite the
fact that the Sharpe ratio of this new portfolio, 0.92, is virtually identical to the previous
portfolio's Sharpe ratio. The mean-variance-ecient frontiers are plotted in Figure 1 for
three values of the correlation coecient between the two funds ( 50%, 0%, and 50%), and
it is apparent that the optimal portfolio depends heavily on this correlation. For example,
as the correlation between the two assets changes from 0% to  50%, the optimal portfolio
changes from A to B, which are two very dierent portfolios. Because of the dynamic nature
of hedge-fund strategies, their correlations are particularly unstable through time and over
varying market conditions as we shall see in Section 1.2, and swings from  30% to 30% are
not unusual.
Table 1 shows that as the correlation between the two assets increases, the optimal
weight for asset 1 eventually becomes negative, which makes intuitive sense from a hedging
perspective even if it is unrealistic for hedge-fund investments and other assets that cannot
be shorted. Note that for correlations of 80% and greater, the optimization approach does
not yield a well-dened solution because a mean-variance-ecient tangency portfolio does
not exist for the parameter values we hypothesized for the two assets. However, numerical
3See, for example, Ingersoll (1987).
4Several authors have considered mean-variance optimization techniques for determining hedge-fund al-
locations, with varying degrees of success and skepticism. See, in particular, Amenc and Martinelli (2002),
Amin and Kat (2003c), Terhaar, Staub, and Singer (2003), and Cremers, Kritzman, and Page (2004).
3Mean-Variance Optimal Portfolios
For Two-Asset Case
(1;1) = (5%;20%), (2;2) = (30%;30%), Rf = 2:5%
 E[R] SD[R] Sharpe !
1 !
2
 90 15:5 5:5 2:36 58:1 41:9
 80 16:0 8:0 1:70 55:9 44:1
 70 16:7 10:0 1:41 53:4 46:6
 60 17:4 11:9 1:25 50:5 49:5
 50 18:2 13:8 1:14 47:2 52:8
 40 19:2 15:7 1:06 43:3 56:7
 30 20:3 17:7 1:01 38:6 61:4
 20 21:8 19:9 0:97 32:9 67:1
 10 23:5 22:3 0:94 25:9 74:1
0 25:8 25:1 0:93 17:0 83:0
10 28:7 28:6 0:92 5:2 94:8
20 32:7 32:9 0:92  10:9 110:9
30 38:6 38:8 0:93  34:4 134:4
40 48:0 47:7 0:95  71:9 171:9
50 65:3 63:2 0:99  141:2 241:2
60 108:1 99:6 1:06  312:2 412:2
70 387:7 329:9 1:17  1430:8 1530:8
Table 1: Mean-variance optimal portfolio weights for the two-asset case with xed means
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Figure 1: Mean-variance ecient frontiers for the two-asset case with parameters (1;1) =
(5%;20%), (2;2) = (30%;30%), and correlation = 50%;0%;50%.
5optimization procedures may still yield a specic portfolio for this case, e.g., a portfolio on
the lower branch of the mean-variance parabola, even if it is not optimal. This example
underscores the importance of modeling means, standard deviations, and correlations in a
consistent manner when accounting for changes in market conditions and statistical regimes,
otherwise degenerate or nonsensical \solutions" may arise.
To illustrate the challenges and opportunities in modeling the risk exposures of hedge
funds, we provide two concrete examples in this section. In Section 1.1, we present a hy-
pothetical hedge-fund strategy that yields remarkable returns with seemingly little risk, yet
a closer examination will reveal quite a dierent story. And in Section 1.2, we show that
correlation analysis may not be able capture certain risk exposures that are particularly
relevant for hedge-fund investments.
These examples provide an introduction to the analysis in Sections 3{7, and serve as
motivation for developing new quantitative methods for capturing the impact of hedge funds
on systemic risk. In Section 3, we summarize the empirical properties of aggregate and
individual hedge fund data used in this study, the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes and
the TASS individual hedge-fund database. In Section 4, we turn to the issue of liquidity|one
of the central aspects of systemic risk|and present several measures for gauging illiquidity
exposure in hedge funds and other asset classes, and apply them to individual and index
data. Since systemic risk is directly related to hedge-fund failures, in Section 5 we investigate
attrition rates of hedge funds in the TASS database and present a logit analysis that yields
estimates of a fund's probability of liquidation as a function of various fund characteristics
such as return history, assets under management, and recent fund 
ows. In Section 6, we
present three other approaches to measuring systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry: risk
models for hedge-fund indexes, regression models relating the banking sector to hedge funds,
and regime-switching models applied to hedge-fund indexes. These three approaches yield
distinct insights regarding the risks posed by the hedge-fund industry, and we conclude
in Section 7 by discussing the current outlook for the hedge-fund industry based on the
analytics and empirical results of this study. Our tentative inferences suggest that the
hedge-fund industry may be heading into a challenging period of lower expected returns,
and that systemic risk has been increasing steadily over the recent past.
1.1 Tail Risk
Consider the 8-year track record of a hypothetical hedge fund, Capital Decimation Partners,
LP, summarized in Table 2. This track record was obtained by applying a specic investment
strategy, to be revealed below, to actual market prices from January 1992 to December 1999.
6Before discussing the particular strategy that generated these results, let us consider its
overall performance: an average monthly return of 3.7% versus 1.4% for the S&P 500 during
the same period; a total return of 2;721:3% over the 8-year period versus 367:1% for the S&P
500; a Sharpe ratio of 1.94 versus 0.98 for the S&P 500; and only 6 negative monthly returns
out of 96 versus 36 out of 96 for the S&P 500. In fact, the monthly performance history|
displayed in Table 3|shows that, as with many other hedge funds, the worst months for
this fund were August and September of 1998. Yet October and November 1998 were the
fund's two best months, and for 1998 as a whole the fund was up 87.3% versus 24.5% for the
S&P 500! By all accounts, this is an enormously successful hedge fund with a track record
that would be the envy of most managers.5 What is its secret?
Capital Decimation Partners, L.P.
Performance Summary, January 1992 to December 1999
Statistic S&P 500 CDP
Monthly Mean 1:4% 3:7%
Monthly Std. Dev. 3:6% 5:8%
Min Month  8:9%  18:3%
Max Month 14:0% 27:0%
Annual Sharpe Ratio 0.98 1.94
# Negative Months 36/96 6/96
Correlation with S&P 500 100:0% 59:9%
Total Return 367:1% 2721:3%
Table 2: Summary of simulated performance of a particular dynamic trading strategy using
monthly historical market prices from January 1992 to December 1999.
The investment strategy summarized in Tables 2 and 3 consists of shorting out-of-the-
money S&P 500 (SPX) put options on each monthly expiration date for maturities less than
or equal to three months, and with strikes approximately 7% out of the money. The num-
ber of contracts sold each month is determined by the combination of: (1) CBOE margin
5In fact, as a mental exercise to check your own risk preferences, take a hard look at the monthly returns
in Table 3 and ask yourself whether you would invest in such a fund.
7requirements;6 (2) an assumption that we are required to post 66% of the margin as collat-
eral;7 and (3) $10M of initial risk capital. For concreteness, Table 4 reports the positions
and prot/loss statement for this strategy for 1992. See Lo (2001) for further details of this
strategy.
The track record in Tables 2 and 3 seems much less impressive in light of the simple
strategy on which it is based, and few investors would pay hedge-fund-type fees for such a
fund. However, given the secrecy surrounding most hedge-fund strategies, and the broad
discretion that managers are given by the typical hedge-fund oering memorandum, it is
dicult for investors to detect this type of behavior without resorting to more sophisticated
risk analytics that can capture dynamic risk exposures.
6The margin required per contract is assumed to be:
100  f15%  (current level of the SPX)   (put premium)   (amount out of the money)g
where the amount out of the money is equal to the current level of the SPX minus the strike price of the
put.
7This gure varies from broker to broker, and is meant to be a rather conservative estimate that might
apply to a $10M startup hedge fund with no prior track record.
8Capital Decimation Partners, L.P.
Monthly Performance History
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Month
SPX CDP SPX CDP SPX CDP SPX CDP SPX CDP SPX CDP SPX CDP SPX CDP
Jan 8:2 8:1  1:2 1:8 1:8 2:3 1:3 3:7  0:7 1:0 3:6 4:4 1:6 15:3 5:5 10:1
Feb  1:8 9:3  0:4 1:0  1:5 0:7 3:9 0:7 5:9 1:2 3:3 6:0 7:6 11:7  0:3 16:6
Mar 0:0 4:9 3:7 3:6 0:7 2:2 2:7 1:9  1:0 0:6  2:2 3:0 6:3 6:7 4:8 10:0
Apr 1:2 3:2  0:3 1:6  5:3  0:1 2:6 2:4 0:6 3:0  2:3 2:8 2:1 3:5 1:5 7:2
May  1:4 1:3  0:7 1:3 2:0 5:5 2:1 1:6 3:7 4:0 8:3 5:7  1:2 5:8 0:9 7:2
Jun  1:6 0:6  0:5 1:7 0:8 1:5 5:0 1:8  0:3 2:0 8:3 4:9  0:7 3:9 0:9 8:6
Jul 3:0 1:9 0:5 1:9  0:9 0:4 1:5 1:6  4:2 0:3 1:8 5:5 7:8 7:5 5:7 6:1
Aug  0:2 1:7 2:3 1:4 2:1 2:9 1:0 1:2 4:1 3:2  1:6 2:6  8:9  18:3  5:8  3:1
Sep 1:9 2:0 0:6 0:8 1:6 0:8 4:3 1:3 3:3 3:4 5:5 11:5  5:7  16:2  0:1 8:3
Oct  2:6  2:8 2:3 3:0  1:3 0:9 0:3 1:1 3:5 2:2  0:7 5:6 3:6 27:0  6:6  10:7
Nov 3:6 8:5  1:5 0:6  0:7 2:7 2:6 1:4 3:8 3:0 2:0 4:6 10:1 22:8 14:0 14:5
Dec 3:4 1:2 0:8 2:9  0:6 10:0 2:7 1:5 1:5 2:0  1:7 6:7 1:3 4:3  0:1 2:4
Year 14:0 46:9 5:7 23:7  1:6 33:6 34:3 22:1 21:5 28:9 26:4 84:8 24:5 87:3 20:6 105:7
Table 3: Simulated performance history of a particular dynamic trading strategy using monthly historical market prices from
January 1992 to December 1999.
9Some might argue that this example illustrates the need for position transparency|
after all, it would be apparent from the positions in Table 4 that the manager of Capital
Decimation Partners is providing little or no value-added. However, there are many ways of
implementing this strategy that are not nearly so transparent, even when positions are fully
disclosed. For example, Table 5 reports the weekly positions over a six-month period in one
of 500 securities contained in a second hypothetical fund, Capital Decimation Partners II.
Casual inspection of the positions of this one security seem to suggest a contrarian trading
strategy: when the price declines, the position in XYZ is increased, and when the price
advances, the position is reduced. A more careful analysis of the stock and cash positions
and the varying degree of leverage in Table 5 reveals that these trades constitute a so-called
\delta-hedging" strategy, designed to synthetically replicate a short position in a 2-year
European put option on 10,000,000 shares of XYZ with a strike price of $25 (recall that
XYZ's initial stock price is $40, hence this is a deep out-of-the-money put).
Shorting deep out-of-the-money puts is a well-known artice employed by unscrupulous
hedge-fund managers to build an impressive track record quickly, and most sophisticated
investors are able to avoid such chicanery. However, imagine an investor presented with
position reports such as Table 5, but for 500 securities, not just one, as well as a corresponding
track record that is likely to be even more impressive than that of Capital Decimation
Partners, LP.8 Without additional analysis that explicitly accounts for the dynamic aspects
of the trading strategy described in Table 5, it is dicult for an investor to fully appreciate
the risks inherent in such a fund.
In particular, static methods such as traditional mean-variance analysis cannot capture
the risks of dynamic trading strategies like Capital Decimation Partners (note the impressive
Sharpe ratio in Table 2). In the case of the strategy of shorting out-of-the-money put options
on the S&P 500, returns are positive most of the time and losses are infrequent, but when
they occur, they are extreme. This is a very specic type of risk signature that is not
well-summarized by static measures such as standard deviation. In fact, the estimated
standard deviations of such strategies tend to be rather low, hence a naive application of
mean-variance analysis such as risk-budgeting|an increasingly popular method used by
institutions to make allocations based on risk units|can lead to unusually large allocations
to funds like Capital Decimation Partners. The fact that total position transparency does
not imply risk transparency is further cause for concern.
This is not to say that the risks of shorting out-of-the-money puts are inappropriate for all
8A portfolio of options is worth more than an option on the portfolio, hence shorting 500 puts on the
individual stocks that constitute the SPX will yield substantially higher premiums than shorting puts on the
index.
10Capital Decimation Partners, LP
Positions and Profit/Loss For 1992
S&P 500 # Puts Strike Price Expiration
Margin 
Required Profits






12/20/91 387.04 new 2300 360 4.625 Mar-92 $6,069,930 $10,000,000 $6,024,096
1/17/92 418.86 mark to market 2300 360 1.125 Mar-92 $654,120 $805,000 $10,805,000 $6,509,036 8.1%
418.86 new 1950 390 3.250 Mar-92 $5,990,205
Total Margin $6,644,325
2/21/92 411.46 mark to market 2300 360 0.250 Mar-92 $2,302,070 $690,000
411.46 mark to market 1950 390 1.625 Mar-92 $7,533,630 $316,875 $11,811,875 $7,115,587 9.3%
411.46 liquidate 1950 390 1.625 Mar-92 $0 $0 $11,811,875 $7,115,587
411.46 new 1246 390 1.625 Mar-92 $4,813,796
Total Margin $7,115,866
3/20/92 411.30 expired 2300 360 0.000 Mar-92 $0 $373,750
411.30 expired 1246 390 0.000 Mar-92 $0 $202,475
411.30 new 2650 380 2.000 May-92 $7,524,675   $12,388,100 $7,462,711 4.9%
Total Margin $7,524,675
4/19/92 416.05 mark to market 2650 380 0.500 May-92 $6,852,238 $397,500
416.05 new 340 385 2.438 Jun-92 $983,280 $12,785,600 $7,702,169 3.2%
Total Margin $7,835,518
5/15/92 410.09 expired 2650 380 0.000 May-92 $0 $132,500
410.09 mark to market 340 385 1.500 Jun-92 $1,187,399 $31,875
410.09 new 2200 380 1.250 Jul-92 $6,638,170 $12,949,975 $7,801,190 1.3%
Total Margin $7,825,569
6/19/92 403.67 expired 340 385 0.000 Jun-92 $0 $51,000
403.67 mark to market 2200 380 1.125 Jul-92 $7,866,210 $27,500 $13,028,475 $7,848,479 0.6%
Total Margin $7,866,210
7/17/92 415.62 expired 2200 380 0.000 Jul-92 $0 $247,500
415.62 new 2700 385 1.8125 Sep-92 $8,075,835   $13,275,975 $7,997,575 1.9%
Total Margin $8,075,835
8/21/92 414.85 mark to market 2700 385 1 Sep-92 $8,471,925 $219,375 $13,495,350 $8,129,729 1.7%
Total Margin $8,471,925
9/18/92 422.92 expired 2700 385 0 Sep-92 $0 $270,000 $13,765,350 $8,292,380 2.0%
422.92 new 2370 400 5.375 Dec-92 $8,328,891
Total Margin $8,328,891
10/16/92 411.73 mark to market 2370 400 7 Dec-92 $10,197,992 ($385,125)
411.73 liquidate 2370 400 7 Dec-92 $0 $0 $13,380,225 $8,060,377 -2.8%
411.73 new 1873 400 7 Dec-92 $8,059,425
Total Margin $8,059,425
11/20/92 426.65 mark to market 1873 400 0.9375 Dec-92 $6,819,593 $1,135,506 $14,515,731 $8,744,416 8.5%
426.65 new 529 400 0.9375 Dec-92 $1,926,089
Total Margin $8,745,682
12/18/92 441.20 expired 1873 400 0 Dec-92 $0 $175,594 $14,691,325 $8,850,196 1.2%
1992 Total Return: 46.9%
Table 4: Simulated positions and prot/loss statement for 1992 for a trading strategy that
consists of shorting out-of-the-money put options on the S&P 500 once a month.
11investors|indeed, the thriving catastrophe reinsurance industry makes a market in precisely
this type of risk, often called \tail risk". However, such insurers do so with full knowledge
of the loss prole and probabilities for each type of catastrophe, and they set their capital
reserves and risk budgets accordingly. The same should hold true for institutional investors
of hedge funds, but the standard tools and lexicon of the industry currently provide only an
incomplete characterization of such risks. The need for a new set of dynamic risk analytics
specically targeted for hedge-fund investments is clear.
Capital Decimation Partners II, L.P.
Weekly Positions in XYZ
Week Pt Position Value Financing
t ($) (Shares) ($) ($)
0 40:000 7;057 282;281  296;974
1 39:875 7;240 288;712  304;585
2 40:250 5;850 235;456  248;918
3 36:500 33;013 1;204;981  1;240;629
4 36:875 27;128 1;000;356  1;024;865
5 36:500 31;510 1;150;101  1;185;809
6 37:000 24;320 899;841  920;981
7 39:875 5;843 232;970  185;111
8 39:875 5;621 224;153  176;479
9 40:125 4;762 191;062  142;159
10 39:500 6;280 248;065  202;280
11 41:250 2;441 100;711  44;138
12 40:625 3;230 131;205  76;202
13 39:875 4;572 182;300  129;796
14 39:375 5;690 224;035  173;947
15 39:625 4;774 189;170  137;834
16 39:750 4;267 169;609  117;814
17 39:250 5;333 209;312  159;768
18 39:500 4;447 175;657  124;940
19 39:750 3;692 146;777  95;073
20 39:750 3;510 139;526  87;917
21 39:875 3;106 123;832  71;872
22 39:625 3;392 134;408  83;296
23 39:875 2;783 110;986  59;109
24 40:000 2;445 97;782  45;617
25 40:125 2;140 85;870  33;445
Table 5: Simulated weekly positions in XYZ for a particular trading strategy over a six-
month period.
121.2 Phase-Locking Risk
One of the most compelling reasons for investing in hedge funds is the fact that their returns
seem relatively uncorrelated with market indexes such as the S&P 500, and modern portfolio
theory has convinced even the most hardened skeptic of the benets of diversication (see,
for example, the correlations between hedge-fund indexes and the S&P 500 in Table 7 below).
However, the diversication argument for hedge funds must be tempered by the lessons of
the summer of 1998 when the default in Russian government debt triggered a global 
ight to
quality that changed many of these correlations overnight from 0 to 1. In the physical and
natural sciences, such phenomena are examples of \phase-locking" behavior, situations in
which otherwise uncorrelated actions suddenly become synchronized.9 The fact that market
conditions can create phase-locking behavior is certainly not new|market crashes have been
with us since the beginning of organized nancial markets|but prior to 1998, few hedge-
fund investors and managers incorporated this possibility into their investment processes in
any systematic fashion.
From a nancial-engineering perspective, the most reliable way to capture phase-locking
eects is to estimate a risk model for returns in which such events are explicitly allowed. For
example, suppose returns are generated by the following two-factor model:
Rit = i + it + ItZt + it (3)
and assume that t, It, Zt, and it are mutually independently and identically distributed
(IID) with the following moments:
E[t] =  ; Var[t] = 2

E[Zt] = 0 ; Var[Zt] = 2
z
E[it] = 0 ; Var[it] = 2
i
(4)





1 with probability p
0 with probability 1   p
: (5)
9One of the most striking examples of phase-locking behavior is the automatic synchronization of the

ickering of Southeast Asian re
ies. See Strogatz (1994) for a description of this remarkable phenomenon
as well as an excellent review of phase-locking behavior in biological systems.
13According to (3), expected returns are the sum of three components: the fund's alpha, i,
a \market" component, t, to which each fund has its own individual sensitivity, i, and a
phase-locking component that is identical across all funds at all times, taking only one of two
possible values, either 0 (with probability p) or Zt (with probability 1 p). If we assume that
p is small, say 0:001, then most of the time the expected returns of fund i are determined by
i+it, but every once in a while an additional term Zt appears. If the volatility z of Zt
is much larger than the volatilities of the market factor, t, and the idiosyncratic risk, it,
then the common factor Zt will dominate the expected returns of all stocks when It=1, i.e.,
phase-locking behavior.
More formally, consider the conditional correlation coecient of two funds i and j, dened
as the ratio of the conditional covariance divided by the square root of the product of the
conditional variances, conditioned on It=0:













 0 for i  j  0 (7)
where we have assumed that i  j  0 to capture the market-neutral characteristic that
































for i  j  0 : (8b)
If 2
z is large relative to 2
i and 2
j, i.e., if the variability of the catastrophe component
dominates the variability of the residuals of both funds|a plausible condition that follows
from the very denition of a catastrophe|then (8) will be approximately equal to 1! When
phase-locking occurs, the correlation between two funds i and j|close to 0 during normal
times|can become arbitrarily close to 1.
An insidious feature of (3) is the fact that it implies a very small value for the uncondi-
tional correlation, which is the quantity most readily estimated and most commonly used in
risk reports, Value-at-Risk calculations, and portfolio decisions. To see why, recall that the
14unconditional correlation coecient is simply the unconditional covariance divided by the























































for i  j  0 : (10b)
If we let p = 0:001 and assume that the variability of the phase-locking component is 10







= 0:001=:101 = 0:0099
or less than 1%. As the variance 2
z of the phase-locking component increases, the uncon-
ditional correlation (10) also increases so that eventually, the existence of Zt will have an
impact. However, to achieve an unconditional correlation coecient of, say, 10%, 2
z would
have to be about 100 times larger than 2
. Without the benet of an explicit risk model
such as (3), it is virtually impossible to detect the existence of a phase-locking component
from standard correlation coecients.
These considerations suggest the need for a more sophisticated analysis of hedge-fund
returns, one that accounts for asymmetries in factor exposures, phase-locking behavior, jump
risk, nonstationarities, and other nonlinearities that are endemic to high-performance active
investment strategies. In particular, nonlinear risk models must be developed for the various
types of securities that hedge funds trade, e.g., equities, xed-income instruments, foreign
exchange, commodities, and derivatives, and for each type of security, the risk model should










The last category involves dependencies between the previous groups of factors, some of which
are nonlinear in nature. For example, credit factors may become more highly correlated with
market factors during economic downturns, and virtually uncorrelated at other times. Often
dicult to detect empirically, these types of dependencies are more readily captured through
economic intuition and practical experience, and should not be overlooked when constructing
a risk model.
Finally, although common factors listed above may serve as a useful starting point for
developing a quantitative model of hedge-fund risk exposures, it should be emphasized that
a certain degree of customization will be required. To see why, consider the following list of
key components of a typical long/short equity hedge fund:
 Investment style (value, growth, etc.)
 Fundamental analysis (earnings, analyst forecasts, accounting data)
 Factor exposures (S&P 500, industries, sectors, characteristics)
 Portfolio optimization (mean-variance analysis, market neutrality)
 Stock loan considerations (hard-to-borrow securities, short \squeezes")
 Execution costs (price impact, commissions, borrowing rate, short rebate)
 Benchmarks and tracking error (T-bill rate vs. S&P 500)
and compare them with a similar list for a typical xed-income hedge fund:
16 Yield-curve models (equilibrium vs. arbitrage models)
 Prepayment models (for mortgage-backed securities)
 Optionality (call, convertible, and put features)
 Credit risk (defaults, rating changes, etc.)
 In
ationary pressures, central bank activity
 Other macroeconomic factors and events
The degree of overlap is astonishingly small. While these dierences are also present among
traditional institutional asset managers, they do not have nearly the latitude that hedge-fund
managers do in their investment activities, hence the dierences are not as consequential for
traditional managers. Therefore, the number of unique hedge-fund risk models may have to
match the number of hedge-fund styles that exist in practice.
2 Literature Review
The explosive growth in the hedge-fund sector over the past several years has generated
a rich literature both in academia and among practitioners, including a number of books,
newsletters, and trade magazines, several hundred published articles, and an entire journal
dedicated solely to this industry (the Journal of Alternative Investments). However, none
of this literature has considered the impact of hedge funds on systemic risk.10 Neverthe-
less, thanks to the availability of hedge-fund returns data from sources such as AltVest,
CISDM, HedgeFund.net, HFR, and TASS, a number of empirical studies have highlighted
the unique risk/reward proles of hedge-fund investments. For example, Ackermann, McE-
nally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Fung and Hsieh (1999, 2000, 2001), Liang (1999, 2000, 2001),
Agarwal and Naik (2000b, 2000c), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Kao (2002), and Amin
and Kat (2003a) provide comprehensive empirical studies of historical hedge-fund perfor-
mance using various hedge-fund databases. Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2000, 2001a,b),
Fung and Hsieh (1997a, 1997b), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Agarwal and
Naik (2000a,d), Brown and Goetzmann (2003), and Locho (2002) present more detailed
performance attribution and \style" analysis for hedge funds.
Several recent empirical studies have challenged the uncorrelatedness of hedge-fund re-
turns with market indexes, arguing that the standard methods of assessing their risks and
rewards may be misleading. For example, Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) show that in sev-
10For example, a literature search among all abstracts in the EconLit database|a comprehensive electronic
collection of the economics literature that includes over 750 journals|in which the two phrases \hedge fund"
and \systemic risk" are specied yields no records.
17eral cases where hedge funds purport to be market neutral, i.e., funds with relatively small
market betas, including both contemporaneous and lagged market returns as regressors and
summing the coecients yields signicantly higher market exposure. Moreover, in deriving
statistical estimators for Sharpe ratios of a sample of mutual and hedge funds, Lo (2002)
proposes a better method for computing annual Sharpe ratios based on monthly means and
standard deviations, yielding point estimates that dier from the naive Sharpe ratio estima-
tor by as much as 70% in his empirical application. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)
focus directly on the unusual degree of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns, and argue
that illiquidity exposure and smoothed returns are the most common sources of such serial
correlation. They also propose methods for estimating the degree of return-smoothing and
adjusting performance statistics like the Sharpe ratio to account for serial correlation.
The persistence of hedge-fund performance over various time intervals has also been
studied by several authors. Such persistence may be indirectly linked to serial correlation,
e.g., persistence in performance usually implies positively autocorrelated returns. Agarwal
and Naik (2000c) examine the persistence of hedge-fund performance over quarterly, half-
yearly, and yearly intervals by examining the series of wins and losses for two, three, and
more consecutive time periods. Using net-of-fee returns, they nd that persistence is highest
at the quarterly horizon and decreases when moving to the yearly horizon. The authors
also nd that performance persistence, whenever present, is unrelated to the type of hedge
fund strategy. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), Ackermann, McEnally, and
Ravenscraft (1999), and Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2004) show that survivorship bias|
the fact that most hedge-fund databases do not contain funds that were unsuccessful and
which went out of business|can aect the rst and second moments and cross-moments
of returns, and generate spurious persistence in performance when there is dispersion of
risk among the population of managers. However, using annual returns of both defunct
and currently operating oshore hedge funds between 1989 and 1995, Brown, Goetzmann,
and Ibbotson (1999) nd virtually no evidence of performance persistence in raw returns or
risk-adjusted returns, even after breaking funds down according to their returns-based style
classications.
Fund 
ows in the hedge-fund industry have been considered by Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik
(2004) and Getmansky (2004), with the expected conclusion that funds with higher returns
tend to receive higher net in
ows and funds with poor performance suer withdrawals and,
eventually, liquidation, much like the case with mutual funds and private equity.11 Agarwal,
11See, for example, Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Gruber
(1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Zheng (1999), and Berk and Green (2004) for studies of mutual fund 
ows,
and Kaplan and Schoar (2004) for private-equity fund 
ows.
18Daniel, and Naik (2004), Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), and Getmansky (2004) all
nd decreasing returns to scale among their samples of hedge funds, implying that an optimal
amount of assets under management exists for each fund and mirroring similar ndings for
the mutual-fund industry by P erold and Salomon (1991) and the private-equity industry
by Kaplan and Schoar (2004). Hedge-fund survival rates have been studied by Brown,
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000, 2001), Bares, Gibson
and Gyger (2003), Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001b), Gregoriou (2002), and Amin and
Kat (2003b). Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2004) estimate liquidation probabilities of hedge
funds and nd that they are greatly dependent on past performance.
The survival rates of hedge funds have been estimated by Brown, Goetzmann and Ib-
botson (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000, 2001), Brown, Goetzmann and Park
(2001a,b), Gregoriou (2002), Amin and Kat (2003b), Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003), and
Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004). Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001b) show that the prob-
ability of liquidation increases with increasing risk, and that funds with negative returns
for two consecutive years have a higher risk of shutting down. Liang (2000) nds that the
annual hedge-fund attrition rate is 8.3% for the 1994{1998 sample period using TASS data,
and Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2004) nd a slightly higher rate of 8.6% for the 1994{2000
sample period. Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2004) also nd that surviving funds outper-
form non-surviving funds by approximately 2.1% per year, which is similar to the ndings
of Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2002b) and Liang (2000), and that investment style, size, and past
performance are signicant factors in explaining survival rates. Many of these patterns are
also documented by Liang (2000), Boyson (2002), and Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004). In
particular, Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004) nd that attrition rates in the TASS database
from 1994 to 2004 dier signicantly across investment styles, from a low of 5.2% per year on
average for convertible arbitrage funds to a high of 14.4% per year on average for managed
futures funds. They also relate a number of factors to these attrition rates, including past
performance, volatility, and investment style, and document dierences in illiquidity risk
between active and liquidated funds. In analyzing the life cycle of hedge funds, Getmansky
(2004) nds that the liquidation probabilities of individual hedge funds depend on fund-
specic characteristics such as past returns, asset 
ows, age, and assets under management
as well, as category-specic variables such as competition and favorable positioning within
the industry.
Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001b) nd that half-life of the TASS hedge funds is
exactly 30 months, while Brooks and Kat (2002) estimate that approximately 30% of new
hedge funds do not make it past 36 months due to poor performance, and in Amin and
Kat's (2003b) study, 40% of their hedge funds do not make it to the fth year. Howell
19(2001) observed that the probability of hedge funds failing in their rst year was 7.4%,
only to increase to 20.3% in their second year. Poor-performing younger funds drop out of
databases at a faster rate than older funds (see Getmansky, 2004, and Jen, Heasman, and
Boyatt, 2001), presumably because younger funds are more likely to take additional risks to
obtain good performance which they can use to attract new investors, whereas older funds
that have survived already have track records with which to attract and retain capital.
A number of case studies of hedge-fund liquidations have been published recently, no
doubt spurred by the most well-known liquidation in the hedge-fund industry to date: Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM). The literature on LTCM is vast, spanning a number of
books, journal articles, and news stories; a representative sample includes Greenspan (1998),
McDonough (1998), P erold (1999), the President's Working Group on Financial Markets
(1999), and MacKenzie (2003). Ineichen (2001) has compiled a list of selected hedge funds
and analyzed the reasons for their liquidations. Kramer (2001) focuses on fraud, providing
detailed accounts of six of history's most egregious cases. Although it is virtually impossible
to obtain hard data on the frequency of fraud among liquidated hedge funds,12 in a study
of over 100 liquidated hedge funds during the past two decades, Feer and Kundro (2003)
conclude that \half of all failures could be attributed to operational risk alone", of which
fraud is one example. In fact, they observe that \The most common operational issues related
to hedge fund losses have been misrepresentation of fund investments, misappropriation
of investor funds, unauthorized trading, and inadequate resources" (Feer and Kundro,
2003, p. 5). The last of these issues is, of course, not related to fraud, but Feer and
Kundro (2003, Figure 2) report that only 6% of their sample involved inadequate resources,
whereas 41% involved misrepresentation of investments, 30% misappropriation of funds,
and 14% unauthorized trading. These results suggest that operational issues are indeed an
important factor in hedge-fund liquidations, and deserve considerable attention by investors
and managers alike.
Collectively, these studies show that the dynamics of hedge funds are quite dierent than
those of more traditional investments, and the potential impact on systemic risk is apparent.
3 The Data
It is clear from Section 1 that hedge funds exhibit unique and dynamic characteristics that
bear further study. Fortunately, the returns of many individual hedge funds are now available
through a number of commercial databases such as AltVest, CISDM, HedgeFund.net, HFR,
12The lack of transparency and the unregulated status of most hedge funds are signicant barriers to any
systematic data collection eort, hence it is dicult to draw inferences about industry norms.
20and TASS. For the empirical analysis in this paper, we use two main sources: (1) a set
of aggregate hedge-fund index returns from CSFB/Tremont; and (2) the TASS database
of hedge funds, which consists of monthly returns and accompanying information for 4,781
individual hedge funds (as of August 2004) from February 1977 to August 2004.13
The CSFB/Tremont indexes are asset-weighted indexes of funds with a minimum of $10
million of assets under management (\AUM"), a minimum one-year track record, and current
audited nancial statements. An aggregate index is computed from this universe, and 10
sub-indexes based on investment style are also computed using a similar method. Indexes
are computed and rebalanced on a monthly frequency and the universe of funds is redened
on a quarterly basis.
Live Graveyard Combined
1 Convertible Arbitrage 127      49      176     
2 Dedicated Short Bias 14      15      29     
3 Emerging Markets 130      133      263     
4 Equity Market Neutral 173      87      260     
5 Event Driven 250      134      384     
6 Fixed-Income Arbitrage 104      71      175     
7 Global Macro 118      114      232     
8 Long/Short Equity 883      532      1,415     
9 Managed Futures  195      316      511     
10 Multi-Strategy 98      41      139     
11 Fund of Funds 679      273      952     
Total 2,771      1,765      4,536     
Category
Number of TASS Funds In:
Definition
Table 6: Number of funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live, Graveyard, and Combined
databases, from February 1977 to August 2004.
The TASS database consists of monthly returns, assets under management and other
fund-specic information for 4,781 individual funds from February 1977 to August 2004.
The database is divided into two parts: \Live" and \Graveyard" funds. Hedge funds that
13For further information about these data see http://www.hedgeindex.com (CSFB/Tremont indexes) and
http://www.tassresearch.com (TASS). We also use data from Altvest, the University of Chicago's Center for
Research in Security Prices, and Yahoo!Finance.
21are in the \Live" database are considered to be active as of August 31, 2004.14 As of August,
2004, the combined database of both live and dead hedge funds contained 4,781 funds with
at least one monthly return observation. Out of these 4,781 funds, 2,920 funds are in the
Live database and 1,861 in the Graveyard database. The earliest data available for a fund
in either database is February 1977. TASS started tracking dead funds in 1994, hence it
is only since 1994 that TASS transferred funds from the Live database to the Graveyard
database. Funds that were dropped from the Live database prior to 1994 are not included
in the Graveyard database, which may yield a certain degree of survivorship bias.15
The majority of 4,781 funds reported returns net of management and incentive fees on a
monthly basis.16 and we eliminated 50 funds that reported only gross returns, leaving 4,731
funds in the \Combined" database (2,893 in the Live and 1,838 in the Graveyard database).
We also eliminated funds that reported returns on quarterly|not monthly|basis, leav-
ing 4,705 funds in the Combined database (2,884 in the Live and 1,821 in the Graveyard
database). Finally, we dropped funds that did not report assets under management, or re-
ported only partial assets under management, leaving a nal sample of 4,536 hedge funds in
the Combined database which consists of 2,771 funds in the Live database and 1,765 funds
in the Graveyard database. For the empirical analysis in Section 4, we impose an additional
lter in which we require funds to have at least ve years of non-missing returns, leaving
1,226 funds in the Live database and 611 in the Graveyard database for a combined total of
1,837 funds. This obviously creates additional survivorship bias in the remaining sample of
funds, but since the main objective is to estimate measures of illiquidity exposure and not
14Once a hedge fund decides not to report its performance, is liquidated, is closed to new investment,
restructured, or merged with other hedge funds, the fund is transferred into the \Graveyard" database.
A hedge fund can only be listed in the \Graveyard" database after being listed in the \Live" database.
Because the TASS database fully represents returns and asset information for live and dead funds, the
eects of suvivorship bias are minimized. However, the database is subject to backll bias|when a fund
decides to be included in the database, TASS adds the fund to the \Live" database and includes all available
prior performance of the fund. Hedge funds do not need to meet any specic requirements to be included in
the TASS database. Due to reporting delays and time lags in contacting hedge funds, some Graveyard funds
can be incorrectly listed in the Live database for a period of time. However, TASS has adopted a policy
of transferring funds from the Live to the Graveyard database if they do not report over a 8- to 10-month
period.
15 For studies attempting to quantify the degree and impact of survivorship bias, see Baquero, Horst, and
Verbeek (2004), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999),
Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (1997), Carpenter and Lynch (1999), Fung and Hsieh (1997b, 2000), Horst,
Nijman, and Verbeek (2001), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1997), and Schneeweis and Spurgin (1996).
16TASS denes returns as the change in net asset value during the month (assuming the reinvestment of any
distributions on the reinvestment date used by the fund) divided by the net asset value at the beginning of the
month, net of management fees, incentive fees, and other fund expenses. Therefore, these reported returns
should approximate the returns realized by investors. TASS also converts all foreign-currency denominated
returns to U.S.-dollar returns using the appropriate exchange rates.
22to make inferences about overall performance, this lter may not be as problematic.17
TASS also classies funds into one of 11 dierent investment styles, listed in Table 6
and described in the Appendix, of which 10 correspond exactly to the CSFB/Tremont sub-
index denitions.18 Table 6 also reports the number of funds in each category for the Live,
Graveyard, and Combined databases, and it is apparent from these gures that the rep-
resentation of investment styles is not evenly distributed, but is concentrated among four
categories: Long/Short Equity (1,415), Fund of Funds (952), Managed Futures (511), and
Event Driven (384). Together, these four categories account for 71.9% of the funds in the
Combined database. Figure 2 shows that the relative proportions of the Live and Graveyard
databases are roughly comparable, with the exception of two categories: Funds of Funds
(24% in the Live and 15% in the Graveyard database), and Managed Futures (7% in the
Live and 18% in the Graveyard database). This re
ects the current trend in the industry















































Figure 2: Breakdown of TASS Live and Graveyard funds by category.
3.1 CSFB/Tremont Indexes
Table 7 reports summary statistics for the monthly returns of the CSFB/Tremont indexes
from January 1994 to August 2004. Also included for purposes of comparison are summary
statistics for a number of aggregate measures of market conditions which we will use later
17See the references in footnote 15.
18This is no coincidence|TASS is owned by Tremont Capital Management, which created the
CSFB/Tremont indexes in partnership with Credit Suisse First Boston.
23as risk factors for constructing explicit risk models for hedge-fund returns in Section 6, and
their denitions are given in Table 30.
Table 7 shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in the historical risk and return
characteristics of the various categories of hedge-fund investment styles. For example, the
annualized mean return ranges from  0:69% for Dedicated Shortsellers to 13:85% for Global
Macro, and the annualized volatility ranges from 3:05% for Equity Market Neutral to 17:28%
for Emerging Markets. The correlations of the hedge-fund indexes with the S&P 500 are
generally low, with the largest correlation at 57.2% for Long/Short Equity, and the lowest
correlation at  75:6% for Dedicated Shortsellers|as investors have discovered, hedge funds
oer greater diversication benets than many traditional asset classes. However, these
correlations can vary over time. For example, consider a rolling 60-month correlation between
the CSFB/Tremont Multi-Strategy Index and the S&P 500 from January 1999 to December
2003, plotted in Figure 3. At the start of the sample in January 1999, the correlation is
 13:4%, then drops to  21:7% a year later, and increases to 31:0% by December 2003 as
the outliers surrounding August 1998 drop out of the 60-month rolling window.
Although changes in rolling correlation estimates are also partly attributable to estima-
tion errors,19 in this case, an additional explanation for the positive trend in correlation
is the enormous in
ow of capital into multi-strategy funds and fund-of-funds over the past
ve years. As assets under management increase, it becomes progressively more dicult for
fund managers to implement strategies that are truly uncorrelated with broad-based market
indexes like the S&P 500. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the correlation between the Multi-
Strategy Index return and the lagged S&P 500 return has also increased in the past year,
indicating an increase in the illiquidity exposure of this investment style (see Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov, 2004 and Section 4 below). This is also consistent with large in
ows of
capital into the hedge-fund sector.
Despite their heterogeneity, several indexes do share a common characteristic: nega-
tive skewness. Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Distressed, Event-
Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arbitrage, Fixed-Income Arbitrage, and Fund of Funds all have
skewness coecients less than zero, in some cases substantially so. This property is an indi-
cation of tail risk exposure, as in the case of Capital Decimation Partners (see Section 1.1),
and is consistent with the nature of the investment strategies employed by funds in those
categories. For example, Fixed-Income Arbitrage strategies are known to generate fairly
consistent prots, with occasional losses that may be extreme, hence a skewness coecient
of  3:27 is not surprising. A more direct measure of tail risk or \fat tails" is kurtosis|the
























































Figure 3: 60-month rolling correlations between CSFB/Tremont Multi-Strategy Index re-
turns and the contemporaneous and lagged return of the S&P 500, from January 1999 to
December 2003. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation, the approximate standard error
of the correlation coecient is 1=
p
60=13% hence the dierences between the beginning-of-















Hedge Funds 128      10.51  8.25  45.9   -7.55  0.78  8.53  0.12  1.95  12.0  4.0  -0.5  54.8 
Convert Arb 128      9.55  4.72  11.0   -4.68  1.09  3.57  -1.47  3.78  55.8  41.1  14.4  0.0 
Dedicated Shortseller 128      -0.69  17.71  -75.6   -8.69  -0.39  22.71  0.90  2.16  9.2  -3.6  0.9  73.1 
Emerging Markets 128      8.25  17.28  47.2   -23.03  1.17  16.42  -0.58  4.01  30.5  1.6  -1.4  0.7 
Equity Market Neutral 128      10.01  3.05  39.6   -1.15  0.81  3.26  0.25  0.23  29.8  20.2  9.3  0.0 
Event Driven 128      10.86  5.87  54.3   -11.77  1.01  3.68  -3.49  23.95  35.0  15.3  4.0  0.0 
Distressed 128      12.73  6.79  53.5   -12.45  1.18  4.10  -2.79  17.02  29.3  13.4  2.0  0.3 
Event-Driven Multi-Strategy 128      9.87  6.19  46.6   -11.52  0.90  4.66  -2.70  17.63  35.3  16.7  7.8  0.0 
Risk Arb 128      7.78  4.39  44.7   -6.15  0.62  3.81  -1.27  6.14  27.3  -1.9  -9.7  1.2 
Fixed Income Arb 128      6.69  3.86  -1.3   -6.96  0.77  2.02  -3.27  17.05  39.2  8.2  2.0  0.0 
Global Macro 128      13.85  11.75  20.9   -11.55  1.19  10.60  0.00  2.26  5.5  4.0  8.8  65.0 
Long/Short Equity 128      11.51  10.72  57.2   -11.43  0.78  13.01  0.26  3.61  16.9  6.0  -4.6  21.3 
Managed Futures 128      6.48  12.21  -22.6   -9.35  0.18  9.95  0.07  0.49  5.8  -9.6  -0.7  64.5 
Multi-Strategy 125      9.10  4.43  5.6   -4.76  0.83  3.61  -1.30  3.59  -0.9  7.6  18.0  17.2 
SP500 120      11.90  15.84  100.0   -14.46  1.47  9.78  -0.61  0.30  -1.0  -2.2  7.3  86.4 
Banks 128      21.19  13.03  55.8   -18.62  1.96  11.39  -1.16  5.91  26.8  6.5  5.4  1.6 
LIBOR 128      -0.14  0.78  3.5   -0.94  -0.01  0.63  -0.61  4.11  50.3  32.9  27.3  0.0 
USD 128      -0.52  7.51  7.3   -5.35  -0.11  5.58  0.00  0.08  7.2  -3.2  6.4  71.5 
Oil 128      15.17  31.69  -1.6   -22.19  1.38  36.59  0.25  1.17  -8.1  -13.6  16.6  7.3 
Gold 128      1.21  12.51  -7.2   -9.31  -0.17  16.85  0.98  3.07  -13.7  -17.4  8.0  6.2 
Lehman Bond 128      6.64  4.11  0.8   -2.71  0.50  3.50  -0.04  0.05  24.6  -6.3  5.2  3.2 
Large Minus Small Cap 128      -1.97  13.77  7.6   -20.82  0.02  12.82  -0.82  5.51  -13.5  4.7  6.1  36.6 
Value Minus Growth 128      0.86  18.62  -48.9   -22.78  0.40  15.85  -0.44  3.01  8.6  10.2  0.4  50.3 
Credit Spread (not ann.) 128      4.35  1.36  -30.6   2.68  3.98  8.23  0.82  -0.30  94.1  87.9  83.2  0.0 
Term Spread (not ann.) 128      1.65  1.16  -11.6   -0.07  1.20  3.85  0.42  -1.25  97.2  94.0  91.3  0.0 
VIX (not ann.) 128      0.03  3.98  -67.3   -12.90  0.03  19.48  0.72  4.81  -8.2  -17.5  -13.9  5.8 
Table 7: Summary statistics for monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns and
various hedge-fund risk factors, from January 1994 to August 2004 (except for Fund of
Funds which begins in April 1994, and SP500 which ends in December 2003).
26normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3:00, so values greater than this represent fatter tails
than the normal. Not surprisingly, the two categories with the most negative skewness|
Event Driven ( 3:49) and Fixed-Income Arbitrage ( 3:27)|also have the largest kurtosis,
23.95 and 17.05, respectively.
Several indexes also exhibit a high degree of positive serial correlation, as measured
by the rst three autocorrelation coecients 1, 2, and 3, as well as the p-value of the
Ljung-Box Q-statistic, which measures the degree of statistical signicance of the rst three
autocorrelations.20 In comparison to the S&P 500, which has a rst-order autocorrelation
coecient of  1:0%, the autocorrelations of the hedge-fund indexes are very high, with values
of 55:8% for Convertible Arbitrage, 39:2% for Fixed-Income Arbitrage, and 35:0% for Event
Driven, all of which are signicant at the 1% level according to the corresponding p-values.21
Serial correlation can be a symptom of illiquidity risk exposure, which is particularly relevant
for systemic risk, and we shall focus on this issue in more detail in Section 4.
The correlations among the hedge-fund indexes are given in Table 8, and the entries also
display a great deal of heterogeneity, ranging from  71:9% (between Long/Short Equity and
Dedicated Shortsellers) and 93:6% (between Event Driven and Distressed). However, these
correlations can vary through time as Table 9 illustrates, both because of estimation error
and through the dynamic nature of many hedge-fund investment strategies and the changes
in fund 
ows among them. Over the sample period from January 1994 to December 2003, the
correlation between the Convertible Arbitrage and Emerging Market Indexes is 31.8%, but
during the rst half of the sample this correlation is 48.2% and during the second half it is
 5:8%. A graph of the 60-month rolling correlation between these two indexes from January
1999 to December 2003 provides a clue as to the source of this nonstationarity: Figure 4







which is asymptotically 2
k under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. By forming the sum of squared
autocorrelations, the statistic Q re
ects the absolute magnitudes of the ^ j's irrespective of their signs, hence
funds with large positive or negative autocorrelation coecients will exhibit large Q-statistics. See Kendall,
Stuart and Ord (1983, Chapter 50.13) for further details.
21The p-value of a statistic is dened as the smallest level of signicance for which the null hypothesis
can be rejected based on the statistic's value. For example, a p-value of 73.1% for the Q-statistic of the
Dedicated Shortseller index implies that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation can be rejected at the
73.1% signicance level|at any smaller level of signicance, say 5%, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Therefore, smaller p-values indicate stronger evidence against the null hypothesis, and larger p-values indicate
stronger evidence in favor of the null. p-values are often reported instead of test statistics because they are
easier to interpret (to interpret a test statistic, one must compare it to the critical values of the appropriate
distribution; this comparison is performed in computing the p-value). See, for example, Bickel and Doksum




















































































































































































































Hedge Funds 100.0 
Convert Arb 39.1  100.0 
Dedicated Shortseller -46.7  -22.3  100.0 
Emerging Markets 65.7  32.0  -56.8  100.0 
Equity Market Neutral 32.0  30.0  -34.6  24.8  100.0 
Event Driven 66.1  59.0  -62.9  66.5  39.3  100.0 
Distressed 56.5  50.7  -62.3  57.7  35.7  93.6  100.0 
Event-Driven Multi-Strategy 69.0  60.1  -54.0  67.1  37.3  93.0  74.9  100.0 
Risk Arb 39.6  41.8  -50.6  44.1  32.1  69.7  58.0  66.6  100.0 
Fixed Income Arb 40.7  53.0  -4.6  27.1  5.7  37.3  28.3  43.3  13.2  100.0 
Global Macro 85.4  27.5  -11.0  41.5  18.6  36.9  29.5  42.7  12.9  41.5  100.0 
Long/Short Equity 77.6  25.0  -71.9  58.9  34.2  65.2  57.0  63.9  51.7  17.0  40.6  100.0 
Managed Futures 12.4  -18.1  21.1  -10.9  15.3  -21.2  -14.6  -24.4  -21.1  -6.7  26.8  -3.6  100.0 
Multi-Strategy 16.0  35.0  -5.8  -3.2  20.6  15.9  10.9  19.7  5.9  27.3  11.3  14.5  -2.4  100.0 
Correlation Matrix
Table 8: Correlation matrix for CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns, in percent, based
on monthly data from January 1994 to August 2004.
shows a sharp drop in the correlation during the month of September 2003. This is the rst
month for which the August 1998 data point|the start of the LTCM event|is not included
in the 60-month rolling window. Table 10 shows that in August 1998, the returns for the
Convertible Arbitrage and Emerging Market Indexes were  4:64% and  23:03, respectively.
In fact, 10 out of the 13 style-category indexes yielded negative returns in August 1998, many
of which were extreme outliers relative to the entire sample period, hence rolling windows
containing this month can yield dramatically dierent correlations than those without it.
3.2 TASS Data
To develop a sense of the dynamics of the TASS database, in Table 11 we report annual
frequency counts of the funds in the database at the start of each year, funds entering
during the year, funds exiting during the year, and funds entering and exiting within the
year. The table shows that despite the start date of February 1977, the database is relatively
sparsely populated until the 1990's, with the largest increase in new funds in 2001 and the
largest number of funds exiting the database in the most recent year, 2003. The attrition
rates reported in Table 11 are dened as the ratio of funds exiting in a given year to the
number of existing funds at the start of the year. TASS began tracking fund exits starting
only in 1994 hence attrition rates cannot be computed in prior years. For the unltered
28Correlation Matrices For Five CSFB/Tremont Hedge-Fund Index Returns
Monthly Data, January 1994 to December 2003
Dedicated Emerging Equity Mkt Event
Short Mkts Neutral Driven Distressed
January 1994 to December 2003
Convert Arb  23:0 31:8 31:2 58:7 50:8
Dedicated Short  57:1  35:3  63:4  63:2
Emerging Mkts 22:0 67:8 59:2
Equity Mkt Neutral 37:9 34:9
Event-Driven 93:8
January 1994 to December 1998
Convert Arb  25:2 48:2 32:1 68:4 61:6
Dedicated Short  52:6  43:5  66:2  69:1
Emerging Mkts 22:1 70:8 65:4
Equity Mkt Neutral 43:4 44:9
Event-Driven 94:9
January 1999 to December 2003
Convert Arb  19:7  5:8 32:3 41:8 33:5
Dedicated Short  67:3  22:9  63:0  56:8
Emerging Mkts 22:1 60:6 45:2
Equity Mkt Neutral 20:8 6:4
Event-Driven 91:4
Source: AlphaSimplex Group
Table 9: Correlation matrix for ve CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns, in percent,




















































Figure 4: 60-month rolling correlations between CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage and
Emerging Market Index returns, from January 1999 to December 2003. The sharp decline
in September 2003 is due to the fact that this is the rst month in which the August 1998
observation is dropped from the 60-month rolling window.
30CSFB/Tremont Hedge-Fund Index and Market-Index Returns
August to October 2003
Index August September October
1998 1998 1998
Aggregate Index  7:55  2:31  4:57
Convert Arb  4:64  3:23  4:68
Dedicated Short 22:71  4:98  8:69
Emerging Mkts  23:03  7:40 1:68
Equity Mkt Neutral  0:85 0:95 2:48
Event-Driven  11:77  2:96 0:66
Distressed  12:45  1:43 0:89
ED Multi-Strategy  11:52  4:74 0:26
Risk Arbitrage  6:15  0:65 2:41
Fixed Income Arb  1:46  3:74  6:96
Global Macro  4:84  5:12  11:55
Long/Short Equity  11:43 3:47 1:74
Managed Futures 9:95 6:87 1:21
Multi-Strategy 1:15 0:57  4:76
Ibbotson S&P 500  14:46 6:41 8:13
Ibbotson Small Cap  20:10 3:69 3:56
Ibbotson LT Corp Bonds 0:89 4:13  1:90
Ibbotson LT Govt Bonds 4:65 3:95  2:18
Source: AlphaSimplex Group
Table 10: Monthly returns of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes and Ibbotson stock and
bond indexes during August, September, and October 1998, in percent. Note: ED =
Event Driven.
31sample of all funds, the average attrition rate from 1994{1999 is 7.51%, which is very similar
to the 8.54% attrition rate obtained by Liang (2001) for the same period.
Table 12 contains basic summary statistics for the funds in the TASS Live, Graveyard,
and Combined databases. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of variation in mean returns
and volatilities both across and within categories and databases. For example, the 127
Convertible Arbitrage funds in the Live database have an average mean return of 9.92% and
an average standard deviation of 5.51%, but in the Graveyard database, the 49 Convertible
Arbitrage funds have an average mean return of 10.02% and a much higher average standard
deviation of 8.14%. Not surprisingly, average volatilities in the Graveyard database are
uniformly higher than those in the Live database because the higher-volatility funds are
more likely to be eliminated.22
Average serial correlations also vary considerably across categories in the Combined
database, but six categories stand out: Convertible Arbitrage (31.4%), Fund of Funds
(19.6%), Event Driven (18.4%), Emerging Markets (16.5%), Fixed-Income Arbitrage (16.2%),
and Multi-Strategy (14.7%). Given the descriptions of these categories provided by TASS
(see Appendix A.1) and common wisdom about the nature of the strategies involved|these
categories include some of the most illiquid securities traded|serial correlation seems to be
a reasonable proxy for illiquidity and smoothed returns (see Lo, 2001; Getmansky, Lo, and
Makarov, 2004; and Section 4 below). Alternatively, equities and futures are among the
most liquid securities in which hedge funds invest, and not surprising, the average rst-order
serial correlations for Equity Market Neutral, Long/Short Equity, and Managed Futures are
5.1%, 9.5%, and  0:6%, respectively. Dedicated Shortseller funds also have a low average
rst-order autocorrelation, 5:9%, which is consistent with the high degree of liquidity that
often characterize shortsellers (by denition, the ability to short a security implies a certain
degree of liquidity).
These summary statistics suggest that illiquidity and smoothed returns may be important
attributes for hedge-fund returns which can be captured to some degree by serial correlation
and the time-series model of smoothing in Section 4.
Finally, Table 13 reports the year-end assets under management for funds in each of
the 11 TASS categories for the Combined database from 1977 to 2003, and the relative
proportions are plotted in Figure 5. Table 13 shows that the total assets in the TASS
combined database is approximately $391 billion, which is a signicant percentage|though
22This eect works at both ends of the return distribution|funds that are wildly successful are also more
likely to leave the database since they have less of a need to advertise their performance. That the Graveyard
database also contains successful funds is supported by the fact that in some categories, the average mean
return in the Graveyard database is the same as or higher than in the Live database, e.g., Convertible
















1977 0    4    0    0    4    —
1978 4    2    0    0    6    —
1979 6    2    0    0    8    —
1980 8    4    0    0    12    —
1981 12    3    0    0    15    —
1982 15    6    0    0    21    —
1983 21    9    0    0    30    —
1984 30    15    0    0    45    —
1985 45    9    0    0    54    —
1986 54    23    0    0    77    —
1987 77    29    0    0    106    —
1988 106    35    0    0    141    —
1989 141    45    0    0    186    —
1990 186    107    0    0    293    —
1991 293    94    0    0    387    —
1992 387    155    0    0    542    —
1993 542    247    0    0    789    —
1994 789    252    24    2    1,017    3.0%   
1995 1,017    300    62    1    1,255    6.1%   
1996 1,255    332    122    9    1,465    9.7%   
1997 1,465    357    101    6    1,721    6.9%   
1998 1,721    347    164    9    1,904    9.5%   
1999 1,904    403    186    7    2,121    9.8%   
2000 2,121    391    237    9    2,275    11.2%   
2001 2,275    460    257    6    2,478    11.3%   
2002 2,478    432    249    9    2,661    10.0%   
2003 2,661    325    287    12    2,699    10.8%   
Table 11: Annual frequency counts of entries into and exits out of the TASS Hedge Fund
Combined Database from February 1977 to August 2004. Note the TASS Graveyard database
did not exist prior to 1994, hence attrition rates are only available from 1994 to 2003.
33Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Convertible Arbitrage 127    9.92  5.89  5.51  4.15  33.6   19.2   2.57   4.20   1.95   2.86   19.5   27.1  
Dedicated Shortseller 14    0.33  11.11  25.10  10.92  3.5   10.9   -0.11   0.70   0.12   0.46   48.0   25.7  
Emerging Markets 130    17.74  13.77  21.69  14.42  18.8   13.8   1.36   2.01   1.22   1.40   35.5   31.5  
Equity Market Neutral 173    6.60  5.89  7.25  5.05  4.4   22.7   1.20   1.18   1.30   1.28   41.6   32.6  
Event Driven 250    12.52  8.99  8.00  7.15  19.4   20.9   1.98   1.47   1.68   1.47   31.3   34.1  
Fixed Income Arbitrage 104    9.30  5.61  6.27  5.10  16.4   23.6   3.61   11.71   3.12   7.27   36.6   35.2  
Global Macro 118    10.51  11.55  13.57  10.41  1.3   17.1   0.86   0.68   0.99   0.79   46.8   30.6  
Long/Short Equity 883    13.05  10.56  14.98  9.30  11.3   17.9   1.03   1.01   1.01   0.95   38.1   31.8  
Managed Futures  195    8.59  18.55  19.14  12.52  3.4   13.9   0.48   1.10   0.73   0.63   52.3   30.8  
Multi-Strategy 98    12.65  17.93  9.31  10.94  18.5   21.3   1.91   2.34   1.46   2.06   31.1   31.7  
Fund of Funds 679    6.89  5.45  6.14  4.87  22.9   18.5   1.53   1.33   1.48   1.16   33.7   31.6  
Convertible Arbitrage 49    10.02  6.61  8.14  6.08  25.5   19.3   1.89   1.43   1.58   1.46   27.9   34.2  
Dedicated Shortseller 15    1.77  9.41  27.54  18.79  8.1   13.2   0.20   0.44   0.25   0.48   55.4   25.2  
Emerging Markets 133    2.74  27.74  27.18  18.96  14.3   17.9   0.37   0.91   0.47   1.11   48.5   34.6  
Equity Market Neutral 87    7.61  26.37  12.35  13.68  6.4   20.4   0.52   1.23   0.60   1.85   46.6   31.5  
Event Driven 134    9.07  15.04  12.35  12.10  16.6   21.1   1.22   1.38   1.13   1.43   39.3   34.2  
Fixed Income Arbitrage 71    5.51  12.93  10.78  9.97  15.9   22.0   1.10   1.77   1.03   1.99   46.0   35.7  
Global Macro 114    3.74  28.83  21.02  18.94  3.2   21.5   0.33   1.05   0.37   0.90   46.2   31.0  
Long/Short Equity 532    9.69  22.75  23.08  16.82  6.4   19.8   0.48   1.06   0.48   1.17   47.8   31.3  
Managed Futures  316    4.78  23.17  20.88  19.35  -2.9   18.7   0.26   0.77   0.37   0.97   48.4   30.9  
Multi-Strategy 41    5.32  23.46  17.55  20.90  6.1   17.4   1.10   1.55   1.58   2.06   49.4   32.2  
Fund of Funds 273    4.53  10.07  13.56  10.56  11.3   21.2   0.62   1.26   0.57   1.11   40.9   31.9  
Convertible Arbitrage 176    9.94  6.08  6.24  4.89  31.4   19.5   2.38   3.66   1.85   2.55   21.8   29.3  
Dedicated Shortseller 29    1.08  10.11  26.36  15.28  5.9   12.2   0.05   0.59   0.19   0.46   52.0   25.2  
Emerging Markets 263    10.16  23.18  24.48  17.07  16.5   16.2   0.86   1.63   0.84   1.31   42.2   33.7  
Equity Market Neutral 260    6.94  15.94  8.96  9.21  5.1   21.9   0.97   1.24   1.06   1.53   43.3   32.3  
Event Driven 384    11.31  11.57  9.52  9.40  18.4   21.0   1.71   1.48   1.49   1.48   34.1   34.3  
Fixed Income Arbitrage 175    7.76  9.45  8.10  7.76  16.2   22.9   2.59   9.16   2.29   5.86   40.4   35.6  
Global Macro 232    7.18  22.04  17.21  15.61  2.3   19.3   0.60   0.92   0.70   0.90   46.5   30.8  
Long/Short Equity 1415    11.79  16.33  18.02  13.25  9.5   18.8   0.82   1.06   0.81   1.07   41.7   31.9  
Managed Futures  511    6.23  21.59  20.22  17.07  -0.6   17.4   0.34   0.91   0.50   0.88   49.8   30.9  
Multi-Strategy 139    10.49  19.92  11.74  15.00  14.7   20.9   1.67   2.16   1.49   2.05   36.7   32.9  
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Table 12: Means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for hedge funds in the
TASS Hedge Fund Live, Graveyard, and Combined databases from February 1977 to August
2004. The columns `p-Value(Q)' contain means and standard deviations of p-values for the

























1977 16.2   42.9   5.4   64.4  
1978 22.1   53.2   18.0   32.2   125.5  
1979 34.5   0.0   77.6   44.3   46.9   203.4  
1980 52.7   0.1   110.6   55.1   76.9   295.4  
1981 55.5   0.2   125.6   62.4   80.0   323.7  
1982 3.5   76.9   13.5   0.3   174.3   72.2   172.0   512.8  
1983 4.1   114.9   20.4   5.8   249.7   68.9   233.0   696.9  
1984 3.7   168.7   23.0   6.2   345.0   68.8   245.6   860.9  
1985 4.4   44.2   274.0   18.0   4.8   510.8   114.7   386.3   1,357.3  
1986 5.2   63.4   387.5   64.9   132.6   737.3   180.7   641.9   2,213.4  
1987 5.7   72.6   452.0   96.7   248.5   925.2   484.7   1,830.0   898.2   5,013.6  
1988 27.5   108.5   17.9   1,012.1   95.1   265.2   1,324.8   775.4   1,821.6   1,318.7   6,766.9  
1989 82.4   133.8   169.3   134.6   1,216.5   152.0   501.6   2,025.5   770.5   2,131.2   1,825.5   9,143.0  
1990 188.2   260.4   330.3   156.5   1,383.4   289.0   1,964.9   2,609.8   1,006.6   2,597.8   2,426.2   13,213.2  
1991 286.9   221.7   696.4   191.0   2,114.7   605.6   4,096.2   3,952.2   1,183.3   3,175.6   3,480.4   20,004.0  
1992 1,450.7   237.0   1,235.4   316.2   2,755.3   928.2   7,197.0   5,925.5   1,466.8   3,778.0   4,941.8   30,231.9  
1993 2,334.9   260.2   3,509.6   532.1   4,392.4   1,801.7   14,275.5   11,160.6   2,323.2   5,276.0   10,224.3   56,090.6  
1994 2,182.4   388.2   5,739.4   577.2   5,527.6   2,237.5   11,822.6   12,809.7   2,965.4   4,349.9   10,420.2   59,020.2  
1995 2,711.1   342.8   5,868.8   888.3   7,025.5   3,279.6   12,835.3   17,257.1   2,768.8   6,404.2   11,816.1   71,197.5  
1996 3,913.3   397.4   8,439.8   2,168.7   9,493.3   5,428.4   16,543.2   23,165.7   2,941.0   7,170.1   14,894.0   94,554.9  
1997 6,488.7   581.5   12,780.2   3,747.4   14,508.8   9,290.5   25,917.6   31,807.0   3,665.0   10,272.4   21,056.9   140,116.1  
1998 7,802.7   868.2   5,743.9   6,212.5   17,875.4   8,195.3   23,960.9   36,432.9   4,778.5   9,761.3   22,778.5   144,410.3  
1999 9,228.6   1,061.2   7,991.5   9,165.5   20,722.1   8,052.1   15,928.3   62,817.2   4,949.3   11,520.2   26,373.3   177,809.3  
2000 13,365.2   1,312.7   6,178.7   13,507.5   26,569.6   8,245.0   4,654.9   78,059.0   4,734.8   10,745.2   31,378.5   198,751.0  
2001 19,982.4   802.8   6,940.1   18,377.9   34,511.9   11,716.3   5,744.1   88,109.3   7,286.4   13,684.2   40,848.5   248,003.9  
2002 23,649.4   812.8   8,664.8   20,008.2   36,299.0   17,256.8   8,512.8   84,813.5   10,825.4   16,812.1   51,062.7   278,717.4  
2003 34,195.7   503.8   16,874.0   23,408.4   50,631.1   24,350.1   21,002.2   101,461.0   19,449.1   22,602.6   76,792.4   391,270.5  
Table 13: Assets under management at year-end in millions of U.S. dollars for funds in each
of the 11 categories in the TASS Combined Hedge Fund database, from 1977 to 2003.
35not nearly exhaustive|of the estimated $1 trillion in the hedge fund industry today.23 The
two dominant categories in the most recent year are Long/Short Equity ($101.5 billion) and
Fund of Funds ($76.8 billion), but Figure 5 shows that the relative proportions can change




































Convertible Arbitrage Dedicated Short Bias Emerging Markets Equity Market Neutral Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage Global Macro Long/Short Equity Managed Futures  Multi-Strategy
Figure 5: Relative proportions of assets under management at year-end in the 11 categories
of the TASS Hedge Fund Combined database, from 1977 to 2003.
4 Measuring Illiquidity Risk
The examples of Section 1 highlight the fact that hedge funds exhibit a heterogeneous array
of risk exposures, but a common theme surrounding systemic risk factors is credit and
liquidity. Although they are separate sources of risk exposures for hedge funds and their
investors|one type of risk can exist without the other|nevertheless, liquidity and credit
have been inextricably intertwined in the minds of most investors because of the problems
encountered by Long Term Capital Management and many other xed-income relative-value
23Of course, part of the $391 billion is Graveyard funds, hence the proportion of current hedge-fund assets
represented by the TASS database is less.
36hedge funds in August and September of 1998. Because many hedge funds rely on leverage,
the size of the positions are often considerably larger than the amount of collateral posted to
support those positions. Leverage has the eect of a magnifying glass, expanding small prot
opportunities into larger ones, but also expanding small losses into larger losses. And when
adverse changes in market prices reduce the market value of collateral, credit is withdrawn
quickly, and the subsequent forced liquidation of large positions over short periods of time can
lead to widespread nancial panic, as in the aftermath of the default of Russian government
debt in August 1998.24 Along with the many benets of a truly global nancial system is the
cost that a nancial crisis in one country can have dramatic repercussions in several others,
i.e., contagion.
The basic mechanisms driving liquidity and credit are familiar to most hedge-fund man-
agers and investors, and there has been much progress in the recent literature in modeling
both credit and liquidity risk.25 However, the complex network of creditor/obligor relation-
ships, revolving credit agreements, and other nancial interconnections is largely unmapped.
Perhaps some of the newly developed techniques in the mathematical theory of networks
will allow us to construct systemic measures for liquidity and credit exposures and the ro-
bustness of the global nancial system to idiosyncratic shocks. The \small-world" networks
considered by Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Watts (1999) seem to be particularly promising
starting points.
4.1 Serial Correlation and Illiquidity
A more immediate method for gauging the liquidity risk exposure of a given hedge fund
is to examine the autocorrelation coecients k of the fund's monthly returns, where k 
Cov[Rt;Rt k]=Var[Rt] is the k-th order autocorrelation of fRtg,26 which measures the degree
of correlation between month t's return and month t k's return. To see why autocorrelations
may be useful indicators of liquidity exposure, recall that one of the earliest nancial asset
pricing models is the martingale model, in which asset returns are serially uncorrelated
(k = 0 for all k 6= 0). Indeed, the title of Samuelson's (1965) seminal paper|\Proof that
24Note that in the case of Capital Decimation Partners in Section 1.1, the fund's consecutive returns of
 18:3% and  16:2% in August and September 1998 would have made it virtually impossible for the fund to
continue without a massive injection of capital. In all likelihood, it would have closed down along with many
other hedge funds during those fateful months, never to realize the extraordinary returns that it would have
earned had it been able to withstand the losses in August and September (see Table 3).
25See, for example, Bookstaber (1999, 2000) and Kao (1999), and their citations.
26The k-th order autocorrelation of a time series fRtg is dened as the correlation coecient between Rt
and Rt k, which is simply the covariance between Rt and Rt k divided by the square root of the product of
the variances of Rt and Rt k. But since the variances of Rt and Rt k are the same under the assumption
of stationarity, the denominator of the autocorrelation is simply the variance of Rt.
37Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly"|provides a succinct summary for the
motivation of the martingale property: In an informationally ecient market, price changes
must be unforecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e., if they fully incorporate the
expectations and information of all market participants.
This extreme version of market eciency is now recognized as an idealization that is
unlikely to hold in practice.27 In particular, market frictions such as transactions costs,
borrowing constraints, costs of gathering and processing information, and institutional re-
strictions on shortsales and other trading practices do exist, and they all contribute to the
possibility of serial correlation in asset returns which cannot easily be \arbitraged" away
precisely because of the presence of these frictions. From this perspective, the degree of
serial correlation in an asset's returns can be viewed as a proxy for the magnitude of the
frictions, and illiquidity is one of most common forms of such frictions. For example, it is
well known that the historical returns of residential real-estate investments are considerably
more highly autocorrelated than, say, the returns of the S&P 500 indexes during the same
sample period. Similarly, the returns of S&P 500 futures contracts exhibit less serial corre-
lation than those of the index itself. In both examples, the more liquid instrument exhibits
less serial correlation than the less liquid, and the economic rationale is a modied version
of Samuelson's (1965) argument|predictability in asset returns will be exploited and elim-
inated only to the extent allowed by market frictions. Despite the fact that the returns to
residential real estate are highly predictable, it is impossible to take full advantage of such
predictability because of the high transactions costs associated with real-estate transactions,
the inability to shortsell properties, and other frictions.28
There is another, more prosaic reason for using serial correlation as a proxy for liquidity.
For portfolios of illiquid securities, i.e., securities that are not frequently traded and for which
there may not be well-established market prices, a hedge-fund manager has considerable dis-
cretion in marking the portfolio's value at the end of each month to arrive at the fund's net
asset value. Given the nature of hedge-fund compensation contracts and performance statis-
tics, managers have an incentive to \smooth" their returns by marking their portfolios to less
than their actual value in months with large positive returns so as to create a \cushion" for
those months with lower returns. Such return-smoothing behavior yields a more consistent
set of returns over time, with lower volatility and, therefore, a higher Sharpe ratio, but it
also produces serial correlation as a side eect. Of course, if the securities in the manager's
27See, for example, Farmer and Lo (2000) and Lo (2004).
28These frictions have led to the creation of real-estate investment trusts (REITs), and the returns to these
securities|which are considerably more liquid than the underlying assets on which they are based|exhibit
much less serial correlation.
38portfolio are actively traded, the manager has little discretion in marking the portfolio; it is
\marked to market". The more illiquid the portfolio, the more discretion the manager has
in marking its value and smoothing returns, creating serial correlation in the process.29 The
impact of smoothed returns and serial correlation is considered in more detail in Lo (2002)
and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), and we update their analysis in Section 4.2 using
more recent data. However, a simpler method for assessing the overall statistical signicance
of the autocorrelations is to use the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (see footnote 20).
To illustrate the potential value of autocorrelations and the Q-statistic for measuring
liquidity risk, we estimate these quantities with monthly historical total returns of the 10
largest (as of February 11, 2001) mutual funds, from various start dates through June 2000,
and 12 hedge funds from various inception dates to December 2000. Monthly total returns
for the mutual funds were obtained from the University of Chicago's Center for Research
in Securities Prices. The 12 hedge funds were selected from the Altvest database to yield a
diverse range of annual Sharpe ratios (from 1 to 5) computed in the standard way (
p
12 c SR,
where c SR is the Sharpe ratio estimator applied to monthly returns), with the additional
requirement that the funds have a minimum ve-year history of returns.30 The names of the
hedge funds have been omitted to maintain their privacy, and we will refer to them only by
their stated investment styles, e.g., Relative Value Fund, Risk Arbitrage Fund, etc.
Table 14 reports the means, standard deviations, ^ 1 to ^ 6, and the p-values of the Q-
statistic using the rst six autocorrelations for the sample of mutual and hedge funds. The
rst subpanel shows that the 10 mutual funds have very little serial correlation in returns,
with rst-order autocorrelations ranging from  3:99% to 12:37%, and with p-values of the
corresponding Q-statistics ranging from 10.95% to 80.96%, implying that none of the Q-
statistics is signicant at the 5% level. The lack of serial correlation in these 10 mutual-fund
returns is not surprising. Because of their sheer size, these funds consist primarily of highly
liquid securities and, as a result, their managers have very little discretion in marking such
portfolios. Moreover, many of the SEC regulations that govern the mutual-fund industry,
e.g., detailed prospectuses, daily net asset value calculations, and quarterly lings, were
enacted specically to guard against arbitrary marks, price manipulation, and other unsavory
investment practices.
29There are, of course, other considerations in interpreting the serial correlation of any portfolio's returns,
of which return-smoothing is only one. Others include nonsynchronous trading, time-varying expected
returns, and market ineciencies.
30See http://www.investorforce.com for further information about the Altvest database.
39Autocorrelations of Mutual-Fund and Hedge-Fund Returns




^  ^  ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 ^ 4 ^ 5 ^ 6 p-value of
Date (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Q6 (%)
Mutual Funds:
Vanguard 500 Index 76:10 286 1:30 4:27  3:99  6:60  4:94  6:38 10:14  3:63 31:85
Fidelity Magellan 67:01 402 1:73 6:23 12:37  2:31  0:35 0:65 7:13 3:14 17:81
Investment Company of America 63:01 450 1:17 4:01 1:84  3:23  4:48  1:61 6:25  5:60 55:88
Janus 70:03 364 1:52 4:75 10:49  0:04  3:74  8:16 2:12  0:60 30:32
Fidelity Contrafund 67:05 397 1:29 4:97 7:37  2:46  6:81  3:88 2:73  4:47 42:32
Washington Mutual Investors 63:01 450 1:13 4:09  0:10  7:22  2:64 0:65 11:55  2:61 16:73
Janus Worldwide 92:01 102 1:81 4:36 11:37 3:43  3:82  15:42  21:36  10:33 10:95
Fidelity Growth and Income 86:01 174 1:54 4:13 5:09  1:60  8:20  15:58 2:10  7:29 30:91
American Century Ultra 81:12 223 1:72 7:11 2:32 3:35 1:36  3:65  7:92  5:98 80:96
Growth Fund of America 64:07 431 1:18 5:35 8:52  2:65  4:11  3:17 3:43 0:34 52:45
Hedge Funds:
Convertible/Option Arbitrage 92:05 104 1:63 0:97 42:59 28:97 21:35 2:91  5:89  9:72 0:00
Relative Value 92:12 97 0:66 0:21 25:90 19:23  2:13  16:39  6:24 1:36 3:32
Mortgage-Backed Securities 93:01 96 1:33 0:79 42:04 22:11 16:73 22:58 6:58  1:96 0:00
High Yield Debt 94:06 79 1:30 0:87 33:73 21:84 13:13  0:84 13:84 4:00 1:11
Risk Arbitrage A 93:07 90 1:06 0:69  4:85  10:80 6:92  8:52 9:92 3:06 74:10
Long/Short Equities 89:07 138 1:18 0:83  20:17 24:62 8:74 11:23 13:53 16:94 0:05
Multi-Strategy A 95:01 72 1:08 0:75 48:88 23:38 3:35 0:79  2:31  12:82 0:06
Risk Arbitrage B 94:11 74 0:90 0:77  4:87 2:45  8:29  5:70 0:60 9:81 93:42
Convertible Arbitrage A 92:09 100 1:38 1:60 33:75 30:76 7:88  9:40 3:64  4:36 0:06
Convertible Arbitrage B 94:07 78 0:78 0:62 32:36 9:73  4:46 6:50  6:33  10:55 8:56
Multi-Strategy B 89:06 139 1:34 1:63 49:01 24:60 10:60 8:85 7:81 7:45 0:00
Fund of Funds 94:10 75 1:68 2:29 29:67 21:15 0:89  0:90  12:38 3:01 6:75
Source: AlphaSimplex Group
Table 14: Means, standard deviations, and autocorrelation coecients for monthly total returns of mutual funds and hedge
funds from various start dates through June 2000 for the mutual-fund sample and various start dates through December 2000
for the hedge-fund sample. \^ k" denotes the k-th autocorrelation coecient, and \p-value of Q6" denotes the signicance level
of the Ljung-Box (1978) Q-statistic T(T+2)
P6
k=1 2
k=(T k) which is asymptotically 2
6 under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation.
4
0The results for the 12 hedge funds are considerably dierent. In sharp contrast to the
mutual-fund sample, the hedge-fund sample displays substantial serial correlation, with rst-
order autocorrelation coecients that range from  20:17% to 49:01%, with eight out of 12
funds that have Q-statistics with p-values less than 5%, and 10 out of 12 funds with p-values
less than 10%. The only two funds with p-values that are not signicant at the 5% or 10%
levels are the Risk Arbitrage A and Risk Arbitrage B funds, which have p-values of 74.10%
and 93.42%, respectively. This is consistent with the notion of serial correlation as a proxy
for liquidity risk because among the various types of funds in this sample, risk arbitrage
is likely to be the most liquid since, by denition, such funds invest in securities that are
exchange-traded and where trading volume is typically heavier than usual because of the
impending merger events on which risk arbitrage is based.
Of course, there are several other aspects of liquidity that are not captured by serial cor-
relation, and certain types of trading strategies can generate serial correlation even though
they invest in highly liquid instruments. In particular, conditioning variables such as in-
vestment style, the types of securities traded, and other aspects of the market environment
should be taken into account, perhaps through the kind of risk models proposed in Section
6 below. However, as a rst cut for measuring and comparing the liquidity exposures of
various hedge-fund investments, autocorrelation coecients and Q-statistics provide a great
deal of insight and information in a convenient manner.
4.2 An Econometric Model of Smoothed Returns
There are several potential explanations for serial correlation in nancial asset returns|time-
varying expected returns, time-varying leverage, and incentive fees with high-water marks,
for example|but Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) conclude that the most plausible ex-
planation in the context of hedge funds is illiquidity and smoothed returns. Although these
are two distinct phenomena, it is important to consider illiquidity and smoothed returns in
tandem because one facilitates the other|for actively traded securities, both theory and em-
pirical evidence suggest that in the absence of transactions costs and other market frictions,
returns are unlikely to be very smooth.
As discussed above, nonsynchronous trading is a plausible source of serial correlation
in hedge-fund returns. In contrast to the studies by Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990a) and
Kadlec and Patterson (1999) in which they conclude that it is dicult to generate serial
correlations in weekly U.S. equity portfolio returns much greater than 10% to 15% through
nonsynchronous trading eects alone, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) argue that in
the context of hedge funds, signicantly higher levels of serial correlation can be explained
41by the combination of illiquidity and smoothed returns, of which nonsynchronous trading is
a special case. To see why, note that the empirical analysis in the nonsynchronous-trading
literature is devoted exclusively to exchange-traded equity returns, not hedge-fund returns,
hence the corresponding conclusions may not be relevant in this context. For example, Lo and
MacKinlay (1990a) argue that securities would have to go without trading for several days
on average to induce serial correlations of 30%, and they dismiss such nontrading intervals as
unrealistic for most exchange-traded U.S. equity issues. However, such nontrading intervals
are considerably more realistic for the types of securities held by many hedge funds, e.g.,
emerging-market debt, real estate, restricted securities, control positions in publicly traded
companies, asset-backed securities, and other exotic OTC derivatives. Therefore, nonsyn-
chronous trading of this magnitude is likely to be an explanation for the serial correlation
observed in hedge-fund returns.
But even when prices are synchronously measured|as they are for many funds that mark
their portfolios to market at the end of the month to strike a net-asset-value at which investors
can buy into or cash out of the fund|there are several other channels by which illiquidity
exposure can induce serial correlation in the reported returns of hedge funds. Apart from
the nonsynchronous-trading eect, naive methods for determining the fair market value or
\marks" for illiquid securities can yield serially correlated returns. For example, one approach
to valuing illiquid securities is to extrapolate linearly from the most recent transaction price
(which, in the case of emerging-market debt, might be several months ago), which yields
a price path that is a straight line, or at best a series of straight lines. Returns computed
from such marks will be smoother, exhibiting lower volatility and higher serial correlation
than true economic returns, i.e., returns computed from mark-to-market prices where the
market is suciently active to allow all available information to be impounded in the price of
the security. Of course, for securities that are more easily traded and with deeper markets,
mark-to-market prices are more readily available, extrapolated marks are not necessary, and
serial correlation is therefore less of an issue. But for securities that are thinly traded, or not
traded at all for extended periods of time, marking them to market is often an expensive and
time-consuming procedure that cannot easily be performed frequently.31 Therefore, serial
correlation may serve as a proxy for a fund's liquidity exposure.
Note that even if a hedge-fund manager does not make use of any form of linear extrapo-
lation to mark the securities in his portfolio, he may still be subject to smoothed returns if he
obtains marks from broker-dealers that engage in such extrapolation. For example, consider
the case of a conscientious hedge-fund manager attempting to obtain the most accurate mark
31Liang (2003) presents a sobering analysis of the accuracy of hedge-fund returns that underscores the
challenges of marking a portfolio to market.
42for his portfolio at month end by getting bid/oer quotes from three independent broker-
dealers for every security in his portfolio, and then marking each security at the average of
the three quote midpoints. By averaging the quote midpoints, the manager is inadvertently
downward-biasing price volatility, and if any of the broker-dealers employ linear extrapola-
tion in formulating their quotes (and many do, through sheer necessity because they have
little else to go on for the most illiquid securities), or if they fail to update their quotes
because of light volume, serial correlation will also be induced in reported returns.
Finally, a more prosaic channel by which serial correlation may arise in the reported re-
turns of hedge funds is through \performance smoothing", the unsavory practice of reporting
only part of the gains in months when a fund has positive returns so as to partially oset
potential future losses and thereby reduce volatility and improve risk-adjusted performance
measures such as the Sharpe ratio. For funds containing liquid securities that can be easily
marked to market, performance smoothing is more dicult and, as a result, less of a con-
cern. Indeed, it is only for portfolios of illiquid securities that managers and brokers have
any discretion in marking their positions. Such practices are generally prohibited by various
securities laws and accounting principles, and great care must be exercised in interpreting
smoothed returns as deliberate attempts to manipulate performance statistics. After all,
as discussed above, there are many other sources of serial correlation in the presence of
illiquidity, none of which is motivated by deceit. Nevertheless, managers do have certain
degrees of freedom in valuing illiquid securities|for example, discretionary accruals for un-
registered private placements and venture capital investments|and Chandar and Bricker
(2002) conclude that managers of certain closed-end mutual funds do use accounting dis-
cretion to manage fund returns around a passive benchmark. Therefore, the possibility of
deliberate performance smoothing in the less regulated hedge-fund industry must be kept in
mind in interpreting any empirical analysis of smoothed returns.
To quantify the impact of all of these possible sources of serial correlation, Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004) propose the following model of hedge-fund returns. Denote by Rt
the true economic return of a hedge fund in period t, and let Rt satisfy the following linear
single-factor model:
Rt =  + t + t ; E[t] = E[t] = 0 ; t ; t  IID (11a)
Var[Rt]  
2 : (11b)
True returns represent the 
ow of information that would determine the equilibrium value
of the fund's securities in a frictionless market. However, true economic returns are not
43observed. Instead, Ro
t denotes the reported or observed return in period t, and let
R
o
t = 0 Rt + 1 Rt 1 +  + k Rt k (12)
j 2 [0;1] ; j = 0;:::;k (13)
1 = 0 + 1 +  + k (14)
which is a weighted average of the fund's true returns over the most recent k+1 periods,
including the current period.
This averaging process captures the essence of smoothed returns in several respects. From
the perspective of illiquidity-driven smoothing, (12) is consistent with several models in the
nonsynchronous trading literature. For example, Cohen, Maier et al. (1986, Chapter 6.1)
propose a similar weighted-average model for observed returns.32 Alternatively, (12) can be
viewed as the outcome of marking portfolios to simple linear extrapolations of acquisition
prices when market prices are unavailable, or \mark-to-model" returns where the pricing
model is slowly varying through time. And of course, (12) also captures the intentional
smoothing of performance.
The constraint (14) that the weights sum to 1 implies that the information driving the
fund's performance in period t will eventually be fully re
ected in observed returns, but this
process could take up to k+1 periods from the time the information is generated.33 This is a
sensible restriction in the current context of hedge funds for several reasons. Even the most
illiquid securities will trade eventually, and when that occurs, all of the cumulative informa-
tion aecting that security will be fully impounded into its transaction price. Therefore the
parameter k should be selected to match the kind of illiquidity of the fund|a fund com-








where rj;t l is the true but unobserved return for security j in period t l, the coecients f
j;t l;lg are
assumed to sum to 1, and j;t l are random variables meant to capture \bid/ask bounce". The authors




j;t;N comprise a delay distribution that shows how the true return generated in period
t impacts on the returns actually observed during t and the next N periods". In other words, the essential
feature of nonsynchronous trading is the fact that information generated at date t may not be fully impounded
into prices until several periods later.
33In Lo and MacKinlay's (1990a) model of nonsynchronous trading, they propose a stochastic non-trading
horizon so that observed returns are an innite-order moving average of past true returns, where the coe-
cients are stochastic. In that framework, the waiting time for information to become fully impounded into
future returns may be arbitrarily long (but with increasingly remote probability).
44prised mostly of exchange-traded U.S. equities would require a much lower value of k than a
private equity fund. Alternatively, in the case of intentional smoothing of performance, the
necessity of periodic external audits of fund performance imposes a nite limit on the extent
to which deliberate smoothing can persist.34
Under the smoothing mechanism (12), the implications for the statistical properties of
observed returns are given by:
Proposition 1 (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004) Under (12){(14), the statistical prop-
erties of observed returns are characterized by:
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if 0  m  k
0 if m > k
(20)
34In fact, if a fund allows investors to invest and withdraw capital only at pre-specied intervals, imposing
lock-ups in between, and external audits are conducted at these same pre-specied intervals, then it may
be argued that performance smoothing is irrelevant. For example, no investor should be disadvantaged by
investing in a fund that oers annual liquidity and engages in annual external audits with which the fund's
net-asset-value is determined by a disinterested third party for purposes of redemptions and new investments.
However, there are at least two additional concerns that remain|historical track records and estimates of
a fund's liquidity exposure are both aected by smoothed returns|and they are important factors in the
typical hedge-fund investor's overall investment process. Moreover, given the apparently unscrupulous role
that the auditors at Arthur Andersen played in the Enron aair, there is the further concern of whether
third-party auditors are truly objective and free of all con
icts of interest.
45where:













0 +  + 2
k (23)
c;m  m ; 0  m  k (24)
Proposition 1 shows that smoothed returns of the form (12){(14) do not aect the expected
value of Ro
t but reduce its variance, hence boosting the Sharpe ratio of observed returns
by a factor of cs. From (18), we see that smoothing also aects o
0, the contemporaneous
market beta of observed returns, biasing it towards 0 or \market neutrality", and induces
correlation between current observed returns and lagged market returns up to lag k. This
provides a formal interpretation of the empirical analysis of Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001)
in which many hedge funds were found to have signicant lagged market exposure despite
relatively low contemporaneous market betas.
Smoothed returns also exhibit positive serial correlation up to order k according to (20),
and the magnitude of the eect is determined by the pattern of weights fjg. If, for example,
the weights are disproportionately centered on a small number of lags, relatively little serial
correlation will be induced. However, if the weights are evenly distributed among many lags,
this will result in higher serial correlation. A useful summary statistic for measuring the






j 2 [0;1] (25)
which is simply the denominator of (20). This measure is well known in the industrial
organization literature as the Herndahl index, a measure of the concentration of rms in a
given industry where j represents the market share of rm j. Because j 2 [0;1],  is also
conned to the unit interval, and is minimized when all the j's are identical, which implies
a value of 1=(k+1) for , and is maximized when one coecient is 1 and the rest are 0,
in which case  = 1. In the context of smoothed returns, a lower value of  implies more
smoothing, and the upper bound of 1 implies no smoothing, hence we shall refer to  as a
\smoothing index".
In the special case of equal weights, j = 1=(k+1) for j =0;:::;k, the serial correlation





t m] = 1  
m
k + 1
; 1  m  k (26)
which declines linearly in the lag m. This can yield substantial correlations even when k
is small|for example, if k = 2 so that smoothing takes place only over a current quarter
(i.e. this month and the previous two months), the rst-order autocorrelation of monthly
observed returns is 66.7%.
4.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Smoothing Proles
Using the method of maximum-likelihood, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) estimate the
smoothing model (12){(14) by estimating an MA(2) process for observed returns assuming
normally distributed errors, with the additional constraint that the MA coecients sum to
1,35 and we apply the same procedure to our updated and enlarged sample of funds in the
TASS Combined Hedge Fund database from February 1977 to August 2004. For purposes
of estimating (12), we impose an additional lter on our data, eliminating funds with less
than 5 years of non-missing monthly returns. This leaves a sample of 1,840 funds for which
we estimate the MA(2) smoothing model. The maximum-likelihood estimation procedure
did not converge for three of these funds, indicating some sort of misspecication or data
errors, hence we have results for 1,837 funds.36 Table 15 contains summary statistics for
maximum-likelihood estimate of the smoothing parameters (0;1;2) and smoothing index
, and Table 16 presents the maximum-likelihood estimates of the smoothing model for the
50 most illiquid funds of the 1,837 funds, as ranked by ^ 0.
Table 15 shows that three categories seem to exhibit smaller average values of ^ 0 than
the rest|Convertible Arbitrage (0.719), Event Driven (0.786), and Fixed-Income Arbitrage
(0.775). Consider, in particular, the Convertible Arbitrage category, which has a mean of
0.719 for ^ 0. This is, of course, the average across all 79 funds in this category, but if it
were the point estimate of a given fund, it would imply that only 71.9% of that fund's true
current monthly return would be reported, with the remaining 28.1% distributed over the
next two months (recall the constraint that ^ 0 + ^ 1 + ^ 2 = 1). The estimates 0.201 and 0.080
for ^ 1 and ^ 2 imply that on average, the current reported return also includes 20% of last
35However, we do not impose the constraints that i 2 [0;1] so as to obtain an indication of poten-
tial misspecication, i.e., estimates that fall outside the unit interval. See Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2004, Section 5.3) for additional specication tests of their smoothing model.
36The reference numbers for the funds that did not yield maximum-likelihood estimates are 1018, 1405
and 4201.
47Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Convertible Arbitrage 79     0.719   0.161   0.201   0.148   0.080   0.101   0.621   0.327   15.558     
Dedicated Short Bias 16     1.070   0.484   0.045   0.166   -0.115   0.331   1.508   2.254   -0.579     
Emerging Markets 136     0.836   0.145   0.146   0.098   0.018   0.106   0.762   0.285   13.179     
Equity Market Neutral 65     0.891   0.203   0.047   0.189   0.062   0.138   0.895   0.396   4.326     
Event Driven 183     0.786   0.143   0.158   0.105   0.056   0.102   0.687   0.235   20.307     
Fixed Income Arbitrage 65     0.775   0.169   0.147   0.104   0.078   0.120   0.682   0.272   10.714     
Global Macro 88     0.999   0.202   0.047   0.161   -0.047   0.147   1.090   0.501   0.036     
Long/Short Equity 532     0.880   0.179   0.092   0.125   0.028   0.142   0.851   0.398   15.453     
Managed Futures  230     1.112   0.266   -0.032   0.193   -0.080   0.162   1.379   0.942   -6.406     
Multi-Strategy 47     0.805   0.157   0.113   0.128   0.082   0.076   0.713   0.270   8.503     
Fund of Funds 396     0.874   0.638   0.102   0.378   0.024   0.292   1.409   10.917   3.931     
All 1837     0.890   0.357   0.092   0.223   0.017   0.188   1.014   5.096  
Test 
Statistic 
z(q (q (q (q0 0 0 0)  )  )  ) for H: 
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Table 15: Means and standard deviations of maximum-likelihood estimates of MA(2)
smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt +1Rt 1 +2Rt 2, subject to the normalization 1=0+1+2,
where   2
0 + 2
1 + 2
2, for 1,837 hedge funds in the TASS combined database with at least
ve years of returns history during the period from February 1977 to August 2004.
48month's true return and 8% of the true return two months ago.37
To develop a more formal statistical sense of the signicance of these average values of
^ 0, we can compute a z-statistic for the null hypothesis that the expected value of ^ 0 is 1 by
dividing the dierence between 1 and each mean by its corresponding standard error, which
can be approximated by the cross-sectional standard deviation divided by the square root of
the number of funds in the average, assuming that the ^ 0's are cross-sectionally independently
and identically distributed (IID).38 Under the null hypothesis of no smoothing, the z-statistic
is asymptotically standard normal. These z-statistics are reported in the last column of Table
15 and conrm the intuition that the categories with the lowest average ^ 0's are signicantly
dierent from 1 (recall that the 99% critical value for a standard normal distribution is 2.33).
Overall, the summary statistics in Table 15 are broadly consistent with common intuition
about the nature of the strategies and securities involved in these fund categories, which
contain the most illiquid securities and, therefore, have the most potential for smoothed
returns and serial correlation.
Table 16 contains the smoothing parameter estimates for the top 50 funds ranked in order
of increasing ^ 0, which provides a more direct view of illiquidity and smoothed returns. In
contrast to the averages of Table 15, the parameter estimates of 0 among these 50 funds
range from 0.456 to 0.579, implying that only half to two-thirds of the current month's true
returns are re
ected in observed returns. The asymptotic standard errors are generally quite
small, ranging from 0.029 to 0.069, hence the smoothing parameters seem to be estimated
reasonably precisely.
The funds in Table 16 fall mainly into ve categories: Fund of Funds (15), Convertible
Arbitrage (8), Long/Short Equity (8), Fixed-Income Arbitrage (7), and Event Driven (6).
Together, these ve categories account for 44 of the 50 funds in Table 16. A more complete
summary of the distribution of smoothing parameter estimates across the dierent fund
categories is provided in Figure 6, which contains a graph of the smoothing coecients ^ 0
by category, where 9 out of the 1,837 funds were omitted because their ^ 0's were larger than
2.0 so as to preserve the resolution of the graph.
This gure shows that although there is considerable variation within each category,
nevertheless, some clear dierences emerge between categories. For example, categories 1,
3, 5, 6, and 10 (Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Fixed-Income
Arbitrage, and Multi-Strategy, respectively) have clearly discernible concentrations of ^ 0's
37The averages do not always sum to 1 exactly because of rounding errors.
38The IID assumption is almost surely violated in the cross section (after all, the categories are supposed to
group funds by certain common characteristics), but the relative rankings of the z-statistics across categories
may still contain useful information.
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1463   Equity Market Neutral 199501 200408 116    0.456   0.029   0.324   0.022   0.220   0.026   0.361  
34563   Equity Market Neutral 199501 200408 116    0.456   0.029   0.330   0.022   0.214   0.026   0.363  
4346   Event Driven 199501 200011 71    0.468   0.041   0.336   0.029   0.196   0.037   0.370  
180   Long/Short Equity 198906 199608 87    0.480   0.040   0.343   0.027   0.177   0.036   0.379  
1201   Convertible Arbitrage 199409 200408 120    0.485   0.036   0.368   0.022   0.147   0.033   0.392  
4273   Fixed Income Arbitrage 199501 200106 78    0.495   0.033   0.187   0.034   0.318   0.029   0.381  
518   Fixed Income Arbitrage 199312 200005 78    0.506   0.032   0.144   0.035   0.350   0.028   0.399  
971   Convertible Arbitrage 199409 200012 76    0.512   0.037   0.172   0.037   0.316   0.032   0.391  
1997   Convertible Arbitrage 199801 200401 73    0.512   0.046   0.268   0.037   0.220   0.039   0.383  
2142   Emerging Markets 199808 200408 73    0.513   0.049   0.300   0.035   0.187   0.042   0.388  
1204   Convertible Arbitrage 199510 200408 107    0.516   0.043   0.336   0.027   0.148   0.038   0.401  
4529   Event Driven 199901 200408 68    0.518   0.050   0.288   0.038   0.195   0.044   0.389  
1234   Fund of Funds 199410 200103 78    0.526   0.059   0.442   0.020   0.032   0.056   0.473  
1657   Long/Short Equity 199510 200408 107    0.528   0.046   0.352   0.027   0.120   0.041   0.417  
4146   Convertible Arbitrage 199706 200408 87    0.532   0.050   0.321   0.033   0.146   0.044   0.408  
1696   Fund of Funds 199501 200001 61    0.532   0.066   0.403   0.030   0.065   0.060   0.450  
4459   Fund of Funds 199907 200408 62    0.534   0.061   0.336   0.038   0.129   0.054   0.415  
3721   Long/Short Equity 199811 200408 70    0.536   0.055   0.302   0.038   0.162   0.048   0.405  
1584   Fund of Funds 199601 200401 97    0.537   0.044   0.252   0.035   0.212   0.037   0.396  
2315   Long/Short Equity 199902 200408 67    0.541   0.058   0.298   0.040   0.161   0.050   0.407  
1827   Fixed Income Arbitrage 199610 200312 87    0.541   0.046   0.226   0.039   0.232   0.038   0.398  
2209   Fund of Funds 199704 200401 82    0.542   0.050   0.268   0.038   0.189   0.043   0.402  
4153   Event Driven 199903 200407 65    0.543   0.063   0.356   0.035   0.101   0.056   0.432  
2774   Equity Market Neutral 199501 200006 66    0.544   0.056   0.266   0.043   0.190   0.048   0.403  
4209   Fund of Funds 199903 200408 66    0.544   0.069   0.445   0.022   0.011   0.066   0.494  
120   Fixed Income Arbitrage 198207 199810 196    0.545   0.031   0.238   0.026   0.218   0.027   0.401  
4080   Fund of Funds 199901 200407 67    0.549   0.064   0.354   0.036   0.097   0.056   0.436  
1907   Fund of Funds 199709 200408 84    0.550   0.048   0.222   0.041   0.229   0.040   0.404  
3148   Convertible Arbitrage 199903 200408 66    0.551   0.060   0.285   0.042   0.163   0.051   0.412  
3149   Convertible Arbitrage 199902 200408 67    0.554   0.060   0.288   0.042   0.158   0.051   0.415  
2396   Long/Short Equity 199711 200408 82    0.554   0.047   0.192   0.043   0.254   0.040   0.409  
1659   Fund of Funds 199701 200309 81    0.554   0.055   0.295   0.038   0.150   0.047   0.417  
1920   Fixed Income Arbitrag 199711 200211 61    0.555   0.067   0.336   0.040   0.110   0.058   0.432  
2286   Long/Short Equity 199802 200408 79    0.555   0.051   0.226   0.042   0.218   0.043   0.407  
4739   Multi-Strategy 199908 200408 61    0.557   0.060   0.241   0.048   0.201   0.050   0.409  
33846   Fund of Funds 199801 200408 80    0.558   0.055   0.266   0.040   0.175   0.046   0.413  
3225   Fund of Funds 199901 200407 67    0.559   0.053   0.185   0.048   0.257   0.044   0.412  
34189   Fund of Funds 199901 200407 67    0.559   0.062   0.290   0.043   0.151   0.053   0.419  
2997   Fund of Funds 199906 200408 63    0.559   0.060   0.238   0.048   0.203   0.050   0.411  
33876   Event Driven 199712 200408 81    0.563   0.064   0.400   0.028   0.038   0.058   0.478  
2755   Long/Short Equity 199203 200406 148    0.565   0.046   0.359   0.024   0.076   0.041   0.454  
3114   Event Driven 199112 200408 153    0.567   0.044   0.326   0.027   0.107   0.038   0.439  
415   Convertible Arbitrage 198807 199608 98    0.567   0.054   0.307   0.035   0.125   0.046   0.432  
4007   Fixed Income Arbitrage 199903 200408 66    0.568   0.059   0.224   0.048   0.207   0.049   0.416  
33845   Fund of Funds 199801 200408 80    0.569   0.058   0.279   0.041   0.152   0.049   0.424  
4006   Fixed Income Arbitrage 199903 200408 66    0.569   0.060   0.225   0.048   0.207   0.050   0.417  
1633   Event Driven 199304 199901 70    0.571   0.065   0.312   0.041   0.118   0.056   0.437  
1471   Long/Short Equity 199610 200408 95    0.575   0.048   0.177   0.043   0.248   0.039   0.424  
35997   Fund of Funds 199510 200407 106    0.576   0.049   0.238   0.038   0.187   0.041   0.423  
37321   Multi-Strategy 199410 200408 119    0.579   0.048   0.249   0.036   0.172   0.040   0.427  
Table 16: First 50 funds of ranked list of 1,837 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund
Combined database with at least ve years of returns history during the period from February
1977 to August 2004, ranked in increasing order of the estimated smoothing parameter ^ 0
of the MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt + 1Rt 1 + 2Rt 2, subject to the normalization
1 = 0 + 1 + 2, and estimated via maximum likelihood.
50that are lower than 1, and lower than the other categories, suggesting more illiquid funds and
more smoothed returns. On the other hand, categories 2, 7, and 9 (Dedicated Shortseller,
Global Macro, and Managed Futures, respectively) have concentrations that are at or above
1, suggesting just the opposite|more liquidity and less return-smoothing.
To develop further intuition for the smoothing model (12){(14) and the possible inter-
pretations of the smoothing parameter estimates, we reproduce the analysis in Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004) where they apply the same estimation procedure to the returns of
the Ibbotson stock and bond indexes, the Merrill Lynch Convertible Securities Index,39 the
CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes, and two mutual funds: the highly liquid Vanguard 500
Index Fund, and the considerably less liquid American Express Extra Income Fund.40 Table
17 contains summary statistics, market betas (where the market return is taken to be the
S&P 500 total return), contemporaneous and lagged market betas as in Asness, Krail and
Liew (2001), and smoothing-coecient estimates for these index and mutual-fund returns.41
Consistent with our interpretation of ^ 0 as an indicator of liquidity, the returns of the
most liquid portfolios in the rst panel of Table 17|the Ibbotson Large Company Index, the
Vanguard 500 Index Fund (which is virtually identical to the Ibbotson Large Company Index,
except for sample period and tracking error), and the Ibbotson Long-Term Government
Bond Index|have smoothing parameter estimates near unity: 0.92 for the Ibbotson Large
Company Index, 1.12 for the Vanguard 500 Index Fund, and 0.92 for the Ibbotson Long-Term
Government Bond Index. The rst-order autocorrelation coecients and lagged market
betas also conrm their lack of serial correlation; 9.8% rst-order autocorrelation for the
Ibbotson Large Company Index ,  2:3% for the Vanguard 500 Index Fund, and 6.7% for the
39 This is described by Merrill Lynch as a \market value-weighted index that tracks the daily price only,
income and total return performance of corporate convertible securities, including U.S. domestic bonds,
Eurobonds, preferred stocks and Liquid Yield Option Notes".
40As of January 31, 2003, the net assets of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund (ticker symbol: VFINX) and the
AXP Extra Income Fund (ticker symbol: INEAX) are given by http://nance.yahoo.com/ as $59.7 billion
and $1.5 billion, respectively, and the descriptions of the two funds are as follows:
\The Vanguard 500 Index Fund seeks investment results that correspond with the price and yield per-
formance of the S&P 500 Index. The fund employs a passive management strategy designed to track the
performance of the S&P 500 Index, which is dominated by the stocks of large U.S. companies. It attempts
to replicate the target index by investing all or substantially all of its assets in the stocks that make up the
index."
\AXP Extra Income Fund seeks high current income; capital appreciation is secondary. The fund ordinarily
invests in long-term high-yielding, lower-rated corporate bonds. These bonds may be issued by U.S. and
foreign companies and governments. The fund may invest in other instruments such as: money market
securities, convertible securities, preferred stocks, derivatives (such as futures, options and forward contracts),
and common stocks."
41Market betas were obtained by regressing returns on a constant and the total return of the S&P 500,
and contemporaneous and lagged market betas were obtained by regressing returns on a constant, the
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Figure 6: Estimated smoothing coecients ^ 0 in the interval [0;2] for 1,837 funds in the TASS
Hedge Fund database with at least ve years of returns during the period from February 1977
to August 2004, ordered by categories 1 to 11. Of the 1,837 funds in the sample, only 9 funds
yielded ^ 0's greater than 2 and have been omitted to preserve the resolution of the graph. Cat-
egory denitions: 1=Convertible Arbitrage, 2=Dedicated Short Bias, 3=Emerging Markets,
4=Equity Market-Neutral, 5=Event Driven, 6=Fixed-Income Arbitrage, 7=Global Macro,
8=Long/Short Equity, 9=Managed Futures, 10=Multi-Strategy, 11=Fund of Funds.
52Ibbotson Long-Term Government Bond Index, and lagged market betas that are statistically
indistinguishable from 0. However, the values of ^ 0 of the less liquid portfolios are less
than 1.00: 0.82 for the Ibbotson Small Company Index, 0.84 for the Ibbotson Long-Term
Corporate Bond Index, 0.82 for the Merrill Lynch Convertible Securities Index, and 0.67 for
the American Express Extra Income Fund, and their rst-order serial correlation coecients
are 15:6%, 15:6%, 6:4% and 35:4%, respectively, which, with the exception of the Merrill
Lynch Convertible Securities Index, are considerably higher than those of the more liquid
portfolios.42 Also, the lagged market betas are statistically signicant at the 5% level for
the Ibbotson Small Company Index (a t-statistic for ^ 1: 5.41), the Ibbotson Long-Term
Government Bond Index (t-statistic for ^ 1:  2:30), the Merrill Lynch Convertible Securities
Index (t-statistic for ^ 1: 3.33), and the AXP Extra Income Fund (t-statistic for ^ 1: 4.64).
The results for the CSFB Hedge Fund Indexes in the second panel of Table 17 are also con-
sistent with the empirical results in Tables 15 and 16|indexes corresponding to hedge-fund
strategies involving less liquid securities tend to have lower ^ 0's. For example, the smoothing-
parameter estimates ^ 0 of the Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, and Fixed-Income
Arbitrage Indexes are 0.49, 0.75, and 0.63, respectively, and rst-order serial correlation
coecients of 56:6%, 29:4%, and 39:6%, respectively. In contrast, the smoothing-parameter
estimates of the more liquid hedge-fund strategies such as Dedicated Short Bias and Man-
aged Futures are 0.99 and 1.04, respectively, with rst-order serial correlation coecients of
7:8% and 3:2%, respectively.
While these ndings are generally consistent with the results in Tables 15 and 16, it
should be noted that the process of aggregation can change the statistical behavior of any
time series. For example, Granger (1980, 1988) observes that the aggregation of a large
number of stationary autoregressive processes can yield a time series that exhibits long-term
memory, characterized by serial correlation coecients that decay very slowly (hyperboli-
cally, as opposed to geometrically as in the case of a stationary ARMA process). Therefore,
while it is true that the aggregation of a collection of illiquid funds will generally yield an
index with smoothed returns,43 the reverse need not be true|smoothed index returns need
not imply that all of the funds comprising the index are illiquid. The latter inference can only
be made with the benet of additional information|essentially identication restrictions|
42However, note that the second-order autocorrelation of the Merrill Lynch Convertible Securities Index is
12:0% which is second only to the AXP Extra Income Fund in absolute magnitude, two orders of magnitude
larger than the second-order autocorrelation of the Ibbotson bond indexes, and one order of magnitude larger
than the Ibbotson stock indexes.
43It is, of course, possible that the smoothing coecients of some funds may exactly oset those of other
funds so as to reduce the degree of smoothing in an aggregate index. However, such a possibility is extremely
remote and pathological if each of the component funds exhibits a high degree of smoothing.
53about the statistical relations among the funds in the index, i.e., covariances and possibly
other higher-order co-moments, or the existence of common factors driving fund returns.
It is interesting to note that the rst lagged market beta, ^ 1, for the CSFB/Tremont
Indexes is statistically signicant at the 5% level in only three cases (Convertible Arbitrage,
Event Driven, and Managed Futures), but the second lagged beta, ^ 2, is signicant in ve
cases (the overall index, Convertible Arbitrage, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Global Macro,
and Long/Short). Obviously, the S&P 500 Index is likely to be inappropriate for certain
styles, e.g., Emerging Markets, and these somewhat inconsistent results suggest that using
a lagged market-beta adjustment may not completely account for the impact of illiquidity
and smoothed returns.
Overall, the patterns in Table 17 conrm our interpretation of smoothing coecients and
serial correlation as proxies for liquidity, and suggest that there may be broader applications
of this model of smoothed returns to other investment strategies and asset classes.
4.4 An Aggregate Measure of Illiquidity
Having established the relevance of serial correlation as a proxy for illiquidity, we now turn
to the measurement of illiquidity in the context of systemic risk. To that end, let 1t;i denote
the rst-order autocorrelation coecient in month t for fund i using a rolling window of
past returns. Then an aggregate measure of illiquidity 
t in the hedge-fund sector may be
obtained by a cross-sectional weighted average of these rolling autocorrelations, where the












where Nt is the number of funds in the sample in month t, and AUMjt is the assets under
management for fund j in month t.
Figure 7 plots these weighted correlations from January 1980 to August 2004 using all
funds in the TASS Combined database with at least 36 consecutive trailing months of non-
missing returns, along with the number of funds each month (at the bottom, measured by
the right vertical axis), and the median correlation in the cross section (in yellow).44 The
44The number of funds in the early years is relatively low, reaching a level of 50 or more only in late 1988,
therefore the weighted correlations before then may be somewhat less informative.
54Summary Statistics and Smoothing Parameter Estimates for Various Indexes and Mutual Funds
Market Model Contemporaneous and Lagged Market Model
Series Period T Mean SD ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 3
^  SE(^ ) R2
^ 0 SE(^ 0) ^ 1 SE(^ 1) ^ 2 SE(^ 2) R2 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
(%) (%)
Ibbotson Small Company 192601{200112 912 1:35 8:63 15:6 1:7  10:6 1:27 0:03 66:9 1:25 0:03 0:16 0:03 0:03 0:03 68:0
Ibbotson Long-Term Government Bonds 192601{200112 912 0:46 2:22 6:7 0:3  8:3 0:07 0:01 2:8 0:07 0:01  0:03 0:01  0:02 0:01 3:6
Ibbotson Long-Term Corporate Bonds 192601{200112 912 0:49 1:96 15:6 0:3  6:0 0:08 0:01 5:2 0:08 0:01  0:01 0:01  0:01 0:01 5:3
Ibbotson Large Company 192601{200112 912 1:03 5:57 9:8  3:2  10:7 1:00 0:00 100:0 1:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 100:0
Merrill Lynch Convertibles Index 199401{200210 168 0:99 3:43 6:4 12:0 5:1 0:59 0:05 48:6 0:60 0:05 0:15 0:05 0:07 0:04 52:2
AXP Extra Income Fund (INEAX) 198401{200112 216 0:67 2:04 35:4 13:1 2:5 0:21 0:03 20:7 0:21 0:03 0:12 0:03 0:04 0:03 28:7
Vanguard 500 Index Trust (VFINX) 197609{200112 304 1:16 4:36  2:3  6:8  3:2 1:00 0:00 100:0 1:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 100:0
CSFB/Tremont Indices:
Aggregate Hedge Fund Index 199401{200210 106 0:87 2:58 11:2 4:1  0:4 0:31 0:05 24:9 0:32 0:05 0:06 0:05 0:16 0:05 32:1
Convertible Arbitrage 199401{200210 106 0:81 1:40 56:6 42:6 15:6 0:03 0:03 1:1 0:04 0:03 0:09 0:03 0:06 0:03 12:0
Dedicated Short Bias 199401{200210 106 0:22 5:29 7:8  6:3  5:0  0:94 0:08 58:6  0:93 0:08  0:06 0:08 0:08 0:08 59:3
Emerging Markets 199401{200210 106 0:54 5:38 29:4 1:2  2:1 0:62 0:11 24:0 0:63 0:11 0:19 0:11 0:03 0:12 26:2
Equity Market Neutral 199401{200210 106 0:89 0:92 29:4 18:1 8:4 0:10 0:02 21:1 0:10 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:00 0:02 22:1
Event Driven 199401{200210 106 0:83 1:81 34:8 14:7 3:8 0:23 0:04 30:2 0:23 0:03 0:11 0:03 0:04 0:03 38:2
Fixed Income Arbitrage 199401{200210 106 0:55 1:18 39:6 10:8 5:4 0:02 0:03 0:7 0:03 0:03 0:05 0:03 0:09 0:03 12:9
Global Macro 199401{200210 106 1:17 3:69 5:6 4:6 8:3 0:24 0:09 7:5 0:26 0:09  0:01 0:09 0:23 0:09 14:1
Long/Short 199401{200210 106 0:98 3:34 15:9 5:9  4:6 0:48 0:06 36:7 0:49 0:06 0:06 0:06 0:15 0:06 40:7
Managed Futures 199401{200210 106 0:55 3:44 3:2  6:3 0:7  0:12 0:08 2:5  0:13 0:08  0:17 0:08 0:02 0:08 7:8
Series Period T ^ 0 SE(^ 0) ^ 1 SE(^ 1) ^ 2 SE(^ 2) ^ 
Ibbotson Small Company 192601{200112 912 0:82 0:03 0:13 0:02 0:04 0:03 0:69
Ibbotson Long-Term Government Bonds 192601{200112 912 0:92 0:05 0:06 0:03 0:01 0:03 0:86
Ibbotson Long-Term Corporate Bonds 192601{200112 912 0:84 0:04 0:14 0:02 0:02 0:03 0:73
Ibbotson Large Company 192601{200112 912 0:92 0:05 0:09 0:03  0:01 0:03 0:85
Merrill Lynch Convertibles Index 199401{200210 168 0:82 0:07 0:02 0:06 0:16 0:05 0:70
AXP Extra Income Fund (INEAX) 198401{200112 216 0:67 0:03 0:24 0:03 0:09 0:04 0:51
Vanguard 500 Index Trust (VFINX) 197609{200112 304 1:12 0:17  0:03 0:07  0:09 0:07 1:26
CSFB/Tremont Indices:
Aggregate Hedge Fund Index 199401{200210 106 0:86 0:12 0:09 0:08 0:04 0:08 0:76
Convertible Arbitrage 199401{200210 106 0:49 0:01 0:26 0:03 0:25 0:03 0:37
Dedicated Short Bias 199401{200210 106 0:99 0:20 0:08 0:09  0:07 0:10 0:99
Emerging Markets 199401{200210 106 0:75 0:08 0:24 0:05 0:01 0:07 0:62
Equity Market Neutral 199401{200210 106 0:71 0:06 0:18 0:05 0:12 0:06 0:54
Event Driven 199401{200210 106 0:68 0:05 0:23 0:05 0:09 0:06 0:52
Fixed Income Arbitrage 199401{200210 106 0:63 0:04 0:28 0:04 0:08 0:05 0:49
Global Macro 199401{200210 106 0:91 0:14 0:04 0:08 0:05 0:08 0:84
Long/Short 199401{200210 106 0:82 0:10 0:13 0:07 0:06 0:07 0:68
Managed Futures 199401{200210 106 1:04 0:23 0:04 0:10  0:08 0:11 1:08
Table 17: Summary statistics and maximum-likelihood estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro




2, subject to the normalization 1 = 0 + 1 + 2, for the returns of various indexes and two mutual funds, the
Vanguard 500 Index Trust (which tracks the S&P 500 index), and the AXP Extra Income Fund (which focuses on high current
income and invests in long-term high-yielding lower-rated corporate bonds). Total returns of the S&P 500 index are used for
both market models.
5
5median correlation is quite dierent from the asset-weighted correlation in the earlier part
of the sample, but as the number of funds increases over time, the behavior of the median
becomes closer to that of 
t.
Figure 7 also shows considerable swings in 
t over time, with dynamics that seem to be
related to liquidity events. In particular, consider the following events: between November
1980 and July 1982, the S&P 500 dropped 23:8%; in October 1987 the S&P 500 fell by
21:8%; in 1990, the Japanese \bubble economy" burst; in August 1990, the Persian Gulf
War began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, ending in January 1991 with Kuwait's liberation
by coalition forces; in February 1994, the U.S. Federal Reserve started a tightening cycle
that caught many hedge funds by surprise, causing signicant dislocation in bond markets
worldwide; the end of 1994 witnessed the start of the \Tequila Crisis" in Mexico; in August
1998, Russia defaulted on its government debt; and between August 2000 and September
2002, the S&P 500 fell by 46:3%. In each of these cases, the weighted autocorrelation rose
in the aftermath, and in most cases abruptly. Of course, the fact that we are using a 36-
month rolling window suggests that as outliers drop out of the window, correlations can
shift dramatically. However, as a coarse measure of liquidity in the hedge-fund sector, the
weighted autocorrelation seems to be intuitively appealing and informative.
5 Hedge-Fund Liquidations
Since the collapse of LTCM in 1998, it has become clear that hedge-fund liquidations can
be a signicant source of systemic risk. In this section, we consider several measures of
liquidation probabilities for hedge funds in the TASS database, including a review of hedge-
fund attrition rates documented in Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004) and a logit analysis of
hedge-funds liquidationsin the TASS Graveyard database.
Because of the voluntary nature of inclusion in the TASS database, Graveyard funds do
not consist solely of liquidations. TASS gives one of seven distinct reasons for each fund
that is assigned to the Graveyard, summarized in Table 18. It may seem reasonable to
conne our attention to those Graveyard funds categorized as \liquidated" (status code 1)
or perhaps to drop those funds that are closed to new investment (status code 4) from our
sample. However, because our purpose is to develop a broader perspective on the dynamics
of the hedge-fund industry, we argue that using the entire Graveyard database may be
more informative. For example, by eliminating Graveyard funds that are closed to new
investors, we create a downward bias in the performance statistics of the remaining funds.

















































Asset-Weighted Autocorrelation Number of Funds Median Autocorrelation
Figure 7: Monthly cross-sectional median and weighted-mean rst-order autocorrelation
coecients of individual hedge funds in the TASS Combined hedge-fund database with at
least 36 consecutive trailing months of returns, from January 1980 to August 2004.
57determine how any particular selection criterion will aect the statistical properties of the
remainder. Therefore, we choose to include the entire set of Graveyard funds in our analysis,




2 Fund No Longer Reporting to TASS
3 TASS Has Been Unable to Contact The Manager for Updated Information
4 Fund Closed to New Investment
5 Fund Has Merged Into Another Entity
7 Fund Dormant
9 Unknown
Table 18: TASS status codes for funds in the Graveyard database.
For concreteness, Table 19 reports frequency counts for Graveyard funds in each status
code and style category, as well as assets under management at the time of transfer to the
Graveyard.45 These counts show that 1,571 of the 1,765 Graveyard funds, or 89%, fall into the
rst three categories, categories that can plausibly be considered liquidations, and within
each of these three categories, the relative frequencies across style categories are roughly
comparable, with Long/Short Equity being the most numerous and Dedicated Shortseller
being the least numerous. Of the remaining 194 funds with status codes 4{9, only status
code 4|funds that are closed to new investors|is distinctly dierent in character from the
other status codes. There are only 7 funds in this category, and these funds are all likely to be
\success stories", providing some counterbalance to the many liquidations in the Graveyard
sample. Of course, this is not to say that 7 out of 1,765 is a reasonable estimate of the
success rate in the hedge-fund industry, because we have not included any of the Live funds
in this calculation. Nevertheless, these 7 funds in the Graveyard sample do underscore the
fact that hedge-fund data are subject to a variety of biases that do not always point in the
same direction, and we prefer to leave them in so as to re
ect these biases as they occur
naturally rather than to create new biases of our own. For the remainder of this article, we
45Of the 1,765 funds in the Graveyard database, 4 funds did not have status codes assigned, hence we
coded them as 9's (\Unknown"). They are 3882 (Fund of Funds), 34053 (Managed Futures), 34054 (Managed
Futures), 34904 (Long/Short Equity).




























1 913   19    7    78    65    50    29    53    257    190    30    135   
2 511   21    4    34    12    56    26    29    187    43    7    92   
3 147   4    1    7    8    17    3    17    54    18    1    17   
4 7   0    0    0    0    1    2    0    3    0    0    1   
5 56   2    1    5    0    6    3    6    16    9    1    7   
7 2   0    0    0    0    1    0    0    1    0    0    0   
9 129   3    2    9    2    3    8    9    14    56    2    21   
Total 1,765   49    15    133    87    134    71    114    532    316    41    273   
1 18,754  1,168   62   1,677   1,656   2,047   1,712   2,615   4,468   975   641   1,732  
2 36,366  6,420   300   848   992   7,132   2,245   678   10,164   537   882   6,167  
3 4,127  45   34   729   133   1,398   50   115   931   269   2   423  
4 487  0   0   0   0   100   31   0   250   0   0   106  
5 3,135  12   31   143   0   222   419   1,775   473   33   3   24  
7 8  0   0   0   0   6   0   0   2   0   0   0  
9 3,052  42   18   222   9   159   152   32   193   1,671   18   538  
Total 65,931  7,686   445   3,620   2,789   11,063   4,610   5,215   16,482   3,484   1,546   8,991  
Frequency Count
Assets Under Management
Table 19: Frequency counts and assets under management (in millions of dollars) of funds
in the TASS Graveyard database by category and Graveyard inclusion code. Assets under
management are at the time of transfer into the Graveyard database.
Figure 8 provides a visual comparison of average means, standard deviations, Sharpe
ratios, and rst-order autocorrelation coecients 1 in the Live and Graveyard databases
(Table 12 contains basic summary statistics for the funds in the TASS Live, Graveyard, and
Combined databases). Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of variation in mean returns
and volatilities both across and within categories and databases. For example, the 127
Convertible Arbitrage funds in the Live database have an average mean return of 9.92% and
an average standard deviation of 5.51%, but in the Graveyard database, the 49 Convertible
Arbitrage funds have an average mean return of 10.02% and a much higher average standard
deviation of 8.14%. As expected, average volatilities in the Graveyard database are uniformly
higher than those in the Live database because the higher-volatility funds are more likely to
be eliminated. This eect operates at both ends of the return distribution|funds that are
wildly successful are also more likely to leave the database since they have less motivation
to advertise their performance. That the Graveyard database also contains successful funds
is supported by the fact that in some categories, the average mean return in the Graveyard
59database is the same as or higher than in the Live database, e.g., Convertible Arbitrage,
















































































































































Figure 8: Comparison of average means, standard deviations, Sharpe ratios, and rst-order
autocorrelation coecients for categories of funds in the TASS Live and Graveyard databases
from January 1994 to August 2004.
Figure 9 displays the histogram of year-to-date returns at the time of liquidation. The
fact that the distribution is skewed to the left is consistent with the conventional wisdom that
performance is a major factor in determining the fate of a hedge fund. However, note that
there is nontrivial weight in right half of the distribution, suggesting that recent performance
is not the only relevant factor.
Finally, Figure 10 provides a summary of two key characteristics of the Graveyard funds:
the age distribution of funds at the time of liquidation, and the distribution of their assets
under management. The median age of Graveyard funds is 45 months, hence half of all
liquidated funds never reached their fourth anniversary. The mode of the distribution is 36



















Figure 9: Histogram of year-to-date return at the time of liquidation of hedge funds in the
TASS Graveyard database, January 1994 to August 2004.
million, not an uncommon size for the typical startup hedge fund.
In Section 5.1, we document the attrition rates of funds in the TASS database, both
in the aggregate and for each style category. These attrition rates provide crude baseline
measures of the likelihood of liquidation for a given fund. To develop a more precise measure
that allows for cross-sectional variability in the likelihood of liquidation|as a function of
fund characteristics such as assets under management and recent performance|we estimate
a logit model for hedge-fund liquidations in Section 5.2.
5.1 Attrition Rates
To develop a sense of the dynamics of the TASS database and the birth and death rates of
hedge funds over the past decade,46 in Table 20 we report annual frequency counts of the
funds in the database at the start of each year, funds entering the Live database during the
year, funds exiting during the year and moving to the Graveyard database, and funds entering
and exiting within the year. The panel labelled \All Funds" contains frequency counts for
all funds, and the remaining 11 panels contain the same statistics for each category. Also
included in Table 20 are attrition rates, dened as the ratio of funds exiting in a given year
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(b) Assets Under Management
Figure 10: Histograms of age distribution and assets under management at the time of
liquidation for funds in the TASS Graveyard database, January 1994 to August 2004.
to the number of existing funds at the start of the year, and the performance of the category
as measured by the annual compound return of the CSFB/Tremont Index for that category.
For the unltered sample of all funds in the TASS database, and over the sample period
from 1994 to 2003, the average attrition rate is 8.8%.47 This is similar to the 8.5% attrition
rate obtained by Liang (2001) for the 1994-to-1999 sample period. The aggregate attrition
rate rises in 1998, partly due to LTCM's demise and the dislocation caused by its aftermath.
The attrition rate increases to a peak of 11.4% in 2001, mostly due to the Long/Short Equity
category|presumably the result of the bursting of the technology bubble.
Although 8.8% is the average attrition rate for the entire TASS database, there is consid-
erable variation in average attrition rates across categories. Averaging the annual attrition
47We do not include 2004 in this average because TASS typically waits 8 to 10 months before moving
a non-reporting fund from the Live to the Graveyard database. Therefore, the attrition rate is severely
downward biased for 2004 since the year is not yet complete, and many non-reporting funds in the Live
database have not yet been classied as Graveyard funds. Also, note that there is only 1 new fund in 2004|
this gure is grossly downward-biased as well. Hedge funds often go through an \incubation period" where
managers trade with limited resources to develop a track record. If successful, the manager will provide the
return stream to a database vendor like TASS, and the vendor usually enters the entire track record into the
database, providing the fund with an \instant history". According to Fung and Hsieh (2000), the average
incubation period|from a fund's inception to its entry into the TASS database|is one year.
62rates from 1994{2003 within each category yields the following:
Convertible Arbitrage: 5.2% Global Macro: 12.6%
Dedicated Shortseller: 8.0% Long/Short Equity: 7.6%
Emerging Markets: 9.2% Managed Futures: 14.4%
Equity Market Neutral: 8.0% Multi-Strategy: 8.2%
Event Driven: 5.4% Fund of Funds: 6.9%
Fixed Income Arbitrage: 10.6%
These averages illustrate the dierent risks involved in each of the 11 investment styles. At
5.2%, Convertible Arbitrage enjoys the lowest average attrition rate, which is not surprising
since this category has the second-lowest average return volatility of 5.89% (see Table 12).
The highest average attrition rate is 14.4% for Managed Futures, which is also consistent
with the 18.55% average volatility of this category, the highest among all 11 categories.
Within each category, the year-to-year attrition rates exhibit dierent patterns, partly
attributable to the relative performance of the categories. For example, Emerging Markets
experienced a 16.1% attrition rate in 1998, no doubt because of the turmoil in emerging
markets in 1997 and 1998, which is re
ected in the  37:7% return in the CSFB/Tremont
Index Emerging Markets Index for 1998. The opposite pattern is also present|during pe-
riods of unusually good performance, attrition rates decline, as in the case of Long/Short
Equity from 1995 to 2000 where attrition rates were 3.2%, 7.4%, 3.9%, 6.8%, 7.4% and
8.0%, respectively. Of course, in the three years following the bursting of the technology
bubble|2001 to 2003|the attrition rates for Long/Short Equity shot up to 13.4%, 12.4%,
and 12.3%, respectively. These patterns are consistent with the basic economic of the hedge-
fund industry: good performance begets more assets under management, greater business
leverage, and staying power; poor performance leads to the Graveyard.
To develop a better sense of the relative magnitudes of attrition across categories, Table
21 and Figure 11(a) provide a decomposition by category where the attrition rates in each
category are renormalized so that when they are summed across categories in a given year,
the result equals the aggregate attrition rate for that year. From these renormalized gures,
it is apparent that there is an increase in the proportion of the total attrition rate due to
Long/Short Equity funds beginning in 2001. In fact, Table 21 shows that of the total attrition
rates of 11.4%, 10.0%, and 10.7% in years 2001{2003, the Long/Short Equity category was
responsible for 4.8, 4.3, and 4.1 percentage points of those totals, respectively. Despite the
fact that the average attrition rate for the Long/Short Equity category is only 7.6% from
631994 to 2003, the funds in this category are more numerous, hence they contribute more to
the aggregate attrition rate. Figure 11(b) provides a measure of the impact of these attrition
rates on the industry by plotting the total assets under management of funds in the TASS
database along with the relative proportions in each category. Long/Short Equity funds are
indeed a signicant fraction of the industry, hence the increase in their attrition rates in
























































1994 769    251     23     2     997   3.0    -4.4   12    7     1     0     18   8.3    -2.0   168    52     2     0     218   1.2    -8.1  
1995 997    299     61     1     1,235   6.1    21.7   18    10     0     0     28   0.0    11.0   218    74     7     0     285   3.2    23.0  
1996 1,235    332     120     9     1,447   9.7    22.2   28    10     0     0     38   0.0    16.6   285    116     21     2     380   7.4    17.1  
1997 1,447    356     100     6     1,703   6.9    25.9   38    14     0     0     52   0.0    14.8   380    118     15     2     483   3.9    21.5  
1998 1,703    346     162     9     1,887   9.5    -0.4   52    29     2     2     79   3.8    13.3   483    117     33     2     567   6.8    17.2  
1999 1,887    403     183     7     2,107   9.7    23.4   79    36     14     1     101   17.7    15.3   567    159     42     3     684   7.4    47.2  
2000 2,107    391     234     9     2,264   11.1    4.8   101    17     13     0     105   12.9    15.0   684    186     55     5     815   8.0    2.1  
2001 2,264    460     257     6     2,467   11.4    4.4   105    49     9     0     145   8.6    9.3   815    156     109     3     862   13.4    -3.7  
2002 2,467    432     246     9     2,653   10.0    3.0   145    41     14     2     172   9.7    7.4   862    137     107     5     892   12.4    -1.6  
2003 2,653    325     285     12     2,693   10.7    15.5   172    23     32     0     163   18.6    7.1   892    83     110     2     865   12.3    17.3  
2004 2,693    1     87     1     2,607   3.2    2.7   163    0     5     0     158   3.1    4.7   865    0     27     0     838   3.1    1.5  
1994 26    13     0     0     39   0.0    -8.1   71    16     0     0     87   0.0    0.7   181    52     8     1     225   4.4    11.9  
1995 39    12     0     0     51   0.0    16.6   87    27     1     0     113   1.1    18.4   225    41     30     0     236   13.3    -7.1  
1996 51    14     7     0     58   13.7    17.9   113    29     3     0     139   2.7    23.0   236    42     49     2     229   20.8    12.0  
1997 58    10     3     0     65   5.2    14.5   139    31     3     0     167   2.2    20.0   229    37     36     1     230   15.7    3.1  
1998 65    14     5     0     74   7.7    -4.4   167    28     2     1     193   1.2    -4.9   230    25     37     0     218   16.1    20.7  
1999 74    10     3     0     81   4.1    16.0   193    29     19     1     203   9.8    22.3   218    35     40     1     213   18.3    -4.7  
2000 81    17     3     0     95   3.7    25.6   203    38     15     0     226   7.4    7.2   213    13     35     0     191   16.4    4.3  
2001 95    25     5     0     115   5.3    14.6   226    34     19     3     241   8.4    11.5   191    18     19     0     190   9.9    1.9  
2002 115    22     6     0     131   5.2    4.0   241    40     30     2     251   12.4    0.2   190    22     32     0     180   16.8    18.3  
2003 131    11     10     0     132   7.6    12.9   251    21     23     1     249   9.2    20.0   180    23     21     2     182   11.7    14.2  
2004 132    0     10     0     122   7.6    0.6   249    0     15     0     234   6.0    5.7   182    0     5     0     177   2.7    -7.0  
1994 11    1     0     0     12   0.0    14.9   22    16     3     0     35   13.6    0.3   17    5     3     1     19   17.6    —
1995 12    0     1     0     11   8.3    -7.4   35    12     2     0     45   5.7    12.5   19    7     2     0     24   10.5    11.9  
1996 11    3     1     0     13   9.1    -5.5   45    16     4     0     57   8.9    15.9   24    14     1     0     37   4.2    14.0  
1997 13    3     1     0     15   7.7    0.4   57    15     4     1     68   7.0    9.4   37    13     3     0     47   8.1    18.3  
1998 15    1     0     0     16   0.0    -6.0   68    16     14     0     70   20.6    -8.2   47    8     5     1     50   10.6    7.7  
1999 16    4     1     0     19   6.3    -14.2   70    13     8     0     75   11.4    12.1   50    10     2     0     58   4.0    9.4  
2000 19    2     1     0     20   5.3    15.8   75    9     11     0     73   14.7    6.3   58    10     2     1     66   3.4    11.2  
2001 20    1     6     0     15   30.0    -3.6   73    20     7     0     86   9.6    8.0   66    16     1     0     81   1.5    5.5  
2002 15    1     1     0     15   6.7    18.2   86    23     5     0     104   5.8    5.7   81    14     5     0     90   6.2    6.3  
2003 15    1     1     0     15   6.7    -32.6   104    12     9     0     107   8.7    8.0   90    14     14     4     90   15.6    15.0  
2004 15    0     2     0     13   13.3    9.1   107    0     4     0     103   3.7    4.7   90    0     0     0     90   0.0    2.8  
1994 44    25     0     0     69    0.0    12.5    50    11     3     0     58    6.0    -5.7    167    53     3     0     217    1.8    —
1995 69    34     1     0     102    1.4    -16.9    58    19     5     0     72    8.6    30.7    217    63     12     1     268    5.5    —
1996 102    25     4     0     123    3.9    34.5    72    16     13     4     75    18.1    25.6    268    47     17     1     298    6.3    —
1997 123    40     8     0     155    6.5    26.6    75    19     6     1     88    8.0    37.1    298    56     21     1     333    7.0    —
1998 155    22     25     1     152    16.1    -37.7    88    20     7     2     101    8.0    -3.6    333    66     32     0     367    9.6    —
1999 152    26     18     0     160    11.8    44.8    101    12     15     1     98    14.9    5.8    367    69     21     0     415    5.7    —
2000 160    20     25     2     155    15.6    -5.5    98    18     33     0     83    33.7    11.7    415    61     41     1     435    9.9    —
2001 155    5     28     0     132    18.1    5.8    83    15     9     0     89    10.8    18.4    435    121     45     0     511    10.3    —
2002 132    4     11     0     125    8.3    7.4    89    26     9     0     106    10.1    14.7    511    102     26     0     587    5.1    —
2003 125    12     13     1     124    10.4    28.7    106    15     8     1     113    7.5    18.0    587    110     44     1     653    7.5    —













Table 20: Attrition rates for all hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund database, and within each style category, from January
1994 to August 2004. Index returns are annual compound returns of the CSFB/Tremont Hedge-Fund Indexes. Note: attrition
rates for 2004 are severely downward-biased because TASS typically waits 8 to 10 months before moving a non-reporting fund
from the Live to the Graveyard database; therefore, as of August 2004, many non-reporting funds in the Live database have
not yet been moved to the Graveyard.
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Figure 11: Attrition rates and total assets under management for funds in the TASS Live
and Graveyard database from January 1994 to August 2004. Note: the data for 2004 is
incomplete, and attrition rates for this year are severely downward biased because of a 8- to
10-month lag in transferring non-reporting funds from the Live to the Graveyard database.
5.2 Logit Analysis of Liquidations
To estimate the in
uence of various hedge-fund characteristics on the likelihood of liqui-
dation, in this section we report the results of a logit analysis of liquidations in the TASS
database. Logit can be viewed as a generalization of the linear regression model to situa-
tions where the dependent variable takes on only a nite number of discrete values (see, for
example, Maddala, 1983, for details). The logit model is based on a \virtual" regression
equation with an unobserved continuous dependent variable Z whose conditional mean is a
linear function of observed \explanatory" variables X:
Z
 = X
0 +  : (29)
Although Z is unobserved, it is related to an observable discrete random variable Z, whose
realizations are determined by where Z lies in its domain or state space. By partitioning
the state space into a nite number of distinct regions, Z may be viewed as an indicator
function for Z over these regions. For example, a binary random variable Z taking on the

























1994 3.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.1     0.0     0.4     0.4     0.3     1.0     0.4     0.4    
1995 6.1     0.0     0.1     0.1     0.0     0.1     0.2     0.5     0.7     3.0     0.2     1.2    
1996 9.7     0.6     0.1     0.3     0.0     0.2     0.3     1.1     1.7     4.0     0.1     1.4    
1997 6.9     0.2     0.1     0.6     0.0     0.2     0.3     0.4     1.0     2.5     0.2     1.5    
1998 9.5     0.3     0.0     1.5     0.1     0.1     0.8     0.4     1.9     2.2     0.3     1.9    
1999 9.7     0.2     0.1     1.0     0.7     1.0     0.4     0.8     2.2     2.1     0.1     1.1    
2000 11.1     0.1     0.0     1.2     0.6     0.7     0.5     1.6     2.6     1.7     0.1     1.9    
2001 11.4     0.2     0.3     1.2     0.4     0.8     0.3     0.4     4.8     0.8     0.0     2.0    
2002 10.0     0.2     0.0     0.4     0.6     1.2     0.2     0.4     4.3     1.3     0.2     1.1    
2003 10.7     0.4     0.0     0.5     1.2     0.9     0.3     0.3     4.1     0.8     0.5     1.7    
2004 3.2     0.4     0.1     0.0     0.2     0.6     0.1     0.0     1.0     0.2     0.0     0.6    
Mean 8.8     0.2     0.1     0.7     0.4     0.5     0.4     0.6     2.4     1.9     0.2     1.4    
SD 2.7     0.2     0.1     0.5     0.4     0.4     0.2     0.4     1.6     1.0     0.2     0.5    
1994 -4.4     -8.1     14.9     12.5     -2.0     0.7     0.3     -5.7     -8.1     11.9     — —
1995 21.7     16.6     -7.4     -16.9     11.0     18.4     12.5     30.7     23.0     -7.1     11.9     —
1996 22.2     17.9     -5.5     34.5     16.6     23.0     15.9     25.6     17.1     12.0     14.0     —
1997 25.9     14.5     0.4     26.6     14.8     20.0     9.4     37.1     21.5     3.1     18.3     —
1998 -0.4     -4.4     -6.0     -37.7     13.3     -4.9     -8.2     -3.6     17.2     20.7     7.7     —
1999 23.4     16.0     -14.2     44.8     15.3     22.3     12.1     5.8     47.2     -4.7     9.4     —
2000 4.8     25.6     15.8     -5.5     15.0     7.2     6.3     11.7     2.1     4.3     11.2     —
2001 4.4     14.6     -3.6     5.8     9.3     11.5     8.0     18.4     -3.7     1.9     5.5     —
2002 3.0     4.0     18.2     7.4     7.4     0.2     5.7     14.7     -1.6     18.3     6.3     —
2003 15.5     12.9     -32.6     28.7     7.1     20.0     8.0     18.0     17.3     14.2     15.0     —
2004 2.7     0.6     9.1     3.1     4.7     5.7     4.7     4.4     1.5     -7.0     2.8     —
Mean 11.6     11.0     -2.0     10.0     10.8     11.8     7.0     15.3     13.2     7.5     11.0     —
SD 11.3     10.5     15.5     25.2     5.6     10.4     6.8     13.9     16.5     9.4     4.3     —
1994 57,684  3.8     0.7     9.3     1.0     9.5     3.9     20.5     20.7     5.1     7.5     18.0    
1995 69,477  3.9     0.5     8.1     1.3     10.0     4.7     18.5     22.9     4.0     9.2     17.0    
1996 92,513  4.2     0.4     8.7     2.3     10.1     5.9     17.9     23.4     3.2     7.8     16.1    
1997 137,814  4.7     0.4     8.9     2.7     10.4     6.7     18.8     21.9     2.7     7.5     15.3    
1998 142,669  5.5     0.6     4.0     4.4     12.5     5.7     16.8     24.4     3.3     6.8     16.0    
1999 175,223  5.3     0.6     4.6     5.2     11.7     4.6     9.1     34.5     2.8     6.6     15.1    
2000 197,120  5.4     0.5     2.5     5.5     10.6     3.3     1.9     31.1     1.9     4.4     12.7    
2001 246,695  8.1     0.3     2.8     7.4     13.9     4.7     2.3     35.3     3.0     5.5     16.6    
2002 277,695  8.5     0.3     3.1     7.2     13.0     6.2     3.1     30.2     3.9     6.1     18.4    
2003 389,965  8.8     0.1     4.3     6.0     13.0     6.2     5.4     25.7     5.0     5.8     19.7    
2004 403,974  8.8     0.2     4.2     5.9     13.5     7.1     6.6     26.3     5.3     6.8     15.3    
Mean 178,685  5.8     0.5     5.6     4.3     11.5     5.2     11.4     27.0     3.5     6.7     16.5    
SD 103,484  1.9     0.2     2.8     2.4     1.5     1.1     7.8     5.3     1.0     1.4     2.0    
Total Attrition Rates and Components by Category (in %)
Total Assets Under Management (in $MM) and Percent Breakdown by Category (in %)
Annual Returns of CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Indexes by Category (in %)
Table 21: Decomposition of attribution rates by category for all hedge funds in the TASS
Hedge Fund database, from January 1994 to August 2004, and corresponding CSFB/Tremont
Hedge-Fund Index returns, and assets under management. Note: attrition rates for 2004 are
severely downward-biased because TASS typically waits 8 to 10 months before moving a
non-reporting fund from the Live to the Graveyard database; therefore, as of August 2004,
many non-reporting funds in the Live database have not yet been moved to the Graveyard.
Consequently, the reported means and standard deviations in all three panels are computed
over the 1994{2003 period.





0 if Z = X0 +   0
1 if Z = X0 +  > 0
: (30)
Logit analysis involves imposing a logistic distributional assumption on  (hence the term
\logit") and estimating the coecients , and the parameters of the distribution of , typi-
cally by maximum likelihood. Although traditional regression diagnostics such as t-statistics,
 R2, and the F-statistic do not apply, approximate counterparts are available by appealing
to the asymptotic properties of maximum-likelihood estimators (see, for example, Pregibon,
1981, and Simono, 2003).
To estimate the logit model of liquidation, we use the same sample of TASS Live and
Graveyard funds as in Section 5.1: 4,536 funds from February 1977 to August 2004, of which
1,765 are in the Graveyard database and 2,771 are in the Live database. As discussed in
Sections 3.2 and 5.1, the Graveyard database was initiated only in January 1994, hence this
will be the start date of our sample for purposes of estimating the logit model of liquidation.
For tractability, we focus on annual observations only, so the dependent variable Zit indicates
whether fund i is live or liquidated in year t.48 Table 22 provides a frequency count of the
funds entering and exiting the TASS database in each year. Not surprisingly, the number of
hedge funds in both the Live and Graveyard databases grows over time. Over the sample
period from January 1994 to August 2004, we have 23,925 distinct observations for Zit, and
after ltering out funds that do not have at least 2 years of history, we are left with 12,895
observations.
Associated with each Zit is a set of explanatory variables listed in Table 23. The moti-
vation for AGE, ASSETS, and RETURN are well-known|older funds, funds with greater
assets, and funds with better recent performance are all less likely to be liquidated, hence
we would expect negative coecients for these explanatory variables (recall that a larger
conditional mean for Z implies a higher probability that Zit=1 or liquidation). The FLOW
variable is motivated by the well-known \return-chasing" phenomenon in which investors

ock to funds that have had good recent performance, and leave funds that have underper-
48Note that a fund cannot \die" more than once, hence liquidation occurs exactly once for each fund i in
the Graveyard database. In particular, the time series observations of funds in the Graveyard database will
always be f0;0;:::;0;1g. This suggests that a more appropriate statistical technique for modeling hedge-
fund liquidations is survival analysis, which we plan to pursue in a future study. However, for purposes of
summarizing the impact of certain explanatory variables on the probability of hedge-fund liquidations, logit



























1977 3     0     0     0     0     2     0     0     0     1     0     0    
1978 2     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     1     0     1    
1979 2     0     0     0     0     0     0     1     0     1     0     0    
1980 3     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     3     0     0    
1981 3     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     1     1     0     1    
1982 4     0     0     0     0     0     1     0     1     1     0     1    
1983 9     0     0     0     0     1     0     1     3     3     0     1    
1984 15     0     0     0     0     1     1     0     6     2     0     5    
1985 9     0     1     0     0     1     0     1     0     1     0     5    
1986 22     0     0     0     0     2     1     2     5     8     0     4    
1987 28     0     0     0     0     2     0     2     10     7     1     6    
1988 33     4     2     0     0     6     0     1     2     9     1     8    
1989 43     1     0     3     3     7     1     2     7     10     0     9    
1990 102     4     3     5     1     11     0     7     24     18     2     27    
1991 89     2     2     5     1     11     1     11     17     20     1     18    
1992 155     8     0     10     4     9     7     10     37     31     2     37    
1993 247     7     3     21     3     18     10     12     55     64     10     44    
1994 251     13     1     25     7     16     16     11     52     52     5     53    
1995 299     12     0     34     10     27     12     19     74     41     7     63    
1996 332     14     3     25     10     29     16     16     116     42     14     47    
1997 356     10     3     40     14     31     15     19     118     37     13     56    
1998 346     14     1     22     29     28     16     20     117     25     8     66    
1999 403     10     4     26     36     29     13     12     159     35     10     69    
2000 391     17     2     20     17     38     9     18     186     13     10     61    
2001 460     25     1     5     49     34     20     15     156     18     16     121    
2002 432     22     1     4     41     40     23     26     137     22     14     102    
2003 325     11     1     12     23     21     12     15     83     23     14     110    
2004 1     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     1    
1994 25     0     0     0     1     0     3     3     2     9     4     3    
1995 62     0     1     1     0     1     2     5     7     30     2     13    
1996 129     7     1     4     0     3     4     17     23     51     1     18    
1997 106     3     1     8     0     3     5     7     17     37     3     22    
1998 171     5     0     26     4     3     14     9     35     37     6     32    
1999 190     3     1     18     15     20     8     16     45     41     2     21    
2000 243     3     1     27     13     15     11     33     60     35     3     42    
2001 263     5     6     28     9     22     7     9     112     19     1     45    
2002 255     6     1     11     16     32     5     9     112     32     5     26    
2003 297     10     1     14     32     24     9     9     112     23     18     45    
2004 88     10     2     1     5     15     4     1     27     5     0     18    
Number of Funds Added to the TASS Database Each Year
Number of Funds Exiting the TASS Database Each Year
Table 22: Annual frequency counts of entries into and exits out of the TASS Hedge Fund
Database from February 1977 to August 2004. Note that prior to January 1994, exits were
not tracked.
69Variable Denition
AGE: The current age of the fund (in months).
ASSETS: The natural logarithm of current total assets under management.
ASSETS 1: The natural logarithm of total assets under management as of Decem-
ber 31 of the previous year.
RETURN: Current year-to-date total return.
RETURN 1: Total return last year.
RETURN 2: Total return two years ago.
FLOW: Fund's current year-to-date total dollar in
ow divided by previous
year's assets under management, where dollar in
ow in month  is
dened as FLOW  AUM  AUM 1(1+R) and AUM is the total
assets under management at the beginning of month , R is the fund's
net return for month , and year-to-date total dollar in
ow is simply
the cumulative sum of monthly in
ows since January of the current
year.
FLOW 1: Previous year's total dollar in
ow divided by assets under management
the year before.
FLOW 2: Total dollar in
ow two years ago divided by assets under management
the year before.
Table 23: Denition of explanatory variables in logit analysis of hedge-fund liquidations in
the TASS database from January 1994 to August 2004.
70formed (see, for example, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; and Agarwal,
Daniel and Naik, 2004).
Table 24 contains summary statistics for these explanatory variables, as well as for the
dependent variable Zit. Note that the sample mean of Zit is 0.09, which may be viewed
as an unconditional estimate of the probability of liquidation, and is consistent with the
attrition rate of 8.8% reported in Section 5.1.49 The objective of performing a logit analysis
of Zit is, of course, to estimate the conditional probability of liquidation, conditional on the
explanatory variables in Table 23.
Variable Mean SD Skew Kurt Min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max
Z 0.09    0.28    2.88    6.32    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    1.00   
AGE 108.20    48.94    1.02    1.50    27        52        72        101        135        175        331       
ASSETS 17.25    1.88    -0.33    0.32    7.67    14.82    16.06    17.34    18.53    19.58    23.01   
ASSETS-1 17.20    1.79    -0.29    0.29    8.11    14.87    16.07    17.28    18.42    19.42    23.01   
RETURN 0.09    0.24    2.81    30.81    -0.96    -0.12    -0.01    0.06    0.16    0.31    4.55   
RETURN-1 0.12    0.26    2.83    28.24    -1.00    -0.11    0.01    0.10    0.20    0.37    4.55   
RETURN-2 0.13    0.32    22.37    1,340.37    -0.95    -0.10    0.01    0.10    0.22    0.38    20.85   
FLOW 0.84    66.32    112.48    12,724.87    -1.98    -0.39    -0.16    0.00    0.21    0.71    7,505.99   
FLOW-1 1.07    67.34    108.00    11,978.17    -3.15    -0.38    -0.15    0.00    0.30    1.01    7,505.99   
FLOW-2 0.85    15.82    74.41    5,857.91    -3.15    -0.33    -0.11    0.02    0.46    1.55    1,323.53   
Table 24: Summary statistics for dependent and explanatory variables of a logit analysis of
hedge-fund liquidations in the TASS database, from 1994 to 2004. Note that the dependent
variable Z takes on the value 1 in the year a hedge fund is liquidated, and is 0 in all prior
years. The units of measurement for the explanatory variables are: months for AGE, the
natural logarithm of millions of dollars for ASSETS, and raw ratios (not percentages) for
RETURN and FLOW.
The correlation matrix for Zit and the explanatory variables is given in Table 25. As
expected, Zit is negatively correlated with age, assets under management, cumulative return,
and fund 
ows, with correlations ranging from  26:2% for AGE to  5:8% for RETURN 2.
Table 25 also shows that assets under management is highly persistent, with a correlation of
94:3% between its contemporaneous and lagged values. To avoid multicollinearity problems,
we include only the lagged variable ASSETS 1 in our logit analysis, yielding the following
49A slight discrepancy should be expected since the selection criterion for the sample of funds in this section
is not identical to that of Section 5.1 (e.g., funds in the logit sample must have non-missing observations for
the explanatory variables in Table 23).
71VARIABLE Z AGE ASSETS ASSETS-1 RETURN RETURN-1 RETURN-2 FLOW FLOW-1 FLOW-2
Z 100.0    -26.2    -21.4    -17.3    -20.4    -14.6    -5.8    -13.0    -11.6    -6.8   
AGE -26.2    100.0    13.8    13.2    15.9    8.5    5.5    -3.8    -9.7    -21.4   
ASSETS -21.4    13.8    100.0    94.3    15.0    17.8    15.2    27.6    28.9    22.1   
ASSETS-1 -17.3    13.2    94.3    100.0    1.4    11.1    14.0    2.6    23.8    22.1   
RETURN -20.4    15.9    15.0    1.4    100.0    4.2    8.9    16.3    -0.7    1.0   
RETURN-1 -14.6    8.5    17.8    11.1    4.2    100.0    3.3    29.2    16.6    -2.9   
RETURN-2 -5.8    5.5    15.2    14.0    8.9    3.3    100.0    7.4    29.1    17.0   
FLOW -13.0    -3.8    27.6    2.6    16.3    29.2    7.4    100.0    28.7    9.0   
FLOW-1 -11.6    -9.7    28.9    23.8    -0.7    16.6    29.1    28.7    100.0    28.6   
FLOW-2 -6.8    -21.4    22.1    22.1    1.0    -2.9    17.0    9.0    28.6    100.0   
Table 25: Correlation matrix of dependent and explanatory variables of a logit analysis of
hedge-fund liquidations in the TASS database, from 1994 to 2004. Note that the dependent
variable Z takes on the value 1 in the year a hedge fund is liquidated, and is 0 in all prior
years.
nal specication which we call Model 1:
Zit = G

0 + 1AGEit + 2ASSETSit 1 +
3RETURNit + 4RETURNit 1 + 5RETURNit 2 +
6FLOWit + 7FLOWit 1 + 8FLOWit 2 + it

: (31)
Table 26 contains maximum-likelihood estimates of (31) in the rst three columns, with
statistically signicant parameters in bold. Note that most of the parameter estimates are
highly signicant. This is due to the unusually large sample size, which typically yields sta-
tistically signicant estimates because of the small standard errors implied by large samples
(recall that the standard errors of consistent and asymptotically normal estimators converge
to 0 at a rate of 1=
p
n where n is the sample size). This suggests that we may wish to impose
a higher threshold of statistical signicance in this case, so as to provide a better balance
between Type I and Type II errors.50
The negative signs of all the coecients other than the constant term conrm our intuition
that age, assets under management, cumulative return, and fund 
ows all have a negative
impact on the probability of liquidation. The fact that RETURN 2 is not statistically
signicant suggests that only the most recent returns are relevant for hedge-fund liquidations,
a possible indication of the short-term performance-driven nature of the hedge-fund industry.
The R2 of this regression is 29.3%, which implies a reasonable level of explanatory power for
50See Leamer (1978) for further discussion of this phenomenon, known as \Lindley's Paradox".
72this specication.51
To address xed eects associated with the calendar year and hedge-fund style category,
in Model 2 we include indicator variables for 10 out of 11 calendar years, and 10 out of 11










1AGEit + 2ASSETSit 1 +
3RETURNit + 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5RETURNit 2 +















1 if fund i is in Category k
0 otherwise
: (33b)
The columns labelled \Model 2" in Table 26 contain the maximum-likelihood estimates
of (32) for the same sample of funds as Model 1. The coecients for AGE, ASSETS, and
RETURN exhibit the same qualitative properties as in Model 1, but the xed-eect variables
do provide some additional explanatory power, yielding an R2 of 34.2%. In particular, the
coecients for the 1999 and 2000 indicator variables are higher than those of the other
year indicators, a manifestation of the impact of August 1998 and the collapse of LTCM
and other xed-income relative-value hedge funds. The impact of LTCM can also be seen
from the coecients of the category indicators|at 0.50, Fixed-Income Relative Value has
the largest estimate among all 10 categories. Managed Futures has a comparable coecient
of 0.49, which is consistent with the higher volatility of such funds and the fact that this
51This R2 is the adjusted generalized coecient of determination proposed by Nagelkerke (1991), which
renormalizes the Cox and Snell's (1989) R2 measure by its maximum (which is less than unity) so that it
spans the entire unit interval. See Nagelkerke (1991) for further discussion.
73category exhibits the highest attrition rate during the 1994{2003 sample period (see Section
5.1), 14.4%. However, the fact that Convertible Arbitrage and Event-Driven categories are
the next largest, with coecients of 0.44 and 0.33, respectively, is somewhat surprising
given their unusually low attrition rates of 5.2% and 5.4%, respectively, reported in Section
5.1. This suggests that the conditional probabilities produced by a logit analysis|which
control for assets under management, fund 
ows, and performance|yields information not
readily available from the unconditional frequency counts of simple attrition statistics. The
remaining category indicators are statistically insignicant at the 5% level.
74b b b b SE(b b b b)
p-Value 
(%)
b b b b SE(b b b b)
p-Value 
(%)
b b b b SE(b b b b)
p-Value 
(%)
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(%)






Constant 4.73    0.34    <.01 2.31    0.41    <.01 -5.62    0.18    <.01 -5.67    0.18    <.01 -7.04    0.26    <.01
AGE -0.03    0.00    <.01 -0.03    0.00    <.01 -1.62    0.07    <.01 -1.66    0.07    <.01 -2.08    0.10    <.01
ASSETS-1 -0.26    0.02    <.01 -0.19    0.02    <.01 -0.34    0.04    <.01 -0.36    0.04    <.01 -0.38    0.06    <.01
RETURN -2.81    0.19    <.01 -2.86    0.20    <.01 -0.67    0.05    <.01 -0.67    0.05    <.01 -0.61    0.06    <.01
RETURN-1 -1.39    0.16    <.01 -1.40    0.17    <.01 -0.36    0.04    <.01 -0.36    0.04    <.01 -0.44    0.06    <.01
RETURN-2 -0.04    0.09    67.5     -0.38    0.14    0.7     -0.12    0.04    0.7     -0.12    0.05    1.1     -0.17    0.07    1.3    
FLOW -0.63    0.08    <.01 -0.49    0.07    <.01 -32.72    4.91    <.01 -33.27    5.04    <.01 -32.93    6.74    <.01
FLOW-1 -0.13    0.04    0.0     -0.11    0.03    0.1     -7.53    2.33    0.1     -7.60    2.37    0.1     -19.26    4.71    <.01
FLOW-2 -0.09    0.02    <.01 -0.11    0.02    <.01 -1.74    0.36    <.01 -1.64    0.36    <.01 -1.83    0.51    0.0    
I(1994) 0.79    0.38    3.9     0.79    0.38    3.9     0.82    0.39    3.4     1.01    0.54    5.9    
I(1995) 1.24    0.27    <.01 1.24    0.27    <.01 1.18    0.28    <.01 1.37    0.37    0.0    
I(1996) 1.83    0.20    <.01 1.83    0.20    <.01 1.83    0.21    <.01 1.92    0.28    <.01
I(1997) 1.53    0.21    <.01 1.53    0.21    <.01 1.52    0.21    <.01 2.03    0.27    <.01
I(1998) 1.81    0.18    <.01 1.81    0.18    <.01 1.80    0.19    <.01 2.29    0.24    <.01
I(1999) 2.10    0.18    <.01 2.10    0.18    <.01 2.05    0.18    <.01 2.25    0.24    <.01
I(2000) 2.25    0.17    <.01 2.25    0.17    <.01 2.19    0.17    <.01 2.08    0.24    <.01
I(2001) 1.97    0.17    <.01 1.97    0.17    <.01 1.96    0.17    <.01 1.80    0.25    <.01
I(2002) 1.46    0.16    <.01 1.46    0.16    <.01 1.41    0.16    <.01 1.50    0.22    <.01
I(2003) 1.55    0.16    <.01 1.55    0.16    <.01 1.53    0.16    <.01 1.71    0.22    <.01
I(ConvertArb) 0.44    0.20    2.9     0.44    0.20    2.9     0.43    0.20    3.4     0.16    0.34    62.5    
I(DedShort) 0.05    0.37    88.9     0.05    0.37    88.9     -0.03    0.39    94.3     0.20    0.49    68.0    
I(EmrgMkt) 0.25    0.15    10.2     0.25    0.15    10.2     0.24    0.15    11.7     0.54    0.20    0.7    
I(EqMktNeut) 0.12    0.20    54.7     0.12    0.20    54.7     0.15    0.20    46.7     0.53    0.25    3.4    
I(EventDr) 0.33    0.15    3.0     0.33    0.15    3.0     0.31    0.15    4.7     -0.01    0.24    97.4    
I(FixedInc) 0.50    0.19    1.1     0.50    0.19    1.1     0.45    0.20    2.3     0.33    0.30    26.8    
I(GlobMac) 0.32    0.18    7.4     0.32    0.18    7.4     0.24    0.18    20.2     0.33    0.25    17.9    
I(LongShortEq) 0.18    0.11    10.2     0.18    0.11    10.2     0.15    0.11    16.6     0.14    0.15    36.4    
I(MgFut) 0.49    0.12    <.01 0.49    0.12    <.01 0.49    0.13    0.0     0.71    0.16    <.01
I(MultiStrat) 0.17    0.25    49.4     0.17    0.25    49.4     0.18    0.25    48.5     0.85    0.29    0.3    
34.5
12,310








Table 26: Maximum likelihood estimates of a logit model for hedge-fund liquidations using annual observations of liquidation
status from the TASS database, for the sample period January 1994 to August 2004. The dependent variable Z takes on the
value 1 in the year a hedge fund is liquidated, and is 0 in all prior years.
7
5To facilitate comparisons across explanatory variables, we standardize each of the non-
indicator explanatory variables by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard devia-
tion and then re-estimating the parameters of (32) via maximum likelihood. This procedure
yields estimates that are renormalized to standard deviation units of each explanatory vari-
able, and are contained in the columns labelled \Model 3" of Table 26. The renormalized
estimates show that fund 
ows are an order of magnitude more important in determining the
probability of liquidation than assets under management, returns or age, with normalized
coecients of  32:72 and  7:53 for FLOW and FLOW 1, respectively.
Finally, we re-estimate the logit model (32) for two subsets of funds using standardized
explanatory variables. In Model 4, we omit Graveyard funds that have either merged with
other funds or are closed to new investments (status codes 4 and 5 in Table 18), yielding a
subsample of 12,846 observations. And in Model 5, we omit all Graveyard funds except those
that have liquidated (status code 1), yielding a subsample of 12,310 observations. The last
two sets of columns in Table 26 show that the qualitative features of most of the estimates are
unchanged, with the funds in Model 5 exhibiting somewhat higher sensitivity to the lagged
FLOW variable. However, the category xed-eects in Model 5 does dier in some ways
from those of Models 2{4, with signicant coecients for Emerging Markets, Equity Market
Neutral, and Multi-Strategy, as well as for Managed Futures. This suggests that there are
signicant dierences between the full Graveyard sample and the subsample of funds with
status code 1, and bears further study.
Because of the inherent nonlinearity of the logit model, the coecients of the explanatory
variables cannot be as easily interpreted as in the linear regression model. One way to remedy
this situation is to compute the estimated probability of liquidation implied by the parameter
estimates ^  and specic values for the explanatory variables, which is readily accomplished
by observing that:
pit  Prob(Zit = 1) = Prob(Z

it > 0) (34a)
= Prob(X
0












Table 27 reports year-by-year summary statistics for the estimated liquidation proba-
bilities f^ pitg of each fund in our sample, where each ^ pit is computed using values of the
explanatory variables in year t. The left panel of Table 27 contains summary statistics for
76estimated liquidation probabilities from Model 1, and the right panel contains corresponding
gures from Model 5. We have also stratied the estimated liquidation probabilities by their
liquidation status|Live funds in the top panel, Graveyard funds in the middle panel, and
the Combined sample of funds in the bottom panel.52
52Note that the usage of \Graveyard funds" in this context is somewhat dierent, involving a time dimen-
sion as well as liquidation status. For example, in this context the set of Graveyard funds in 1999 refers to
only those funds that liquidated in 1999, and does not include liquidations before or after 1999.
771994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 4.19   5.47   5.84   5.04   6.32   5.17   5.59   6.84   8.92   7.11   11.04   1.06   2.22   4.30   3.43   4.70   4.05   3.80   3.40   4.07   4.45   1.76  
SD 7.49   9.33   11.15   9.74   9.66   8.61   8.15   9.23   10.15   8.00   10.91   3.28   6.01   10.97   8.70   9.51   8.87   7.72   6.76   6.58   6.33   2.70  
Min 0.01   0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  
10% 0.13   0.19   0.19   0.18   0.31   0.20   0.35   0.44   0.68   0.41   0.89   0.00   0.01   0.02   0.02   0.06   0.04   0.07   0.07   0.09   0.07   0.03  
25% 0.43   0.51   0.52   0.56   0.99   0.79   1.10   1.39   2.05   1.45   2.66   0.02   0.04   0.09   0.10   0.27   0.23   0.33   0.33   0.44   0.43   0.15  
50% 1.16   1.46   1.52   1.59   2.71   2.18   2.80   3.69   5.62   4.49   7.55   0.07   0.16   0.36   0.45   1.03   0.96   1.18   1.26   1.74   2.04   0.72  
75% 4.21   6.03   5.11   4.83   7.20   5.55   6.54   8.39   12.01   10.22   16.31   0.52   1.25   2.61   2.26   4.03   3.22   3.49   3.63   4.75   6.01   2.31  
90% 12.13   16.17   16.85   13.27   16.76   12.80   13.78   16.23   21.61   17.26   26.33   2.61   5.85   11.24   9.12   14.21   10.09   9.88   8.10   10.52   12.03   4.71  
Max 52.49   58.30   72.97   90.06   77.63   87.06   75.83   92.36   79.02   92.44   79.96   35.62   42.56   76.54   86.91   77.72   80.45   75.95   91.82   73.06   81.10   29.28  
Count 357 483 629 773 924 1,083 1,207 1,317 1,480 1,595 1,898 357 483 629 773 924 1,083 1,207 1,317 1,480 1,595 1,898
Mean 36.59   32.85   31.89   39.75   30.64   27.68   22.78   28.17   25.22   21.55   17.01   24.23   23.50   34.07   42.30   36.17   31.46   32.55   22.82   20.68   20.18   4.60  
SD 24.46   22.77   18.86   22.70   21.67   19.24   17.67   20.03   18.22   15.91   14.30   24.12   20.12   25.19   26.95   25.12   21.96   22.47   19.84   18.94   16.27   6.20  
Min 4.91   2.50   1.05   0.25   0.00   0.53   0.22   0.98   0.13   0.02   0.25   1.00   4.92   1.88   1.49   0.00   0.11   0.02   0.51   0.03   0.03   0.04  
10% 6.08   8.39   10.63   9.29   6.86   4.98   2.41   5.94   5.50   2.64   2.26   5.31   5.53   5.25   8.61   4.49   2.12   3.95   2.00   2.61   3.02   0.13  
25% 22.06   16.28   17.47   21.81   12.13   12.84   9.14   12.07   10.58   8.32   6.43   11.79   7.99   11.28   21.29   15.56   12.66   15.91   6.43   5.29   6.42   0.97  
50% 32.82   28.53   27.44   39.78   25.20   24.03   19.81   23.28   21.50   19.18   13.35   18.02   17.66   33.94   37.54   28.92   30.16   27.57   19.11   14.32   14.03   3.16  
75% 48.40   49.79   43.36   56.94   46.21   39.62   34.92   41.01   37.98   32.28   25.26   26.24   32.58   54.36   64.53   60.14   46.31   48.38   33.10   33.19   30.61   5.51  
90% 71.63   58.62   60.08   71.13   61.74   50.75   45.84   58.90   48.81   45.42   34.67   48.95   51.10   68.87   80.97   69.54   64.68   61.91   55.75   46.84   43.06   10.17  
Max 77.37   97.42   79.51   88.70   85.41   84.87   87.89   78.68   94.65   72.29   67.10   64.10   69.64   82.29   93.17   87.67   89.00   90.90   76.34   90.02   67.86   33.31  
Count 10 27 73 62 104 129 176 175 167 158 68 5 14 41 46 68 64 68 58 76 89 35
Mean 5.07   6.92   8.55   7.61   8.78   7.56   7.77   9.35   10.57   8.42   11.24   1.38   2.82   6.12   5.62   6.85   5.58   5.33   4.22   4.88   5.29   1.81  
SD 9.86   12.10   14.53   14.44   13.59   12.39   11.41   13.01   12.26   9.90   11.10   4.94   7.62   14.21   13.84   13.79   11.85   11.17   8.68   8.44   8.01   2.82  
Min 0.01   0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  
10% 0.14   0.20   0.22   0.20   0.38   0.22   0.39   0.53   0.77   0.43   0.93   0.00   0.01   0.02   0.03   0.06   0.05   0.07   0.07   0.09   0.08   0.03  
25% 0.45   0.55   0.62   0.62   1.10   0.91   1.20   1.62   2.28   1.60   2.72   0.02   0.04   0.10   0.11   0.30   0.24   0.35   0.35   0.48   0.49   0.15  
50% 1.23   1.72   1.84   1.88   3.34   2.63   3.35   4.49   6.31   4.97   7.69   0.08   0.19   0.43   0.54   1.24   1.06   1.32   1.42   1.93   2.28   0.73  
75% 4.89   7.67   8.96   6.25   9.81   7.92   9.03   11.28   13.94   11.74   16.46   0.56   1.38   3.58   3.02   5.57   4.27   4.40   4.15   5.36   6.63   2.36  
90% 14.96   20.53   27.36   22.94   25.11   21.39   20.97   24.21   25.98   21.48   26.97   3.06   7.02   19.05   16.84   22.27   17.07   15.37   9.65   12.50   13.79   4.85  
Max 77.37   97.42   79.51   90.06   85.41   87.06   87.89   92.36   94.65   92.44   79.96   64.10   69.64   82.29   93.17   87.67   89.00   90.90   91.82   90.02   81.10   33.31  
Count 367 510 702 835 1,028 1,212 1,383 1,492 1,647 1,753 1,966 362 497 670 819 992 1,147 1,275 1,375 1,556 1,684 1,933
Live Funds Live Funds
Graveyard Funds Graveyard Funds
Combined Funds Combined Funds
Model 1 Model 5
Statistic
Table 27: Year-by-year summary statistics for the probabilities of liquidation implied by the parameter estimates of two
specications of a logit model for hedge-fund liquidations using annual observations of the liquidation status of individual
hedge funds in the TASS database, for the sample period from January 1994 to August 2004.
7
8For both Models 1 and 5, the mean and median liquidation probabilities are higher for
Graveyard funds than for Live funds, a reassuring sign that the explanatory variables are
indeed providing explanatory power for the liquidation process. For Model 1, the Com-
bined sample shows an increase in the mean and median liquidation probabilities in 1998 as
expected, and another increase in 2001, presumably due to the bursting of the technology
bubble in U.S. equity markets. Most troubling, however, is the fact that the mean and me-
dian liquidation probabilities for 2004 (which only includes data up to August) are 11.24%
and 7.69%, respectively, the highest levels in our entire sample. This may be a symptom
of the enormous growth that the hedge-fund industry has enjoyed in recent years, which
increases both the number of funds entering and exiting the industry, but may also indi-
cate more challenging market conditions for hedge funds in the coming months. Note that
the mean and median liquidation probabilities for Model 5 do not show the same increase
in 2004|this is another manifestation of the time lag with which the Graveyard database
is updated (recall that Model 5 includes only those funds with status code 1, but a large
number of funds that eventually receive this classication have not yet reached their 8- to
10-month limit by August 2004). Therefore, Model 1's estimated liquidation probabilities
are likely to be more accurate for the current year. 53
The logit estimates and implied probabilities suggest that a number of factors in
uence
the likelihood of a hedge fund's liquidation, including past performance, assets under man-
agement, fund 
ows, and age. Given these factors, our estimates imply that the average
liquidation probability for funds in 2004 is over 11%, which is higher than the historical
unconditional attrition rate of 8.8%.
6 Other Hedge-Fund Measures of Systemic Risk
In addition to measures of liquidity exposure, there are several other hedge-fund related
metrics for gauging the degree of systemic risk exposure in the economy. In this section,
we propose three alternatives: (1) risk models for hedge funds; (2) regressions of banking
sector indexes on hedge-fund and other risk factors; and (3) a regime-switching model for
hedge-fund indexes. We describe these alternatives in more detail in Sections 6.1{6.3.
53The TASS reporting delay aects Model 1 as well, suggesting that its estimated liquidation probabilities
for 2004 are biased downward as well.
796.1 Risk Models for Hedge Funds
As the examples in Section 1 illustrate, hedge-fund returns may exhibit a number of nonlin-
earities that are not captured by linear methods such as correlation coecients and linear
factor models. An example of a simple nonlinearity is an asymmetric sensitivity to the
S&P 500, i.e., dierent beta coecients for down-markets versus up-markets. Specically,
consider the following regression:
























t if t  0
0 otherwise
(36)




t , the standard linear model
in which fund i's market betas are identical in up and down markets is a special case of the




i . However, the estimates reported
in Table 28 for the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns show that beta asymmetries
can be quite pronounced for certain hedge-fund styles. For example, the Distressed index
has an up-market beta of 0.04|seemingly market neutral|however, its down-market beta
is 0.43! For the Managed Futures index, the asymmetries are even more pronounced: the
coecients are of opposite sign, with a beta of 0:05 in up markets and a beta of  0:41 in down
markets. These asymmetries are to be expected for certain nonlinear investment strategies,
particularly those that have option-like characteristics such as the short-put strategy of
Capital Decimation Partners (see Section 1.1). Such nonlinearities can yield even greater
diversication benets than more traditional asset classes|for example, Managed Futures
seems to provide S&P 500 downside protection with little exposure on the upside|but
investors must rst be aware of the specic nonlinearities to take advantage of them.
In this section, we estimate risk models for each of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes
as a \proof-of-concept" for developing more sophisticated risk analytics for hedge funds.
With better risk models in hand, the systemic risk posed by hedge funds will be that much
clearer. Of course, a more ambitious approach is to estimate risk models for each hedge
fund and then aggregate risks accordingly, and for nonlinear risk models, a disaggregated
approach may well yield additional insights not apparent from index-based risk models.
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Hedge Funds 0.74   3.60   0.24   5.48   21.0   0.0   1.14   3.22   0.14   1.58   0.34   3.95   22.4   0.0  
Convertible Arbitrage 0.83   6.31   0.03   1.17   1.2   23.8   1.00   4.37   -0.01   -0.18   0.08   1.36   1.9   33.2  
Dedicated Shortseller 0.70   2.12   -0.86   -12.26   57.2   0.0   0.23   0.41   -0.74   -5.33   -0.98   -7.01   57.6   0.0  
Emerging Markets 0.13   0.31   0.52   5.68   22.3   0.0   1.06   1.43   0.28   1.57   0.76   4.18   23.9   0.0  
Equity Mkt Neutral 0.80   10.23   0.08   4.57   15.6   0.0   0.67   4.95   0.11   3.34   0.04   1.26   16.7   0.0  
Event Driven 0.71   5.06   0.20   6.86   29.5   0.0   1.35   5.84   0.04   0.68   0.37   6.54   36.1   0.0  
Distressed 0.84   5.16   0.23   6.72   28.6   0.0   1.58   5.86   0.04   0.65   0.43   6.42   35.2   0.0  
Event-Driven Multi-Strategy 0.64   4.09   0.19   5.59   21.7   0.0   1.25   4.76   0.03   0.46   0.34   5.34   27.0   0.0  
Risk Arbitrage 0.55   4.96   0.13   5.30   20.0   0.0   0.87   4.56   0.04   0.96   0.21   4.46   22.9   0.0  
Fixed Income Arb 0.59   5.57   0.00   -0.13   0.0   89.3   0.95   5.26   -0.10   -2.15   0.09   2.02   5.0   5.4  
Global Macro 1.14   3.53   0.16   2.27   4.4   2.4   1.48   2.64   0.07   0.50   0.25   1.78   4.8   5.9  
Long/Short Equity 0.67   2.66   0.39   7.40   32.7   0.0   0.92   2.12   0.33   3.11   0.46   4.32   33.0   0.0  
Managed Futures 0.80   2.40   -0.17   -2.47   5.1   1.4   -0.09   -0.15   0.05   0.38   -0.41   -2.90   8.1   0.8  
Multi-Strategy 0.77   6.11   0.02   0.60   0.3   54.7   0.86   3.91   -0.01   -0.11   0.04   0.71   0.5   74.2  
Table 28: Regressions of monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns on the S&P 500
index return, and on positive and negative S&P 500 index returns, from January 1994 to
August 2004.
However, this is beyond the scope of this study, and we focus our attention instead on the












































































































































































































































































































































S&P500^2 -12.3  100.0 
S&P500^3 77.1  -43.3  100.0 
Banks 55.8  -33.0  59.1  100.0 
Libor 3.5  -19.4  12.7  -16.9  100.0 
USD 7.3  -4.6  4.5  -1.2  8.9  100.0 
Oil -1.6  -15.1  -1.7  -2.0  14.0  -13.4  100.0 
Gold -7.2  -7.8  -2.6  6.1  -12.2  -35.2  20.1  100.0 
Lehman Bond 0.8  15.2  -8.9  7.5  -42.1  -55.6  7.0  25.7  100.0 
Large Minus Small Cap 7.6  21.8  -0.6  -27.6  3.8  11.0  -19.7  -24.5  8.1  100.0 
Value Minus Growth -48.9  14.4  -30.3  -5.4  -2.1  -4.0  -21.3  -3.9  10.9  32.7  100.0 
Credit Spread -30.6  30.1  -19.8  -16.0  -40.2  -13.0  -2.9  16.4  14.3  -7.2  16.5  100.0 
Term Spread -11.6  -6.1  -0.2  11.5  4.9  -21.5  7.0  20.4  -10.5  -13.7  2.6  38.7  100.0 
VIX -67.3  26.2  -67.8  -49.6  -8.2  -9.2  -1.5  -3.4  15.3  9.7  38.5  3.1  -6.9  100.0 
CSFB/Tremont Indexes
Hedge Funds 45.9  -22.5  38.2  41.6  -0.2  22.0  7.9  8.9  3.6  -29.6  -41.0  -24.4  -8.1  -25.7  100.0 
Convert Arb 11.0  -19.1  29.4  29.8  -9.0  19.6  -4.3  2.1  2.2  -19.6  -6.2  -6.4  -15.2  -0.2  38.4  100.0 
Dedicated Shortseller -75.6  20.1  -66.4  -52.1  4.0  -4.4  -9.2  -9.8  7.5  34.9  64.5  11.9  -10.5  57.2  -46.5  -21.7  100.0 
Emerging Markets 47.2  -24.6  50.1  43.8  5.6  19.4  0.7  7.7  -17.7  -27.2  -34.2  -9.9  16.2  -36.6  65.7  32.0  -57.0  100.0 
Equity Market Neutral 39.6  3.2  34.5  30.9  -9.4  9.1  4.8  -6.8  7.3  1.4  -12.6  -12.6  -29.2  -17.1  31.8  29.9  -34.9  24.2  100.0 
Event Driven 54.3  -44.8  67.8  65.4  -0.9  14.6  6.9  8.2  -7.6  -32.4  -30.7  -24.8  -3.6  -44.4  66.0  59.2  -63.1  66.6  39.8  100.0 
Distressed 53.5  -43.4  62.8  64.3  -10.7  9.7  5.2  13.5  -0.3  -26.7  -27.8  -21.6  -1.2  -43.9  56.3  50.8  -62.7  57.7  36.2  93.6  100.0 
Event-Driven Multi-Strategy 46.6  -39.7  62.1  56.2  8.4  20.0  7.7  1.2  -14.6  -33.0  -29.9  -23.0  -3.4  -37.6  68.9  60.3  -53.9  67.2  37.6  93.0  74.8  100.0 
Risk Arb 44.7  -32.5  53.4  55.7  7.0  4.9  2.6  7.4  -6.4  -42.0  -22.0  -29.9  -20.5  -42.2  39.0  41.4  -49.1  44.2  31.9  70.1  58.4  66.9  100.0 
Fixed Income Arb -1.3  -29.2  5.9  18.8  6.9  18.5  9.4  0.9  2.0  -10.3  1.9  -17.6  3.5  16.9  41.2  54.4  -5.3  28.2  7.0  37.4  28.1  43.4  14.1  100.0 
Global Macro 20.9  -10.8  14.4  28.5  -5.7  28.7  -4.0  -2.3  7.4  -8.8  -6.6  -11.2  -4.7  -5.3  85.4  27.1  -10.6  41.6  19.1  36.8  29.3  42.6  12.4  41.8  100.0 
Long/Short Equity 57.2  -20.2  47.2  40.5  -4.3  -2.1  19.5  14.2  7.0  -48.9  -67.1  -22.9  -13.1  -36.2  77.4  24.1  -71.8  58.8  33.9  65.0  56.9  63.6  51.0  17.2  40.3  100.0 
Managed Futures -22.6  22.4  -32.2  -14.3  -13.0  -19.9  17.5  15.9  35.4  4.6  21.9  17.9  2.0  25.7  10.5  -21.5  24.5  -13.1  13.8  -23.4  -16.1  -26.8  -25.3  -6.9  26.6  -6.4  100.0 
Multi-Strategy 5.6  -4.1  2.2  10.5  0.9  -13.3  5.6  -1.7  12.5  -8.8  -13.5  -18.9  -7.8  9.5  15.0  33.5  -4.4  -3.9  20.1  14.9  10.0  18.8  4.2  27.5  10.8  13.4  -4.1  100.0 
Correlation Matrix
Table 29: Correlation matrix for monthly returns of hedge-fund risk factors, from January 1994 to August 2004.
8
2We begin with a comprehensive set of risk factors that will be candidates for each of the
risk models, covering stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, and volatility. These factors
are described in Table 30, and their basic statistical properties have been summarized in
Table 7. Given the heterogeneity of investment strategies represented by the hedge-fund
industry, the variables in Table 30 are likely to be the smallest set of risk factors capable of
spanning the risk exposures of most hedge funds.
Table 29 is a joint correlation matrix of the risk factors and the hedge-fund indexes. Note
that we have also included squared and cubed S&P 500 returns in the correlation matrix;
they will be included as factors to capture nonlinear eects.54 It is apparent from the lower
left block of the correlation matrix that there are indeed nontrivial correlations between the
risk factors and the hedge-fund indexes. For example, there is a 67.8% correlation between
the Event Driven index and the cubed S&P 500 return, implying skewness eects in this
category of strategies. Also, the Long/Short Equity index has correlations of  48:9% and
 67:1 with the market-cap and equity-style factors, respectively, which is not surprising
given the nature of this category.
Using a combination of statistical methods and empirical judgment, we use these factors
to estimate risk models for each of the 14 indexes, and the results are contained in Table
31. The rst row reports the sample size, the second contains the adjusted R2, and the
remaining rows contain regression coecients and, in parentheses, t-statistics. The number
of factors selected for each risk model varies from a minimum of 4 for Equity Market Neutral
and Managed Futures to a maximum of 13 for Event Driven, not including the constant
term. This pattern is plausible because the Event Driven category includes a broad set of
strategies, i.e., various types of \events", hence a broader array of risk factors will be needed
to capture the variation in this category versus Equity Market Neutral.
The statistical signicance of squared and cubed S&P 500 returns highlights the pres-
ence of nonlinearities in a number of indexes as well as in the overall hedge-fund index.
Together with the S&P 500 return, these higher-order terms comprise a simple polynomial
approximation to a nonlinear functional relation between certain hedge-fund returns and the
market. The squared term may be viewed as a proxy for volatility dependence, and the cubed
term as a proxy for skewness dependence. These are, of course, very crude approximations
for such phenomena because the underlying strategies may not involve market exposure|a
xed-income arbitrage fund may well have nonlinear risk exposures but the nonlinearities are
more likely to involve interest-rate variables than equity market indexes. However, strategies
such as Equity Market Neutral, Risk Arbitrage, and Long/Short Equity, which purposefully
54We have divided the squared and cubed S&P 500 return series by 10 and 100, respectively, so as to yield
regression coecients of comparable magnitudes to the other coecients.
83Variable Denition
S&P500: Monthly return of the S&P 500 index including
dividends
Banks: Monthly return of equal-weighted portfolio of bank
stocks in CRSP (SIC codes 6000{6199 and 6710)
LIBOR: Monthly rst-dierence in U.S.-dollar 6-month
London interbank oer rate
USD: Monthly return on U.S. Dollar Spot Index
Oil: Monthly return on NYMEX crude-oil front-month
futures contract
Gold: Monthly return on gold spot price index
Lehman Bond: Monthly return on Dow Jones/Lehman Bond Index
Large-Cap Minus Small-Cap: Monthly return dierence between Dow Jones
large-cap and small-cap indexes
Value Minus Growth: Monthly return dierence between Dow Jones value
and growth indexes
Credit Spread: Beginning-of-month dierence between KDP High
Yield Daily Index and U.S. 10-Year yield
Term Spread: Beginning-of-month 10-year U.S.-dollar swap rate
minus 6-month U.S.-dollar LIBOR
VIX: Monthly rst-dierence in the VIX implied volatility
index
Table 30: Denitions of aggregate measures of market conditions and risk factors.

































Sample Size: 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 117
R
2: 54.5% 45.1% 79.7% 44.1% 25.5% 75.1% 65.0% 66.4% 58.0% 54.3% 34.3% 73.2% 21.4% 16.3%
Constant 0.30     0.08     1.90     -0.58     0.98     0.29     0.94     0.75     1.14     0.06     0.31     1.09     0.19     0.58     14
(1.22)    (0.22)    (4.25)    (-0.81)    (7.00)    (0.84)    (4.65)    (4.93)    (7.34)    (0.20)    (0.78)    (3.35)    (0.59)    (3.97)   
SP500 0.23     -0.63     0.44     0.13     0.28     5
(5.81)    (-7.11)    (3.29)    (3.17)    (4.29)   
SP500(Lag 1) 0.06     0.06     -0.05     3
(2.39)    (1.82)    (-1.80)   
SP500^2 0.07     -0.10     -0.06     3
(2.49)    (-2.03)    (-2.08)   
SP500^2(Lag 1) -0.12     -0.14     -0.30     -0.12     -0.09     -0.10     -0.06     -0.16     -0.09     0.09     10
(-2.12)    (-1.60)    (-2.44)    (-3.70)    (-2.09)    (-2.68)    (-1.89)    (-1.76)    (-1.74)    (2.07)   
SP500^3 0.21     -0.24     0.44     0.07     0.26     0.21     0.32     0.15     0.15     -0.26     10
(5.92)    (-2.49)    (2.82)    (2.80)    (8.22)    (3.63)    (12.00)    (5.57)    (2.10)    (-3.15)   
SP500^3(Lag 1) 0.15     -0.15     0.08     0.05     0.19     -0.17     0.08     7
(5.21)    (-2.27)    (2.31)    (2.32)    (5.82)    (-2.09)    (2.36)   
SP500^3(Lag 2) 0.09     0.13     0.12     0.15     0.14     5
(1.74)    (4.34)    (4.79)    (1.75)    (4.39)   
Banks 0.06     0.10     0.07     0.10     0.24     5
(2.47)    (2.94)    (2.65)    (3.76)    (3.43)   
Banks(Lag 1) 0.08     0.07     0.08     0.07     -0.06     5
(1.85)    (2.16)    (1.80)    (2.19)    (-2.14)   
Banks(Lag 2) 0.09     0.05     0.07     0.05     0.18     0.10     6
(1.71)    (1.98)    (2.05)    (1.78)    (2.04)    (2.33)   
USD 0.42     0.13     0.65     0.15     0.11     0.21     0.11     0.68     -0.15     9
(4.86)    (2.21)    (3.74)    (3.00)    (2.06)    (3.95)    (2.97)    (4.85)    (-2.78)   
Gold 0.08     0.17     0.05     0.08     -0.05     5
(1.62)    (1.50)    (2.14)    (2.33)    (-1.39)   
Lehman Bond 0.59     0.18     0.13     0.22     0.24     0.98     0.38     0.79     8
(3.77)    (1.56)    (1.32)    (2.16)    (3.17)    (3.69)    (2.82)    (3.08)   
Large Minus Small Cap -0.19     -0.07     0.34     -0.40     -0.10     -0.11     -0.17     -0.13     -0.36     9
(-4.30)    (-2.98)    (5.55)    (-4.35)    (-3.98)    (-3.89)    (-6.69)    (-6.24)    (-8.38)   
Value Minus Growth -0.08     0.23     -0.04     -0.03     -0.08     -0.21     0.08     -0.05     8
(-2.09)    (4.59)    (-2.29)    (-2.10)    (-1.71)    (-5.76)    (1.47)    (-2.35)   
LIBOR -1.09     2.26     -2.02     3
(-1.93)    (2.16)    (-3.55)   
Credit Spread 0.20     0.14     0.09     3
(2.26)    (1.68)    (1.42)   
Term Spread -0.20     -0.65     0.89     -0.24     -0.20     -0.31     -0.38     7
(-1.99)    (-3.26)    (2.66)    (-3.86)    (-2.14)    (-4.51)    (-2.69)   
VIX 0.08     0.22     0.07     0.12     4
(2.37)    (1.69)    (2.80)    (2.11)   
Number of Factors
Selected: 10 10 8 8 4 13 11 7 6 12 7 9 4 6
Table 31: Risk models for monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns, from January 1994 to August 2004.
8
6The last column of Table 31 reports the number of times each risk factor is included
in a particular risk model, and this provides an indication of systemic risk exposures in the
hedge-fund sector. In particular, if we discover a single factor that is included and signicant
in all hedge-fund risk models, such a factor may be a bellwether for broad dislocation in the
industry. But apart from the constant term, there is no such factor. Nevertheless, the
rst lag of the squared S&P 500 return, and the cubed S&P 500 return appear in 10 out
of 14 risk models, implying that time-varying volatility, tail risk, and skewness are major
risk factors across many dierent hedge-fund styles. Close runners-up are the U.S. Dollar
index and the market-capitalization factors, appearing in 9 of 14 risk models. Liquidity
exposure, as measured by either the lagged S&P 500 return (see Asness, Krail, and Liew,
2001 and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004), or the credit spread factor, is signicant for
some indexes such as Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, and Fixed-Income Arbitrage, but
apparently does not aect other indexes.
The R
2
's for these risk models vary, ranging from 16.3% for Fund of Funds to 79.7%
for Dedicated Shortsellers. Given the relatively small sample of about 10 years of monthly
returns, the overall explanatory power of these risk models is encouraging. Of course, we
must recognize that the process of variable selection has inevitably biased upward the R
2
's,
hence these results should be viewed as useful summaries of risk exposures and correlations
rather than structural factor models of hedge-fund returns.
6.2 Hedge Funds and the Banking Sector
To the extent that systemic risk involves distress in the banking sector, a more direct method
for investigating the impact of hedge funds on systemic risk is to determine the relation
between the returns of publicly traded banks and hedge-fund returns. Using monthly total
returns data from the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices database,
we construct equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of all stocks with SIC codes 6000{
6199, and 6710, rebalanced monthly, and use the returns of these portfolios as proxies for
the banking sector. Table 32 contains regressions of the equal-weighted bank index return
on the S&P 500 and CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns, and Table 33 contains the
same regressions for the value-weighted bank index.
The rst column of Table 32 is a regression of the equal-weighted bank index on the S&P
500 return and its rst two lags. The fact that both contemporaneous and lagged S&P 500
returns are signicant suggests that banks are exposed to market risk and also have some
illiquidity exposure, much like serially correlated hedge-fund returns in Section 4 and the
other the serially correlated asset returns in Table 17.
87The next 14 columns contain regressions with both S&P 500 returns and two lags as well
as each of the 14 hedge-fund index returns and two lags, respectively. A comparison of these
regressions may provide some insight into links between certain hedge-fund styles and the
banking industry. These regressions have reasonable explanatory power, with R
2
's ranging
from 31.2% for Managed Futures to 48.4% for Event Driven. Among the 14 indexes, the
ones yielding the highest explanatory power are the event-related indexes: Event Driven,
Distressed, Event-Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arbitrage, with R
2
's of 48.4%, 47.3%, 42.4%,
and 40.8%, respectively. The coecients for the contemporaneous hedge-fund indexes in
each of these four regressions are also numerically comparable, suggesting that these four
strategy groups have similar eects on the banking sector. The least signicant hedge-fund
index for explaining the equal-weighted bank index is Managed Futures, with coecients that
are both statistically insignicant and numerically close to zero. Managed futures strategies
are known to be relatively uncorrelated with most other asset classes, and the banking sector
is apparently one of these asset classes.
The last column reports a nal regression that includes multiple hedge-fund indexes as
well as the S&P 500 return and its two lags. The hedge-fund indexes were selected using a
combination of statistical techniques and empirical judgment, and the R
2
of 63.7% shows a
signicant increase in explanatory power with the additional hedge-fund indexes. As before,
this R
2
is likely to be upward biased because of the variable-selection process. Unlike the
single-hedge-fund-index regressions where the coecients on the contemporaneous hedge-
fund indexes were positive except for Dedicated Shortsellers (which is not surprising given
that banks have positive market exposure), in this case several hedge-fund indexes have neg-
ative exposures: the aggregate Hedge Fund, Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Shortsellers,
and Long/Short Equity. However, the equal-weighted bank index has positive exposure to
Event Driven, Risk Arbitrage, Fixed-Income Arbitrage, and Global Macro indexes. Overall,
it is apparent from this regression that the hedge-fund sector does have signicant implica-
tions for the banking sector.
Table 33 presents corresponding regression results for the value-weighted bank index,
and some intriguing patterns emerge. For the contemporaneous and lagged S&P 500 return
regression, the results are somewhat dierent than those of Table 32|the contemporaneous
coecient is signicant but the lagged coecients are not, implying the presence of market
exposure but little liquidity exposure. This is plausible given the fact that the value-weighted
index consists mainly of the largest banks and bank holding-companies, whereas the equal-
weighted index is tilted more towards smaller banking institutions.
The single-hedge-fund-index regressions in the next 14 columns also diers from those in




















































































































































































































Sample Size: 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 115 115
R
2 32.8%  35.2%  38.9%  33.0%  35.9%  32.1%  48.4%  47.3%  42.4%  40.8%  36.6%  35.8%  35.7%  31.2%  31.5%  63.7%
Constant 1.30   1.21   0.99   1.41   1.29   0.81   0.70   0.61   0.93   0.70   0.76   0.96   1.43   1.35   1.08   0.38    
(4.22) (3.61) (2.82) (4.38) (4.24) (1.64) (2.21) (1.88) (2.92) (2.00) (2.14) (2.85) (4.50) (3.92) (2.50) (1.20)   
SP500 0.47   0.37   0.42   0.34   0.37   0.45   0.22   0.25   0.31   0.34   0.47   0.44   0.39   0.47   0.46   0.24    
(7.42) (5.19) (6.76) (3.40) (4.89) (6.32) (3.06) (3.56) (4.32) (5.14) (7.58) (6.83) (5.02) (7.15) (7.14) (3.21)   
SP500{1} 0.13   0.14   0.09   0.11   0.17   0.11   0.05   0.04   0.08   0.04   0.12   0.14   0.19   0.12   0.12   0.10    
(2.05) (1.92) (1.41) (1.08) (2.28) (1.52) (0.67) (0.57) (1.13) (0.54) (1.84) (2.15) (2.46) (1.83) (1.88) (1.56)   
SP500{2} -0.05   -0.08   -0.05   -0.03   -0.09   -0.06   -0.10   -0.12   -0.08   -0.08   -0.11   -0.11   0.01   -0.07   -0.06  
(-0.86)  (-1.14)  (-0.82)  (-0.28)  (-1.25)  (-0.92)  (-1.48)  (-1.76)  (-1.24)  (-1.20)  (-1.64)  (-1.65)  (0.17) (-0.98)  (-0.86) 
CSFBHEDGE 0.36  
(2.61)
CSFBHEDGE{1} -0.11  
(-0.85) 
CSFBHEDGE{2} -0.03   -1.66    
(-0.24)  (-5.52)   
CSFBCONVERT 0.89  
(3.50)
CSFBCONVERT{1} -0.63   -0.39    
(-2.28)  (-1.67)   
CSFBCONVERT{2} 0.20  
(0.79)
CSFBSHORT -0.15   -0.10    
(-1.77)  (-1.32)   
CSFBSHORT{1} -0.02  
(-0.19) 
CSFBSHORT{2} 0.02   -0.15    
(0.25) (-2.27)   
CSFBEMKTS 0.19  
(2.70)
CSFBEMKTS{1} -0.11  
(-1.39) 
CSFBEMKTS{2} 0.08  
(1.21)
CSFBEQMKTNEUT 0.32  
(0.82)
CSFBEQMKTNEUT{1} 0.23  
(0.58)
CSFBEQMKTNEUT{2} 0.08  
(0.22)
CSFBED 1.19   0.91    
(5.85) (3.83)   
CSFBED{1} -0.24   -0.27    
(-1.12)  (-1.30)   
CSFBED{2} 0.13   0.62    
(0.67) (2.60)   
CSFBDST 0.93  
(5.55)
CSFBDST{1} -0.04  
(-0.26) 
CSFBDST{2} 0.12  
(0.77)
CSFBEDM 0.85  
(4.41)
CSFBEDM{1} -0.25  
(-1.24) 
CSFBEDM{2} 0.14  
(0.79)
CSFBRISKARB 1.02   0.74    
(4.11) (3.05)   
CSFBRISKARB{1} 0.11  
(0.42)
CSFBRISKARB{2} 0.08  
(0.33)
CSFBFIARB 0.68  
(2.33)
CSFBFIARB{1} 0.03   0.57    
(0.10) (2.23)   
CSFBFIARB{2} 0.35  
(1.27)
CSFBGMACRO 0.22  
(2.60)
CSFBGMACRO{1} 0.01  
(0.08)
CSFBGMACRO{2} 0.10   0.99    
(1.15) (5.68)   
CSFBLSE 0.19   -0.24    
(1.66) (-2.18)   
CSFBLSE{1} -0.16  
(-1.45) 
CSFBLSE{2} -0.19  
(-1.75) 
CSFBMF 0.01  
(0.11)
CSFBMF{1} -0.02  
(-0.20) 
CSFBMF{2} -0.05  
(-0.57) 
CSFBMULT 0.27  
(1.09)
CSFBMULT{1} -0.13  
(-0.57) 
CSFBMULT{2} 0.14  
(0.62)








Table 32: Regressions of monthly equal-weighted banking sector returns on the S&P 500
and various CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns, from January 1994 to August 2004.
89than in Table 32, and also remarkably consistent across all 14 regressions|the R
2
's range
from 54.6% (Managed Futures) to 58.2% (Risk Arbitrage). However, this does not imply that
larger banking institutions have more in common with all hedge-fund investment strategies.
In fact, it is the S&P 500 that seems to be providing most of the explanatory power (compare
the rst column with the next 14 in Table 33), and although some hedge-fund indexes do have
signicant coecients, the R
2
's change very little when hedge-fund indexes are included one
at a time. The multiple-hedge-fund-index regression in the last column does yield somewhat
higher explanatory power, an R
2
of 64.2%, but in contrast to the negative coecients in the
equal-weighted bank index regression, in this case most of the coecients are positive. In
particular, Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Shortsellers, Risk Arbitrage, and Fixed-Income
Arbitrage all have positive coecients. One possible explanation is that the larger banking
institutions are involved in similar investment activities through their proprietary trading
desks. Another explanation is that large banks oer related fee-based services to such hedge
funds (e.g., credit, prime brokerage, trading, and structured products), and do well when
their hedge-fund clients do well.
In summary, the banking industry has clear ties to the hedge-fund industry, hence dislo-
cations in one is very likely to create repercussions for the other.
6.3 Regime-Switching Models
Our nal hedge-fund-based measure of systemic risk is motivated by the phase-locking exam-
ple of Section 1.2 where the return-generating process exhibits apparent changes in expected
returns and volatility that are discrete and sudden. The Mexican peso crisis of 1994{1995,
the Asian crisis of 1997, and the global 
ight to quality precipitated by the default of Russian
GKO debt in August 1998 are all examples of such regime shifts. Linear models are generally
incapable of capturing such discrete shifts, hence more sophisticated methods are required.
In particular, we propose to model such shifts by a \regime-switching" process in which two
states of the world are hypothesized, and the data are allowed to determine the parameters
of these states and the likelihood of transitioning from one to the other. Regime-switching
models have been used in a number of contexts, ranging from with Hamilton's (1989) model
of the business cycle to Ang and Bekaert's (2004) regime-switching asset allocation model,
and we propose to apply it to the CSFB/Tremont indexes to obtain another measure of
systemic risk, i.e., the possibility of switching from a normal to a distressed regime.




















































































































































































































Sample Size: 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 115 115
R
2 55.7%  55.8%  55.6%  57.1%  54.9%  55.0%  56.1%  55.6%  55.5%  58.2%  54.7%  55.1%  58.2%  54.6%  55.5%  64.2%
Constant 0.73   1.02   0.60   0.57   0.76   0.30   0.69   0.67   0.72   0.48   0.71   0.80   1.04   0.75   0.65   0.47    
(2.05) (2.60) (1.41) (1.54) (2.11) (0.53) (1.67) (1.59) (1.82) (1.15) (1.66) (2.00) (2.85) (1.90) (1.31) (1.00)   
SP500 0.89   0.91   0.87   1.10   0.89   0.87   0.81   0.83   0.84   0.81   0.90   0.87   0.99   0.90   0.90   1.09    
(12.24) (10.76) (11.53) (9.84) (9.98) (10.65) (8.68) (9.17) (9.46) (10.19) (11.95) (11.20) (11.21) (11.76) (12.09) (10.27)   
SP500{1} 0.02   0.04   0.01   -0.03   0.02   0.02   -0.06   -0.03   -0.04   -0.08   0.01   0.03   0.05   0.02   0.03   -0.02    
(0.31) (0.47) (0.08) (-0.23)  (0.19) (0.22) (-0.60)  (-0.34)  (-0.40)  (-0.93)  (0.15) (0.43) (0.53) (0.25) (0.46) (-0.34)   
SP500{2} -0.02   0.06   -0.01   0.01   0.02   -0.04   0.02   0.01   0.01   0.00   -0.03   -0.02   0.12   -0.03   0.00  
(-0.25)  (0.70) (-0.17)  (0.12) (0.26) (-0.45)  (0.28) (0.16) (0.10) (-0.05)  (-0.36)  (-0.32)  (1.40) (-0.38)  (-0.00) 
CSFBHEDGE -0.12  
(-0.72) 
CSFBHEDGE{1} -0.07  
(-0.47) 
CSFBHEDGE{2} -0.24  
(-1.53) 
CSFBCONVERT 0.45   0.83    
(1.46) (2.51)   
CSFBCONVERT{1} -0.38   -0.59    
(-1.14)  (-1.79)   
CSFBCONVERT{2} 0.12  
(0.40)
CSFBSHORT 0.24   0.28    
(2.47) (2.53)   
CSFBSHORT{1} -0.07  
(-0.73) 
CSFBSHORT{2} 0.06   -0.14    
(0.60) (-1.58)   
CSFBEMKTS -0.01  
(-0.11) 
CSFBEMKTS{1} -0.01  
(-0.07) 
CSFBEMKTS{2} -0.07  
(-0.89) 
CSFBEQMKTNEUT 0.33  
(0.74)
CSFBEQMKTNEUT{1} -0.01  
(-0.02) 
CSFBEQMKTNEUT{2} 0.23  
(0.52)
CSFBED 0.40  
(1.51)
CSFBED{1} 0.11  
(0.41)
CSFBED{2} -0.34  
(-1.36) 
CSFBDST 0.29  
(1.32)
CSFBDST{1} 0.07  
(0.32)
CSFBDST{2} -0.22  
(-1.05) 
CSFBEDM 0.29  
(1.19)
CSFBEDM{1} 0.08  
(0.32)
CSFBEDM{2} -0.25  
(-1.09) 
CSFBRISKARB 0.53   0.86    
(1.79) (2.69)   
CSFBRISKARB{1} 0.53  
(1.76)
CSFBRISKARB{2} -0.48  
(-1.67) 
CSFBFIARB 0.06  
(0.17)
CSFBFIARB{1} 0.19   0.46    
(0.52) (1.32)   
CSFBFIARB{2} -0.18  
(-0.55) 
CSFBGMACRO 0.09  
(0.83)
CSFBGMACRO{1} -0.08  
(-0.81) 
CSFBGMACRO{2} -0.05  
(-0.50) 
CSFBLSE -0.28   -0.23    
(-2.13)  (-1.56)   
CSFBLSE{1} 0.00  
(-0.01) 
CSFBLSE{2} -0.28   -0.34    
(-2.17)  (-2.38)   
CSFBMF 0.03  
(0.32)
CSFBMF{1} -0.03  
(-0.28) 
CSFBMF{2} -0.04  
(-0.37) 
CSFBMULT -0.33   -0.49    
(-1.18)  (-1.73)   
CSFBMULT{1} 0.00  
(0.00)
CSFBMULT{2} 0.35  
(1.33)








Table 33: Regressions of monthly value-weighted banking sector returns on the S&P 500 and
various CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns, from January 1994 to August 2004.
91following:










> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 with probability p11 if It 1 = 1
1 with probability p21 if It 1 = 0
0 with probability p12 if It 1 = 1
0 with probability p22 if It 1 = 0
: (37c)
This is the simplest specication for a two-state regime-switching process where It is an
indicator that determines whether Rt is in state 1 or state 2, and Rit is the return in state
i. Each state has its own mean and variance, and the regime-switching process It has two
probabilities, hence there are a total of six parameters to be estimated. Despite the fact that
the state It is unobservable, it can be estimated statistically (see, for example, Hamilton,
1989, 1990) along with the parameters via maximum likelihood.
This specication is similar to the well-known \mixture of distributions" model. However,
unlike standard mixture models, the regime-switching model is not independently distributed
over time unless p11 = p21. Once estimated, forecasts of changes in regime can be readily
obtained, as well as forecasts of Rt itself. In particular, because the k-step transition matrix
of a Markov chain is simply given by Pk, the conditional probability of the regime It+k given
date-t data Rt  (Rt;Rt 1;:::;R1) takes on a particularly simple form:
Prob(It+k = 1jRt) = 1 + (p11   p21)
k








where Prob(It = 1jRt) is the probability that the date-t regime is 1 given the historical
data up to and including date t (this is a by-product of the maximum-likelihood estimation
procedure). Using similar recursions of the Markov chain, the conditional expectation of







Prob(It = 1jRt) Prob(It = 2jRt)
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(39b)
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State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Hedge Funds 100.0%  1.2%  0.0%  98.8%  6.8%    12.4%    2.9%    9.9%    323.6   
Convertible Arbitrage 89.9%  17.9%  10.1%  82.1%  16.1%    -1.6%    1.9%    6.1%    404.0   
Dedicated Shortseller 23.5%  12.6%  76.5%  87.4%  -76.2%    11.7%    2.3%    16.5%    208.5   
Emerging Markets 100.0%  1.2%  0.0%  98.8%  11.5%    6.6%    8.2%    20.3%    218.0   
Equity Mkt Neutral 95.0%  2.4%  5.0%  97.6%  4.4%    13.8%    2.1%    3.1%    435.1   
Event Driven 98.0%  45.0%  2.0%  55.0%  13.3%    -47.0%    3.8%    14.0%    377.0   
Distressed 97.9%  58.0%  2.1%  42.0%  15.2%    -57.5%    4.8%    15.6%    349.4   
ED Multi-Strategy 98.7%  38.4%  1.3%  61.6%  12.0%    -55.2%    4.5%    15.0%    363.6   
Risk Arbitrage 89.4%  25.6%  10.6%  74.4%  9.6%    3.1%    2.7%    6.9%    391.8   
Fixed Income Arb 95.6%  29.8%  4.4%  70.2%  10.0%    -12.2%    1.9%    6.6%    442.3   
Global Macro 100.0%  1.2%  0.0%  98.8%  13.6%    14.0%    3.2%    14.2%    286.3   
Long/Short Equity 98.5%  2.5%  1.5%  97.5%  6.1%    21.1%    6.3%    15.3%    285.0   
Managed Futures 32.0%  22.2%  68.0%  77.8%  -6.0%    10.7%    3.8%    13.7%    252.1   
Multi-Strategy 98.2%  25.0%  1.8%  75.0%  10.8%    -7.6%    3.2%    9.2%    387.9   
Log(L)
Annualized SD
Index p11 p21 p12 p22
Annualized Mean
Table 34: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of a two-state regime-switching model
for CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes from January 1994 to August 2004.
Table 34 reports the maximum-likelihood estimates of the means and standard deviations
in each of two states for the 14 CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes, as well as the transition
probabilities for the two states. Note that two rows in Table 34 are shaded|Dedicated
Shortselling and Managed Futures|because the maximum-likelihood estimation procedure
did not converge properly for these two categories, implying that the regime-switching process
may not be a good model of their returns. The remaining 12 series yielded well-dened
parameter estimates, and by convention, we denote by state 1 the lower-volatility state.
Consider the second row, corresponding to the Convertible Arbitrage index. The param-
eter estimates indicate that in state 1, this index has an expected return of 16.1% with a
volatility of 1.9%, but in state 2, the expected return is  1:6% with a volatility of 6:1%.
The latter state is clearly a crisis state for Convertible Arbitrage, while the former is a
more normal state. The other hedge-fund indexes have similar parameter estimates|the
low-volatility state is typically paired with higher means, and the high-volatility state is
paired with lower means. While such pairings may seem natural for hedge funds, there are
93three exceptions to this rule; for Equity Market Neutral, Global Macro, and Long/Short
Equity, the higher volatility state has higher expected returns. This suggests that for these





























































Figure 12: Monthly returns and regime-switching model estimates of the probability of being
in the high-volatility state for CSFB/Tremont Fixed-Income Arbitrage hedge-fund index,
from January 1994 to August 2004.
From these parameter estimates, it is possible to estimate the probability of being in
state 1 or 2 at each point in time for each hedge-fund index. For example, in Figure 12 we
plot the estimated probabilities of being in state 2, the high-volatility state, for the Fixed-
Income Arbitrage index for each month from January 1994 to August 2004. We see that
this probability begins to increase in the months leading up to August 1998, and hits 100%
in August and several months thereafter. However, this is not an isolated event, but occurs
on several occasions both before and after August 1998.
To develop an aggregate measure of systemic risk based on this regime-switching model,
we propose summing the state-2 probabilities across all hedge-fund indexes every month
to yield a time series that captures the likelihood of being in high-volatility periods. Of
94course, the summed probabilities|even if renormalized to lie in the unit interval|cannot
be interpreted formally as a probability because the regime-switching process was specied
individually for each index, not jointly across all indexes. Therefore, the interpretation of
\state 2" for Convertible Arbitrage may be quite dierent than the interpretation of \state 2"
for Equity Market Neutral. Nevertheless, as an aggregate measure of the state of the hedge-
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Figure 13: Aggregate hedge-fund risk indicator: sum of monthly regime-switching model es-
timates of the probability of being in the high-volatility state (p2) for 11 CSFB/Tremont
hedge-fund indexes (Convertible Arbitrage; Emerging Markets; Equity Market Neutral;
Event Driven; Distressed; Even-Driven Multi-Strategy; Risk Arbitrage; Fixed-Income Arbi-
trage; Global Macro; Long/Short Equity; and Multi-Strategy), from January 1994 to August
2004.
Figure 13 plots the monthly summed probabilities from January 1994 to August 2004,
and we see that peak occurs around August 1998, with local maxima around the middle of
1994 and the middle of 2002, which corresponds roughly to our intuition of high-volatility
periods for the hedge-fund industry.
95Alternatively, we can construct a similar aggregate measure by summing the probabilities
of being in a low-mean state, which involves summing the state-2 probabilities for those
indexes where high volatility is paired with low mean with the state-1 probabilities for those
indexes where low volatility is paired with low mean. Figure 14 contains this indicator,
which diers signicantly from Figure 13. The low-mean indicator also has local maxima in
1994 and 1998 as expected, but now there is a stronger peak around 2002, largely due to
Equity Market Neutral, Global Macro, and Long/Short Equity. This corresponds remarkably
well to the common wisdom that over the past two years, these three strategy classes have
underperformed for a variety of reasons.55 Therefore, this measure may capture more of the
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Figure 14: Aggregate hedge-fund risk indicator: sum of monthly regime-switching model
estimates of the probability of being in the low-mean state for 11 CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund
indexes (Convertible Arbitrage; Emerging Markets; Equity Market Neutral; Event Driven;
Distressed; Even-Driven Multi-Strategy; Risk Arbitrage; Fixed-Income Arbitrage; Global
Macro; Long/Short Equity; and Multi-Strategy), from January 1994 to August 2004 .
55Large fund 
ows into these strategies and changes in equity markets such as decimalization, the rise of
ECN's, automated trading, and Regulation FD are often cited as reasons for the decreased protability of
these strategies.
967 The Current Outlook
A conclusive assessment of the systemic risks posed by hedge funds requires certain data that
is currently unavailable, and is unlikely to become available in the near future, i.e., counter-
party credit exposures, the net degree of leverage of hedge-fund managers and investors,
the gross amount of structured products involving hedge funds, etc. Therefore, we cannot
determine the magnitude of current systemic risk exposures with any degree of accuracy.
However, based on the analytics developed in this study, there are a few tentative inferences
that we can draw.
1. The hedge-fund industry has grown tremendously over the last few years, fueled by the
demand for higher returns in the face of stock-market declines and mounting pension-
fund liabilities. These massive fund in
ows have had a material impact on hedge-fund
returns and risks in recent years, as evidenced by changes in correlations, reduced
performance, increased illiquidity as measured by the weighted autocorrelation 
t, and
increased mean and median liquidation probabilities for hedge funds in 2004.
2. The banking sector is exposed to hedge-fund risks, especially smaller institutions, but
the largest banks are also exposed through proprietary trading activities, credit ar-
rangements and structured products, and prime brokerage services.
3. The risks facing hedge funds are nonlinear and more complex than those facing tradi-
tional asset classes. Because of the dynamic nature of hedge-fund investment strategies,
and the impact of fund 
ows on leverage and performance, hedge-fund risk models re-
quire more sophisticated analytics, and more sophisticated users.
4. The sum of our regime-switching models' high-volatility or low-mean state probabil-
ities is one proxy for the aggregate level of distress in the hedge-fund sector. Recent
measurements suggest that we may be entering a challenging period. This, coupled
with the recent uptrend in the weighted autocorrelation 
t, and the increased mean and
median liquidation probabilities for hedge funds in 2004 from our logit model implies
that systemic risk is increasing.
We hasten to qualify our tentative conclusions by emphasizing the speculative nature of
these inferences, and hope that our analysis spurs additional research and data collection to
rene both the analytics and the empirical measurement of systemic risk in the hedge-fund
industry.
97A Appendix
This appendix contains the TASS category denitions in Section A.1 and some of the more
technical aspects of the integrated hedge-fund investment process in Section A.2.
A.1 TASS Category Denitions
The following is a list of category descriptions, taken directly from TASS documentation,
that dene the criteria used by TASS in assigning funds in their database to one of 11
possible categories:
Convertible Arbitrage This strategy is identied by hedge investing in the convertible securities of a
company. A typical investment is to be long the convertible bond and short the common stock of the
same company. Positions are designed to generate prots from the xed income security as well as
the short sale of stock, while protecting principal from market moves.
Dedicated Shortseller Dedicated short sellers were once a robust category of hedge funds before the long
bull market rendered the strategy dicult to implement. A new category, short biased, has emerged.
The strategy is to maintain net short as opposed to pure short exposure. Short biased managers take
short positions in mostly equities and derivatives. The short bias of a manager's portfolio must be
constantly greater than zero to be classied in this category.
Emerging Markets This strategy involves equity or xed income investing in emerging markets around
the world. Because many emerging markets do not allow short selling, nor oer viable futures or
other derivative products with which to hedge, emerging market investing often employs a long-only
strategy.
Equity Market Neutral This investment strategy is designed to exploit equity market ineciencies and
usually involves being simultaneously long and short matched equity portfolios of the same size within
a country. Market neutral portfolios are designed to be either beta or currency neutral, or both. Well-
designed portfolios typically control for industry, sector, market capitalization, and other exposures.
Leverage is often applied to enhance returns.
Event Driven This strategy is dened as `special situations' investing designed to capture price movement
generated by a signicant pending corporate event such as a merger, corporate restructuring, liquida-
tion, bankruptcy or reorganization. There are three popular sub-categories in event-driven strategies:
risk (merger) arbitrage, distressed/high yield securities, and Regulation D.
Fixed Income Arbitrage The xed income arbitrageur aims to prot from price anomalies between re-
lated interest rate securities. Most managers trade globally with a goal of generating steady returns
with low volatility. This category includes interest rate swap arbitrage, U.S. and non-U.S. govern-
ment bond arbitrage, forward yield curve arbitrage, and mortgage-backed securities arbitrage. The
mortgage-backed market is primarily U.S.-based, over-the-counter and particularly complex.
Global Macro Global macro managers carry long and short positions in any of the world's major capital
or derivative markets. These positions re
ect their views on overall market direction as in
uenced
by major economic trends and/or events. The portfolios of these funds can include stocks, bonds,
currencies, and commodities in the form of cash or derivatives instruments. Most funds invest globally
in both developed and emerging markets.
98Long/Short Equity This directional strategy involves equity-oriented investing on both the long and short
sides of the market. The objective is not to be market neutral. Managers have the ability to shift from
value to growth, from small to medium to large capitalization stocks, and from a net long position
to a net short position. Managers may use futures and options to hedge. The focus may be regional,
such as long/short U.S. or European equity, or sector specic, such as long and short technology or
healthcare stocks. Long/short equity funds tend to build and hold portfolios that are substantially
more concentrated than those of traditional stock funds.
Managed Futures This strategy invests in listed nancial and commodity futures markets and currency
markets around the world. The managers are usually referred to as Commodity Trading Advisors, or
CTAs. Trading disciplines are generally systematic or discretionary. Systematic traders tend to use
price and market specic information (often technical) to make trading decisions, while discretionary
managers use a judgmental approach.
Multi-Strategy The funds in this category are characterized by their ability to dynamically allocate capital
among strategies falling within several traditional hedge fund disciplines. The use of many strategies,
and the ability to reallocate capital between them in response to market opportunities, means that
such funds are not easily assigned to any traditional category.
The Multi-Strategy category also includes funds employing unique strategies that do not fall under
any of the other descriptions.
Fund of Funds A `Multi Manager' fund will employ the services of two or more trading advisors or Hedge
Funds who will be allocated cash by the Trading Manager to trade on behalf of the fund.
A.2 Constrained Optimization
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99which yields the following rst-order conditions:
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